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Summary 
South African courts seem to be adopting a new approach to the problem of building 
encroachments. For pragmatic and policy reasons courts are now inclined to 
exercise its discretion in favour of leaving building encroachments in place, against 
compensation, despite the common law right to demand removal. It has been widely 
accepted that courts indeed have the discretion to award damages instead of 
removal of the building encroachment. However, the circumstances involved and the 
consequences of these orders are uncertain and hence these orders result in 
confusion. It is unclear how this discretion is exercised. Furthermore, it is uncertain 
whether this discretion includes the power to order transfer of the encroached-upon 
land to the encroacher. There are doctrinal and constitutional implications that may 
be triggered by these court orders that leave building encroachments in place. The 
doctrinal issues centre on what happens when an encroachment is not removed and 
nothing is said about the rights of the respective parties after the order is made. 
Possible solutions are investigated to provide a doctrinally sound outcome in 
encroachment disputes. It is clear that the encroacher is allowed to continue 
occupying the portion of property on which the encroachment is erected. It seems as 
though a use right is indirectly created when the encroachment remains in place. 
The constitutional difficulty lies in the fact that the court orders may result in 
infringements that conflict with section 25 of the Constitution. The focus is 
specifically to determine whether these orders result in the compulsory loss of 
property or property rights. 
 
With reference to Germany, the Netherlands and Australia, a comparative 
perspective is provided in order to support the doctrinal and policy arguments. The 
comparative law provides a source of guidelines for what may work effectively and 
informs the ultimate suggestion of this project, namely the need for legislation to 
regulate building encroachments in South Africa. The legislation envisaged would 
have to prescribe with at least some sort of certainty how and in which 
circumstances the discretion should be exercised. It should also provide clarity with 
regard to the right that is created when the encroachment is not removed and how 
the compensation that is awarded in exchange for removal, should be determined. 
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The unnecessary confusion and uncertainty that result from court orders made in the 
context of building encroachments may be cleared up by legislation. 
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Opsomming 
Suid Afrikaanse howe begin al hoe meer om ‘n nuwe benadering te volg ten opsigte 
van oorskrydende bouwerke. Dit lyk asof howe meer geneig is om hul diskresie uit te 
oefen ten gunste daarvan om die oorskryding vir pragmatiese en beleidsredes teen 
vergoeding in stand te hou, ten spyte van die gemeenregtelike reg om verwydering 
te eis. Daar word algemeen aanvaar dat howe wel die diskresie het om in die 
konteks van oorskrydende bouwerke skadevergoeding toe te ken in plaas van 
verwydering. Die omstandighede betrokke by en die nagevolge van hierdie 
beslissings is egter onseker en daarom lei dit tot verwarring. Dit is nie altyd duidelik 
hoe hierdie diskresie uitgeoefen word nie. Daarbenewens is daar ook onsekerheid 
oor of die diskresie die bevoegdheid insluit om oordrag van die grond waarop die 
oorsrkryding staan, te gelas. Die beslissings kan ook doktrinêre en grondwetlike 
implikasies hê. In terme van die doktrinêre probleem is daar vrae oor wat gebeur as 
die oorskryding nie verwyder word nie en niks word gesê oor die regte van beide 
partye in die dispuut nie. Oplossings word ondersoek om die beste moontlike 
doktrinêre verduideliking te probeer vasstel. Die eienaar van die oorskrydende 
bouwerk mag voortgaan om die grond waarop die oorskryding staan te okkupeer. Dit 
lyk asof ‘n gebruiksreg indirek geskep word ten gunste van die oorskryder wanneer 
die oorskryding nie verwyder word nie. ‘n Grondwetlike probleem mag veroorsaak 
word deur die moontlike oortreding van artikel 25 van die Grondwet. Die beslissings 
mag lei tot die gedwonge verlies van grond of regte, wat aan die vereistes van artikel 
25 moet voldoen. 
 
‘n Vergelykende perspektief met verwysing na Duitsland, Nederland en Australië 
word verskaf om die doktrinêre en beleidsargumente te ondersteun. Die 
vergelykende reg bied ‘n bron van riglyne vir wat effektief kan werk en het dus die 
wetgewing wat in hierdie proefskrif voorgestel word geïnspireer. Die wetgewing wat 
beoog word sal moet voorskryf hoe en onder watter omstanghede die diskresie 
uitgeoefen moet word. Dit moet ook sekerheid gee ten opsigte van die reg wat 
geskep word as die oorskryding nie verwyder word nie en hoe die skadevergoeding 
bepaal moet word. Die onnodige verwaring en onsekerheid wat veroorsaak word 
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deur hierdie hofbeslissings kan opgeklaar word deur die promulgering van 
wetgewing om oorskrydende bouwerke te reguleer. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to the research problem 
In the most recent case dealing with encroachments in South Africa, the Eastern 
Cape High Court had to decide whether it had the discretion to refuse an interdict for 
the removal of an encroachment.1 In Phillips v South African National Parks Board2 a 
fence was erected on the property of the applicants, instead of on the cadastral 
boundary between the properties of the applicants and the respondents. It resulted in 
a substantial portion of the applicant’s property (the SANParks portion) being 
incorporated as part of the respondent’s land. 
 
The applicant sought an interdict to compel the respondent to remove the fence and 
relocate it to the cadastral boundary or onto the respondent’s property. Four 
defences were raised against the application. In the first instance, the respondent 
argued that it had purchased the SANParks portion from the applicant’s predecessor 
in title (Van Rooyen). The second defence was that the applicant had been aware of 
the agreement between Van Rooyen and the respondent and was therefore bound 
by the agreement. Thirdly, the respondent argued that fairness dictates that the 
encroachment should remain in place. In terms of the fourth defence, the respondent 
claimed a declaratory order in terms of which the applicant would be entitled to 
damages instead of removal and that the respondent is entitled to the transfer of the 
SANParks portion of the applicant’s property.3 
 
The court considered these defences raised by the respondent. It transpired that 
there had initially been an agreement between Van Rooyen and the respondent for 
the sale of the SANParks portion; however the agreement was cancelled and the 
sale never took place. As a result of the inadequate proof of the sale, the court 
                                                 
1
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010]. 
2
  (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010]. 
3
  The respondent had also claimed a fifth defence, namely that the court does not have 
jurisdiction concerning the dispute because the dispute falls to be determined in terms of s 29 of the 
second Schedule of the Fencing Act 31 of 1963. See Phillips v South African National Parks Board 
(4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] par 3. 
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rejected the contention that the fence was there lawfully or that the SANParks 
portion of the applicant’s property was sold to the respondents. Consequently, the 
court had to determine whether the fence that resulted in an encroachment should 
be removed or remain in place. 
 
The court confirmed that it had the discretion to deny a demolition order in the 
context of encroachments constructed on the land of another.4 It relied on Rand 
Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander (“Rand Waterraad”)5 and Trustees, Brian Lackey 
Trust v Annandale (“Brian Lackey Trust”)6 to assume the discretion to refuse an 
interdict even where the applicant has a clear right to removal of an encroachment.7 
During the last decade since the decision of Rand Waterraad it seems as though the 
courts are now, in line with the global trend in this area of law, more inclined to order 
that the encroaching structures remain intact and that the encroaching landowner 
pay compensation to the affected landowner instead of removal. In other words, it 
seems as if the inclination in the case of building encroachments is towards 
compensatory awards instead of injunctions or demolition orders. The Rand 
Waterraad decision provided authority for the existence of this discretion of the court, 
which is deemed to be wide and equitable and dependent on the circumstances in 
the particular case.8 
 
In the case of Brian Lackey Trust,9 the Cape High Court decided against the 
established tradition of enforcing the landowner’s common law right to demand 
removal of a building encroachment.10 It found that a building encroachment 
covering 80 percent of an adjacent neighbour’s property should remain in place and 
that the encroaching owner should pay compensation to the affected landowner in 
lieu of demolishing the encroachment. In terms of the South African common law, in 
the case where a building is erected on the land of another, the affected landowner 
                                                 
4
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
par 21. 
5
  1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
6
  2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
7
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
par 21. 
8
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 130-138. 
9
  2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
10
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
3 
 
can demand that the encroaching structure be removed. This is traditionally said to 
be the default remedy in the case of encroachment by building.11 This remedy is 
essentially based on the right to prevent interference with the use and enjoyment of 
one’s property. Therefore, a landowner is entitled, upon becoming aware of the 
encroachment, to demand removal thereof. However, the Brian Lackey Trust 
decision shows that a court has the discretion (in as yet undefined instances) to 
award compensation instead of removal. 
 
The court in Phillips relied on Rand Waterraad and Brian Lackey Trust to 
substantiate the view that the discretion can be exercised despite there being a clear 
right to removal of an encroachment.12 The court then proceeded to determine 
whether the discretion should be exercised in the particular case. It balanced the 
prejudice for both parties in the dispute by considering the loss that would be 
suffered by the affected landowner if the encroachment remained intact and the loss 
for the encroacher if the fence would be removed and placed on the cadastral 
boundary. It was clear from the outset that the affected landowner was not willing to 
buy the land from his predecessor in title if the SANParks portion was not part of it; 
therefore, he valued the SANParks portion very highly. On the other hand, the 
respondent contended that moving the fence to the cadastral boundary would be 
costly, inexpedient and impractical. After a careful balancing of the interests of both 
parties the court concluded that the encroachment should be removed. The reason 
for this is because the balancing of interests favoured the affected landowner in this 
case.13 The court found that there would not be a disproportionality of prejudice if the 
encroachment were taken down and moved to the cadastral boundary. It stated that 
if the encroachment remained in place, there would not be a compelling reason to 
justify the deprivation that would result. Therefore, it would have the effect of a 
                                                 
11
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 202; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 121; JRL Milton “The law of neighbours in 
SA” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-244 at 237; CG van der Merwe & JB Cilliers “The ‘year and a day rule’ in 
South African law: Do our courts have a discretion to order damages instead of removal in the case of 
structural encroachments on neighbouring land?” (1994) 57 THRHR 587-593 at 588. See s 2.5.1 in 
chap 2 below. 
12
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
par 21. 
13
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
par 51. 
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forced sale of land which would not be justified.14 However in the end, the court 
dismissed the claim and eventually decided the case based on the fact that the 
respondent could not prove that its prejudice or other reasons for not demolishing 
the encroachment was stronger than the prejudice the applicant would suffer if it 
were left intact. Therefore, the court ordered removal of the encroachment. 
 
This case is interesting for a number of reasons. The discretion was exercised by 
balancing the interests of both parties in order to determine which outcome would be 
the most appropriate in the particular case. The court ordered that the encroachment 
should be removed. No mention was made of the rights of the respective parties if 
removal were denied; it was unnecessary to discuss the rights of the parties because 
removal was in fact ordered. In this respect the decision simply followed the earlier 
authorities in Rand Waterraad and Brian Lackey Trust; assuming that it had a wide 
discretion and exercising that discretion by deciding the matter purely on the basis of 
the balance of prejudice. 
 
Another interesting aspect of the Phillips case is the fact that the respondent in this 
case argued that if the court allowed the encroachment to remain in place, it should 
also make an order for the transfer of ownership of the SANParks portion to the 
respondent. The court actually considered the possibility of ordering transfer of the 
land to the affected landowner, but decided against it in this case.15 It recognised 
that ordering transfer of ownership of the SANParks portion would constitute a 
deprivation in terms of section 25 of the Constitution. However, the possible 
constitutional problem that would have been created by an order for transfer of the 
affected land did not arise because the encroachment was removed. It should be 
noted, though, that the court decided against the transfer order purely on the basis of 
the balance of prejudice and not on any constitutional or doctrinal principle. 
 
                                                 
14
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
par 51. 
15
  For a discussion of the extent of the courts discretion in the context of building 
encroachments, see s 3.6 in chap 3 below. 
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The Phillips case provides the most recent illustration of many of the key issues 
relating to encroachments. It shows that the courts assume the existence of a wide 
discretion, how the discretion is exercised by South African courts in the context of 
encroachments and what the constitutional implications may be if an encroachment 
is not removed. It also highlights the fact that courts fail to mention what the doctrinal 
implications may be when an encroachment is not removed. These are some of the 
aspects that will be addressed in subsequent chapters. 
 
1.2 Outline of the research problem and hypothesis 
1.2.1 Outline of research problem 
This research project explores the circumstances involved and consequences of an 
order of court allowing building encroachments to remain intact in exchange for the 
payment of compensation. The main aim of the dissertation will be to highlight some 
of the issues that result from these court orders made in the context of building 
encroachments. I believe that what the courts are doing is developing the common 
law, without clearly substantiating the reasons or exploring the extent and 
consequences of the developments they are introducing. For pragmatic and policy 
reasons courts are beginning to adopt a different approach to the problem of building 
encroachments in South Africa, consequently denying the idea of an absolute right to 
demand removal of the encroachment in all instances. However, this new approach 
is not clearly explained and it leaves room for confusion. 
 
It has been widely accepted that courts indeed have the discretion to award 
damages instead of removal of the building encroachment.16 However, it seems 
unclear in exactly which cases a court would award compensation instead of 
removal and what the consequences of such an order are. There are a number of 
interrelated questions concerning the discretion of the courts to award compensation 
                                                 
16
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 202; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 121; JRL Milton “The law of neighbours in 
SA” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-244 at 237; CG van der Merwe & JB Cilliers “The ‘year and a day rule’ in 
South African law: Do our courts have a discretion to order damages instead of removal in the case of 
structural encroachments on neighbouring land?” (1994) 57 THRHR 587-593 at 588; Pike v Hamilton 
(1853-1856) 2 Searle 191; Wade v Paruk (1904) 25 NLR 219; Smith v Basson 1979 (1) SA 559 (W); 
Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
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instead of removal. Many of these issues have been raised by a number of authors 
and have come up in numerous cases dealing with encroachments, but so far they 
have not been adequately discussed or answered. The questions include whether 
the discretion to replace removal with compensation does exist in the context of 
encroachment by building in South Africa; in which cases courts should be willing to 
deviate from the traditional, long-standing remedy of removal of an encroaching 
structure; whether the size of the encroachment does (or should) play a role in the 
determination of whether to allow demolition or not; and what exactly the extent of 
the discretion of the courts is in this regard. If this discretion includes transfer of 
property to the encroaching owner, the authority for such an order needs to be 
determined. Case law has highlighted the issue, but so far has failed to remove the 
uncertainty regarding whether the court also has the discretion to order that the 
encroached-upon land be transferred to the encroaching landowner. Furthermore, 
the courts have so far refrained from explaining what the nature of the parties’ rights 
in the affected land are if the encroachment is not demolished and if the encroacher 
remains in possession of the encroachment. All these questions pertaining to the 
discretion of the court in the context of building encroachment cases are addressed 
in this dissertation. 
 
When courts exercise their discretion in favour of leaving the building encroachment 
intact, this is contrary to the default remedy of removal. Courts focus predominantly 
on balancing the interests of the encroaching landowner with the interests of the 
owner affected by the encroachment. It seems as if courts are more reluctant to 
allow the remedy of removal of the encroaching building if removal would be 
excessively burdensome for the encroacher, more so than it would be for the 
affected landowner if the encroachment remained in place. In these instances the 
discretion would be exercised in favour of the encroacher, and the encroachment will 
remain in place. The policy and equity grounds cited for this discretionary choice 
seem convincing, at least in some cases, but it needs to be determined what the 
legal implications (both doctrinal and constitutional) are of not ordering removal of 
the encroaching structures. 
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After a court order is made where the court opts for a compensation award instead of 
removal, the biggest concern relates to the consequences of the order. Apart from 
not ordering demolition of an encroaching building, the effect that the order has for 
the respective parties becomes problematic. In the absence of an explanation of 
what happens when the encroachment is not removed, there are doctrinal 
implications that may be triggered. 
 
The court order could have the effect of changing the law of accession quite 
dramatically. When the court refuses to order removal of the encroachment, the legal 
situation regarding ownership of the affected land and ownership of the encroaching 
building becomes unclear. The result, namely that one person apparently owns the 
land and another person owns or may occupy the structure that extends over it, is 
quite foreign to the basic principles of South African law. I consider this problem with 
reference to the law of accession, with the aim of finding an explanation for what 
happens doctrinally when the encroaching structure is not removed. The most 
important questions in this regard are firstly whether the order to leave the 
encroachment in place results in a limited real right or other use right being 
established over the affected land, and secondly how this result can be explained 
doctrinally in the absence of an agreement between the parties. 
 
There may also be constitutional implications. For one thing, the question arises 
whether the encroacher can acquire ownership of the encroached-upon land without 
buying it from the affected landowner. It is unclear whether the order automatically 
results in the encroached-upon land being transferred to the encroaching owner or 
whether the court could explicitly order such a transfer. As the matter stands it looks 
as if such an automatic transfer of the land does not and cannot take place. A 
second possibility is that the court can order that the encroaching owner must take 
transfer of the encroached-upon land. Van der Merwe writes that if a court deems it 
equitable it may grant that the portion of land on which the encroachment is erected 
be transferred to the encroaching owner.17 However, there seems to be no authority 
in either common law or legislation that provides for such a power. In either case, it 
                                                 
17
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 202-203. 
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needs to be determined whether this result, which involves involuntary loss of 
ownership of land, could have implications in terms of section 25 of the Constitution. 
This study will specifically focus on the question whether the order results in the 
compulsory loss of property or property rights, especially in cases where the 
encroachment is extensive and causes a serious limitation on the affected 
landowner’s property rights. The possible deprivation of property suffered as a result 
of these court orders needs to comply with section 25 of the Constitution.18 With 
regard to section 25(1), it needs to be considered whether the loss results in an 
arbitrary deprivation of property.19 In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Minister of Finance (“FNB”),20 the Constitutional Court held that a deprivation of 
property is arbitrary when there is insufficient reason for it or if it is procedurally 
unfair.21 The question in the context of encroachment by building will be whether the 
policy and pragmatic reasons forwarded for decisions such as Rand Waterraad and 
Brian Lackey Trust is sufficient to justify the deprivation that results from the 
encroachment being left in place. This question is particularly serious when the nett 
result is that the affected landowner loses property or property rights as a result of 
the continued existence of the encroachment. Furthermore, the alternative relied on 
by the courts, namely payment of compensation, creates the illusion that this may be 
an expropriation. Therefore, I consider whether an expropriation results when a 
building encroachment is left in place against compensation, because if it does the 
expropriation would have to comply with section 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution.22 
 
A comparative analysis of foreign cases and legislation on this topic is undertaken to 
support the doctrinal and policy arguments. The German, Dutch and Australian 
approaches to the problem of building encroachments will be discussed in order to 
determine how these jurisdictions deal with the particular issue. In view of the 
comparative analysis I evaluate whether it will be feasible to adopt a similar 
                                                 
18
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25. 
19
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(1). 
20
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
21
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 100. 
22
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(2) and (3). 
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approach in South Africa or to refine the South African approach with reference to 
these foreign sources. 
 
1.2.2 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this research project is that the current trend in the way that courts 
deal with the problem of encroachments causes uncertainty and may in some cases 
be unconstitutional. Therefore, the law needs to be developed. It might well be 
necessary to consider the possibility of proposing legislation to solve the problem 
with building encroachments in South African law. South African courts should 
approach the issue with caution until such time as legislation is enacted to bring 
clarity as to how building encroachments should effectively be dealt with. In cases 
where the encroachment is extensive and could possibly lead to a compulsory 
transfer of property, there needs to be proper authority for it. It will become clear that 
in some cases it may be necessary or justified to leave even large building 
encroachments in place; however, in these instances there should be adequate 
policy considerations to justify the decision. It should also be clear what happens 
doctrinally in these cases and due consideration needs to be given to section 25 of 
the Constitution which proscribes arbitrary deprivation of property. 
 
1.3 Overview of chapters 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters, this one being the introduction and 
chapter seven being the conclusion. In the following chapter (chapter two) I provide 
an introduction to the law regulating building encroachments in South Africa. As a 
starting point I consider the effect that a building encroachment has on the 
ownership rights of the affected landowner. Thereafter, I look at the application of the 
default remedy of removal in early South African case law. This is especially relevant 
in light of the recent tendency of South African courts not to accept the right of the 
owner to demand removal in all instances. The origins of the remedy of removal and 
the possible defences against this remedy are also examined. A brief historical study 
gives an indication of the remedies and rules that were applicable in terms of Roman 
and Roman-Dutch law in the case of encroachment by building. The remedy of 
removal has its historical origins in Roman law; therefore, I analyse how the remedy 
10 
 
of removal was applied in terms of Roman law. The remedy was mitigated in 
Roman-Dutch law by the defence of the year and a day rule. In terms of Roman-
Dutch law, the year and a day rule formed an important stumbling block against the 
affected landowner’s right to claim removal of building encroachments because it 
allowed for certain instances where removal would be denied. After the rejection of 
the year and a day rule by South African courts, courts became more concerned with 
the question whether they had the discretion to award compensation instead of 
removal of an encroaching structure. Therefore, the question concerning the 
discretion of the courts in the context of building encroachments is discussed in 
chapter three. 
 
Chapter three focuses specifically on the discretion of courts to award compensation 
instead of removal of an encroachment. There are three questions that are 
addressed in chapter three. In the first instance, it is important to determine whether 
South African courts have the discretion to leave building encroachments in place 
and award compensation instead. South African courts seemed inclined to rely on 
English law principles for the exercise of the discretion to replace injunctive relief 
with compensation. A comprehensive study of English private law pertaining 
specifically to building encroachments is undertaken in order to determine how 
English law deals with the problem. The differences between South African and 
English law on this topic are analysed in chapter three to determine whether it is in 
fact possible to use these principles as South African courts have done. Courts have 
also used neighbour law principles as an argument for exercising the discretion in 
favour of leaving encroachments in place. Therefore, it is necessary to consider this 
argument. Another argument for the way in which encroachment cases have been 
decided lately is the law and economics perspective. The law and economics 
argument helps to explain why it may be necessary in some cases to prefer liability 
rules (i e damages) instead of property rules (i e removal). Consequently, the law 
and economics argument is also investigated in chapter three. 
 
The second question that I evaluate in chapter three is the circumstances that are 
appropriate for the exercise of this discretion. In order to answer this question, I 
11 
 
analyse case law in which the discretion was exercised either in favour of removal or 
in favour of leaving the encroachment in place. Finally, I investigate the extent of the 
courts’ discretion. Here, it needs to be determined whether the courts’ discretion 
includes the power to order transfer of the encroached-upon land to the encroacher. 
In any event, if the discretion is exercised in favour of leaving a building 
encroachment in place, the effect of the order should be clear. The result needs to 
be explained in a doctrinally satisfactory way, considering the normal rules of 
accession. This aspect is considered in chapter four. 
 
Chapter four comprises a discussion of the doctrinal implications of the new 
approach to the problem of building encroachments in South Africa. I focus on what 
happens when courts exercise their discretion and deny the default remedy of 
removal without saying anything about the rights of the parties in the dispute. It is 
clear that the encroacher is allowed to continue occupying the part of the affected 
landowner’s property on which the encroachment is erected. The effect is apparently 
that one person owns the land and another person owns or is allowed to occupy the 
buildings erected on the land. I critically assess why courts take no cognisance of the 
principle of attachment when an encroachment has occurred. Generally, the principle 
of accession (specifically inaedificatio) governs the situation where buildings are 
erected on land. Therefore, in chapter four the question is raised why accession 
does not seem to occur in the case of encroachment by building. Additionally, in 
chapter four I consider the rights of the respective parties when the court says 
nothing about what the encroacher gains or the affected landowner loses when the 
encroachment remains in place. I argue that it is imperative to find doctrinal solutions 
to some of the uncertainties that exist when the court orders that a building 
encroachment should remain in place. Besides the doctrinal uncertainty, there may 
also be constitutional implications of these court orders. These implications are 
addressed in chapter five. 
 
In chapter five the possible constitutional consequences of denying demolition orders 
are analysed. The main aim of the chapter is to determine whether the loss suffered 
as a result of the court orders leaving building encroachments intact complies with 
12 
 
section 25 of the Constitution.23 I distinguish three outcomes that may result in 
building encroachment disputes and consider the question whether these outcomes 
amount to a deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.24 If it 
does amount to a deprivation, I inquire whether the deprivation in the particular 
outcome can be justified. I also determine whether the deprivation amounts to 
expropriation that needs to comply with section 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution.25 
 
In chapter six I undertake a comparative analysis to investigate the Australian, 
German and Dutch approaches to the problem of building encroachments. The 
Australian Encroachment of Buildings Act26 clearly sets out which factors are taken 
into consideration in determining whether compensation should be paid instead of 
removal, how the amount of compensation should be determined, what order the 
court may make and, more importantly, what the consequences of such an order 
would be for both landowners affected by the encroachment. This is helpful in order 
to establish how an encroachment statute might look. Both the German and Dutch 
civil codes provide for the course of action that should be followed in the case of 
building encroachments. In terms of German law, if an encroachment is erected and 
it was not erected due to intentional or negligent behaviour on the part of the 
encroaching neighbour, or if the affected landowner did not protest immediately after 
the erection of the encroachment, the affected landowner has a duty to tolerate the 
encroachment.27 The German solution leaves room for the landowner receiving a 
kind of rent for as long as the encroachment is not removed, and the possibility is 
created for the affected landowner to agree to transfer of the affected land. This 
means that the encroachment remains in place, and the affected landowner receives 
compensation in respect of the loss suffered as a result of the encroachment.28 
According to the Dutch approach, if someone erects a building structure on the 
property of another, the affected landowner is precluded from abusing his/her right to 
insist on removal of the encroachment in all cases. The abuse of right argument is 
used to counter unjust results which would cause greater harm or loss for the builder 
                                                 
23
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25. 
24
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(1). 
25
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(2) and (3). 
26
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW). 
27
  BGB § 912. 
28
  BGB § 912, 913. 
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as it would for the affected landowner.29 In the same way as the German law, the 
option to transfer ownership of the land to the encroaching owner rests with the 
affected landowner and not the encroacher or the courts. These two jurisdictions 
provide clarity in terms of some of the issues in the context of building 
encroachments in South Africa. Therefore, I look to German and Dutch law in order 
to try and find a solution to the doctrinal and constitutional uncertainties that exist 
with regard to building encroachments in South Africa. 
 
In the final chapter, I conclude by emphasising the need for legislation in South 
African law in order to clarify some of the unclear aspects of South African law 
regulating building encroachments. This chapter investigates the possibility of 
proposing new legislation in light of the comparative analysis in Chapter 3 (English 
law) and Chapter 5 (German, Dutch and Australian law). I use the comparative 
analysis as a source of guidelines for what may work effectively in South African law. 
I argue that the proposed encroachment legislation (if the current approach is 
refined) must provide for at least the following: 
• Factors that are taken into consideration in the determination of the award of 
compensation instead of removal. 
• How the amount of compensation should be awarded. This should essentially 
depend on whether the order is for transfer of the encroached-upon land or 
whether the compensation is for the use of the land on which the 
encroachment is erected. 
• The rights of the respective parties if removal is denied. It should be clear 
whether (and what kind of) a use right is created in favour of the encroacher 
when demolition is denied. 
• The possibility of transferring the affected land to the encroacher. It should be 
clear from the legislation whether the court has the power to order that the 
encroached-upon land be transferred to the encroacher. 
I also look at the possibility of suggesting legislation that is different to the status quo 
in South Africa, for example legislation inspired by German law, where the point of 
                                                 
29
  BW 5:54. 
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departure is tolerance of the encroachment. Either of these types of legislation may 
help to provide clarity in terms of issues addressed. With the above in mind, I try and 
provide a framework for how such legislation might look, using the uncertainty 
highlighted in the dissertation as indications of how the law regulating building 
encroachment may be improved. 
 
1.4 Qualifications 
As a start to this dissertation (in chapter two) I provide an introduction to the law 
regulating building encroachments in South Africa. Although I do look at the historical 
origins of the remedy of removal, it will not be necessary to provide an in-depth 
historical analysis of the Roman and Roman-Dutch law regulating building 
encroachments. Historical analysis of this nature falls outside the scope of this 
research project. The brief historical analysis that is undertaken is merely intended to 
show that the remedy of removal in South Africa has its historical origins in Roman 
law and that removal was also the default remedy in Roman law. 
 
I include a comparative analysis in chapter six with the aim of identifying solutions to 
some of the uncertainties that may result in the context of building encroachments in 
South Africa. The jurisdictions that I selected are Australia, Germany and the 
Netherlands. The main aim is to see whether these jurisdictions can help to explain 
how courts are deciding building encroachment cases in South Africa and what 
happens when building encroachments are not demolished in terms of the default 
remedy of removal. 
 
I chose Australia because the Encroachment of Buildings Act30 (New South Wales 
legislation), provides a good example of how an encroachment statute might look. 
This may be helpful considering that the underlying assumption of this research 
project is that legislation is required in South Africa to reduce the uncertainty 
regarding encroachment by building. 
 
                                                 
30
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW). 
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German and Dutch law were chosen as suitable comparative jurisdictions because 
both jurisdictions offer interesting solutions to the doctrinal issues that may be 
prevalent in the South African context. Therefore, I predict that both these 
jurisdictions may provide useful insights into the doctrinal uncertainty and possible 
constitutional infringement that may result when building encroachments are not 
demolished in terms of the default remedy of removal in South Africa. 
 
It is not my intention in this dissertation to include a discussion of third-party liability. 
In other words, I recognise that sometimes there could be the likelihood of liability on 
the part of the architect for not ensuring that the building was in the correct position 
or the local authority for not ensuring that building regulations or title conditions 
regarding building lines were adhered to. The intention is not to include this type of 
third-party liability issues in the discussion. Therefore, this issue is not included in my 
research. 
 
In this dissertation I specifically focus on certain aspects of the law regulating 
building encroachments in South Africa. I have narrowed down the topic area (as far 
as possible) to building encroachments. However, there are some instances where 
for explanatory and definitional purposes it may be necessary to refer to cases 
dealing not only with building encroachments, but with encroachments in general, for 
example fences or trees.31 However, the main focus is on highlighting some of the 
aspects of building encroachments that are simply unclear, that may cause further 
consequences and should perhaps be reconsidered. The argument is that courts are 
not giving enough consideration when decisions are made to leave building 
encroachments in place and the consequence is that the result is not explained and 
justified adequately. Recognition of the problems identified in this research project 
may ensure that unnecessary confusion and uncertainty is reduced.
                                                 
31
  An example of this would be the recent unreported case of Phillips v South African National 
Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010], which dealt with the encroachment of a 
predator fence erected on the land of the applicant. The erection of the fence resulted in a substantial 
portion of the applicant’s property being incorporated as part of the respondent’s land. Many of the 
aspects of the case are imperative for this study and will therefore be discussed, although it concerns 
the encroachment of a fence. See chaps 3, 5 and 7 below. 
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Chapter 2: An introduction to the law 
regulating building encroachments in South 
African law 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In South African law, ownership of land generally assures the holder of the right 
undisturbed use and enjoyment of his land. However, there may be certain 
restrictions, either in terms of private or public law, that limit ownership.1 A question 
that has been under investigation on numerous occasions is: How much value can a 
landowner really attach to his title of “ownership”? Courts are continuously faced with 
difficult decisions that could cause serious inroads on ownership, and this makes the 
way that courts view ownership very important.2 
 
A landlord (owner) is precluded from simply evicting his tenant who refuses to leave 
after the termination of the lease period.3 Similarly, in a squatter situation, precaution 
has to be taken when eviction proceedings are set in motion.4 In these instances 
                                                 
1
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 173; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 91; Johannesburg Municipal Council v 
Rand Townships Registrar 1910 TPD 1314 at 1319; Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 
102 (A) at 106-107; Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) at 1120. 
2
  PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 
2006) 94. 
3
  In terms of the common law, a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant who refuses to vacate 
after the termination of the lease (the “holding over” situation). The Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 
limits the landlord’s common law right to terminate the lease and introduces “circumstances which the 
legislature intended to be legally relevant to the question of the eviction of a tenant from his or her 
home and changes the circumstances under which a landlord could lawfully evict a tenant”. See PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 429; 
AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 114-130 at 124-130. The principal statute that 
protects unlawful occupiers against eviction is the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”). Van der Walt states that a major question in landlord-
tenant eviction cases is whether a landlord can institute proceedings in terms of s 4 of PIE rather than 
the common law. He notes that this matter was finally settled by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Ndlovu v Ngcobo/Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) in which the court established that anti-
eviction proceedings did apply to tenants holding over. This position regarding the applicability of PIE 
to tenants holding over was confirmed in the recent case of The Occupiers, Shulana Court, 11 
Hendon Road, Yeoville, Johannesburg v Steele (102/09) [2010] ZASCA 28 (25 March 2010). 
4
  PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 
2006) 652; AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) chap 5. Eviction of unlawful occupiers 
must take place in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
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there are limitations on ownership imposed by legislation. This may result in 
questions concerning what ownership means for the landowners involved and what 
protection it offers. It seems to be inevitable that in some cases limitations on 
ownership are necessary because of the social, economic and political forces at 
work that necessitate the rethinking of the concept and the institution of ownership.5 
 
Building encroachments, that is, instances where a landowner builds a permanent 
structure on her land in such a way that the structure encroaches upon neighbouring 
land, pose a question about ownership which is a little different from the examples 
mentioned above. Yet, what has crystallised from case law on the problem of 
encroachment is a similar type of question as the one facing a landlord or farm 
owner. The question that a landowner affected by a building encroachment might 
ask is: In which cases might I have to accept a limitation on the ownership of my land 
as a result of a building encroachment? 
 
In this chapter I will provide an introduction to the law regulating building 
encroachments in South Africa. In the cases where a landowner erects a building 
encroachment on his neighbour’s property, the affected landowner has a right to 
demand removal of the encroachment. The remedy of removal is based upon 
ownership and the right to be free from interference by another. By virtue of his 
status as owner of the land, the affected landowner has the right to ensure 
                                                                                                                                                        
Act 19 of 1998. There are certain procedural safeguards that protect unlawful occupiers against the 
common law right of the landowner. Post apartheid anti-eviction legislation has been enacted to solve 
the inadequate common law protection of evictees. At common law, the situation was generally that 
an owner had the right to exclude any person from his property and to evict any occupier who does 
not have a valid right to occupy. All that needed to be established was ownership and unlawful 
occupation. 
5
  Van der Walt notes that the Dutch legal historian Van der Bergh pointed out that “it would be 
unrealistic to accept that a legal institution such as ownership could occupy exactly the same place 
and social function in two societies that differ so widely as those of classical Rome and modern 
western Europe”; see AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard 
Windscheid’s theory of ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569-589 at 570. Numerous authors have 
emphasised that rethinking of the institution of ownership within in the modern South African law is 
necessary. See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5th ed 2006) 93; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 170-173; DV Cowen New 
patterns of landownership: The transformation of the concept of ownership as plena in re potestas 
(1984) 1-80; DP Visser “The ‘absoluteness’ of ownership: The South African common law in 
perspective” 1985 Acta Juridica 39-52; C Lewis “The modern concept of ownership of land” 1985 Acta 
Juridica 241-266 at 262; GJ Pienaar “Onwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip in 
perspektief” 1986 TSAR 295-308; AJ van der Walt “The effect of environmental conservation 
measures on the concept of landownership” (1987) 104 SALJ 469-479 at 474-476. 
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undisturbed use and enjoyment of his property. The existence of the encroachment 
may result in the limitation of ownership to varying degrees, depending on the size of 
the encroachment.6 It limits ownership because the affected landowner is forced to 
tolerate the encroachment and therefore the interference with the use and enjoyment 
of his property. The finer distinction between significant and insignificant 
encroachments is obviously important in this regard. This is because the larger the 
encroachment, the greater the extent of the limitation on ownership.7 The aim of this 
chapter is to highlight that if a significant building encroachment is erected and the 
court orders that the encroachment should not be removed, this may impose a 
serious limitation on ownership.8 
 
The remedy of removal has its historical origins in Roman law.9 However, there has 
been considerable development and modification of the law regulating building 
encroachments from Roman law to how it was received in early South African case 
law. In terms of Roman law, it was clear that the affected landowner could ensure 
that the encroachment would be removed.10 This would occur either as a result of 
him removing the encroachment himself, where the structure had attached to the 
affected land, or the affected landowner could apply to have the encroachment 
                                                 
6
  PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 
2006) 121-127. The authors divide the limitations that may imposed on ownership into three 
categories; namely, public law limitations, restrictions imposed in the interests of neighbour relations 
and individual restrictions which are imposed in a particular case by reason of the right to or in respect 
of a thing that is vested in someone other than the owner. An encroachment is discussed as an 
example of a restriction imposed in the interest of neighbour law, specifically by the common law 
regulating building encroachments. However, the authors fail to discuss an encroachment as a 
limitation on ownership in detail or provide any answers to the restriction that an encroachment 
imposes on ownership. For the limitations imposed on ownership in general, see PJ Badenhorst, JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 95-132. 
7
  The limitation that the continued existence of the encroachment poses for the affected 
landowner is important when considering the doctrinal effects and constitutional implications of the 
court orders made in the context of building encroachments. See chaps 4 and 5 below. 
8
  The limitation on ownership will have to be explained and justified adequately. See chaps 4 
and 5 below. 
9
  Corpus Juris Civilis (D 9 2 29 1) (translated and edited by SP Scott The civil law: Including the 
twelve tables: The institutes of Gaius. The opinions of Paulus. The enactments of Justinian. And the 
constitutions of Leo (1973), hereafter “D” followed by the specific section of the Digest) ; JRL Milton 
“The law of neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-244 at 234; FP van den Heever 
Aquilian damages in South African law (1944) 84. 
10
  D 9 2 29 1; JRL Milton “The law of neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-244 at 
234; FP van den Heever Aquilian damages in South African law (1944) 84. 
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removed with the actio negatoria in the cases where the encroachment protruded 
into the airspace over the affected land.11 
 
In Roman-Dutch law as in South African law, the point of departure was also that the 
affected landowner could demand the removal of the encroaching structure.12 
However, the force of the default remedy of removal was mitigated by the defence of 
the year and a day rule.13 It was disputed among Roman-Dutch authors whether the 
year and a day rule was applicable as a defence against the affected landowner’s 
right to demand removal. Despite the controversy about the applicability of the rule in 
Roman-Dutch law, the rule was nonetheless applied in early South African case law. 
However, the rule was finally rejected in South Africa because it did not form part of 
the general law which was taken over in South Africa from Roman-Dutch law.14 
 
Subsequently, courts became more concerned with the question whether they had 
the discretion to deny an order for removal and award compensation instead.15 It 
seems as though the recent inclination of courts is to leave the encroaching structure 
in place and to rather award compensation instead.16 This was evident in the two 
most recent cases dealing with encroachment by building.17 In these cases, the 
                                                 
11
  D 9 2 29 1. 
12
  H De Groot 1583-1645 Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleertheyd 3 34 8 (translated by 
RW Lee The jurisprudence of Holland (1926), hereafter referred to as “Grotius”); Voet 1647-1713 
Commentarius ad pandectas 8 2 4 (translated by P Gane Commentary on the pandect (1955-1958), 
hereafter referred to as “Voet”); Voet 8 2 16; Van Leeuwen 1625-1682 Commentaries on Roman-
Dutch law 2 20 6 (edited and translated by CW Decker & JG Kotzé (2nd ed 1921), hereafter referred to 
as “Van Leeuwen RDL”). 
13
  Grotius 2 36 5; Voet 8 2 6; Voet 8 2 17; Van Leeuwen RDL 2 19 4; CG van der Merwe & JB 
Cilliers “The ‘year and a day rule’ in South African law: Do our courts have a discretion to order 
damages instead of removal in the case of structural encroachments on neighbouring land?” (1994) 
57 THRHR 587-593. 
14
  CG van der Merwe & JB Cilliers “The ‘year and a day rule’ in South African law: Do our courts 
have a discretion to order damages instead of removal in the case of structural encroachments on 
neighbouring land?” (1994) 57 THRHR 587-593; Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 
120 (O) at 126-130. 
15
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 130. 
16
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). See chap 3 below. 
17
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
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default remedy of removal was denied and the affected landowner was forced to 
accept the continued existence of the encroachment.18 
 
As a starting point I consider the effect that a building encroachment has on the 
ownership rights of the affected landowner. Thereafter, I discuss the application of 
the default remedy of removal in early South African case law as well as the year 
and a day rule as a defence against the affected landowner’s right to demand 
removal. In the final section of the chapter the two most recent cases dealing with 
encroachment by building will be considered. 
 
2.2 Ownership and building encroachments 
In terms of the common law, if a landowner builds in such a way that a structure 
crosses the boundary line, a building (or structural) encroachment results.19 The 
landowner affected by the encroachment (the “affected landowner”) in these 
circumstances can immediately upon becoming aware of the encroaching structures 
approach the court and seek an order for removal of the encroachment.20 The basis 
for the common law remedy of removal is the right to be free from any interference 
with the use and enjoyment of your property.21 Milton describes this as follows: 
“The right of an owner to demand removal would, in theory, seem to be absolute 
for he is vindicating the freedom of his property from unlawful interference.”22 
 
Similarly, Van der Merwe and Cilliers reiterate that: 
                                                 
18
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
19
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 201; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 122. 
20
  Although it is stated in PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The 
law of property (5th ed 2006) 122 that an affected landowner has a choice between three remedies, 
this is perhaps somewhat confusing. It will be assumed that the landowner must in all cases approach 
the court if he wishes to have the structures removed. From the recent cases, the courts then have 
the discretion to refuse the claim for removal of the encroachment and award compensation instead. 
See AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” (2008) 
125 SALJ 592-628. 
21
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 201; Wade v Paruk (1904) 25 NLR 219 at 225; 
Smith v Basson 1979 (1) SA 559 (W) at 560. 
22
  JRL Milton “The law of neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-244 at 241. 
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“[t]he right to insist on the removal of the encroachment is consistent with the 
concept of ownership, which is potentially the most extensive real right which a 
person can have in respect of an object, whether movable or immovable.”23 
 
Based on the above, it is clear that the affected landowner by insisting on removal of 
the encroachment is asserting the right to be secure from harm, based on 
ownership. However, ownership may be limited in some cases. 
 
Traditionally, it was said that a landowner may do with his property as he sees fit, 
subject to the restrictions imposed by both private and public law.24 It is generally 
difficult to find a definition of ownership that correlates with the needs of society 
within which the institution of ownership must function at any given time. Therefore, it 
is vital to find a description of the institution of ownership that encompasses the 
features and functions of the social and economic context within which ownership 
should exist. 
 
Even in Roman law, ownership was already seen in terms of relationships organised 
by society.25 Ownership was perceived as relational, thus for example in terms of the 
relationship between two landowners with regard to the same property, which for all 
intents and purposes mean that ownership cannot be unfettered. Therefore, a 
landowner’s rights only stretched as far as and insomuch as it did not interfere with 
his neighbours’ ownership rights. 
 
                                                 
23
  CG van der Merwe & JB Cilliers “The ‘year and a day rule’ in South African law: Do our courts 
have a discretion to order damages instead of removal in the case of structural encroachments on 
neighbouring land?” (1994) 57 THRHR 587-593 at 588. 
24
  PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 
2006) 91; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 170-173; DV Cowen New patterns of 
landownership: The transformation of the concept of ownership as plena in re potestas (1984) 1-80 at 
67. Cowen describes the idea that an owner can do with his property as he wants within the 
restrictions in the interest of neighbouring owners or the general public, as the “totality” of ownership. 
See further Johannesburg Council v Rand Township Registrar 1910 TPD 1314; Regal v African 
Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 102 (A) at 106-107. 
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  M Radin Handbook of Roman law (1927) 332; AM Honoré “Ownership” in AG Guest (ed) 
Oxford essays in jurisprudence (1961) 107-147 at 144-145. 
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The definition of ownership most often cited in South African law was stated in Gien 
v Gien26 as follows: 
“The right of ownership is the most comprehensive real right that a person can 
have in respect of a thing. The point of departure is that a person can, in respect of 
immovable property, do with and on his property as he pleases. This apparently 
unfettered freedom is, however, a half-truth. The absolute power of an owner is 
limited by the restrictions imposed thereupon by the law.”27 
 
With regard to ownership, it is said that Roman and Roman-Dutch law ideas of 
ownership largely survived in the modern South African institution of ownership.28 
However, Van der Walt argues that most of the modern institution of ownership was 
in fact taken over from the Pandectist theory of ownership.29 He looks at Bernhard 
Winscheid’s theory of ownership and particularly the characteristics of the theory.30 
In this investigation Van der Walt highlights that there are fundamental differences 
between the Roman law concept of ownership and the institution of ownership as 
described by the Pandectists.31 Therefore, he asserts that it would be incorrect to 
accept that the nineteenth century Pandectist theory of ownership was an accurate 
description of the Roman law institution.32 
 
There are some interesting characteristics of Windscheid’s theory of ownership that 
are relevant. In the first place, ownership is considered the most complete property 
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  1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) at 1120. 
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  The translation of J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Deliktereg (5th ed 2006) 104 is used 
here; the original is Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) at 1120: “Eiendomsreg is die mees volledige 
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ongebonde vryheid is egter ŉ halwe waarheid. Die absolute beskikkingsbevoegheid van ŉ eienaar 
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Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 91. 
28
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 171. 
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  AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s 
theory of ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569-589 at 568. See DP Visser “The ‘absoluteness’ of 
ownership: The South African common law in perspective” 1985 Acta Juridica 39-52 at 39. 
30
  AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s 
theory of ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569-589. Van der Walt accepts that Windscheid is the main 
spokesperson for the Pandectists. 
31
  AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s 
theory of ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569-589 at 588. 
32
  AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s 
theory of ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569-589 at 579. In this section Van der Walt looks at how “[a] 
number of aspects of the traditional concept of ownership illustrate the underlying assumptions and 
implications of Winscheid’s concept of ownership”. 
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right that entitles the holder of the right the exercise of the right to the exclusion of 
everybody else.33 Therefore, the holder of the right would be able to ward off any 
unlawful interference with the right. Secondly, in terms of Windscheid’s theory, 
ownership was in principle unlimited and any restrictions were abnormal to the 
concept.34 If there was a restriction, it was temporary and ownership would regain its 
natural form when the restriction was removed. This is referred to as the elasticity of 
ownership. It assumes that if anything disturbs the natural form of ownership and 
that disturbance is taken away, then ownership can return to its natural state. 
 
This is interesting if one considers encroachment by building. The affected 
landowner may in theory insist upon removal of an encroachment as a result of his 
right to be free from interference. The encroachment poses a limitation on 
ownership. If removal is ordered in terms of the default remedy of removal, the 
affected landowner’s ownership rights are restored to its natural complete state. 
However, if removal is not ordered the encroachment continues to pose a limitation 
on the affected landowner’s rights. The affected landowner is forced to tolerate the 
interference caused by the encroachment. 
 
The continued existence of the encroachment becomes more problematic the larger 
the encroachment is. Therefore, as a point of departure, a distinction needs to be 
drawn between significant and insignificant encroachments because the extent of the 
limitation on ownership differs.35 However, the Cape High Court recently held that it 
could find no reason why significant and insignificant encroachments should be 
treated differently.36 Moreover, the court held in this case that the defendant’s 
counter-claim of insisting on removal was based on a “rigid and dogmatic insistence 
upon his perceived absolute rights as owner, irrespective of the broader 
considerations of social utility, economic waste and neighbourliness” and that this 
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  AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s 
theory of ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569-589 at 579. 
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  AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s 
theory of ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569-589 at 582. 
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  This will in turn become important for chaps 4 and 5 when the doctrinal and constitutional 
consequence of leaving building encroachments in place is discussed. See chaps 4 and 5 below. 
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  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 29. 
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perception of ownership was unacceptable.37 This statement begs two important 
questions. The first one centres on when it would be acceptable to insist upon 
removal of an encroaching structure. In other words, the question would be: When 
will insisting upon removal be considered to be based on an absolutist view of 
ownership? The second question is linked to the first one: When would it be 
justifiable to limit ownership by leaving the encroachment in place? 
 
In order to answer the first question it is important to distinguish between significant 
and insignificant encroachments. With regard to significant encroachments, it is 
questionable whether insisting upon removal should be considered to be based on 
an “absoluteness” view of ownership as was stated in Brian Lackey Trust or what 
would be called abuse of right in Dutch law.38 The owner may be insisting upon 
removal because the encroachment results in a serious limitation on his property 
rights. In the South African context, it has been questioned whether the above 
conduct of an affected landowner would amount to abuse of rights.39 The abuse of 
rights argument is one which is commonly raised in favour of awarding 
compensation instead of removal. It is based essentially on the idea that an owner 
whose property has been encroached upon and who insists upon removal of the 
encroachment is abusing his rights.40 
 
Van der Walt argues that a hold-out by an affected landowner, either because he 
does not want to sell his property to the encroaching owner or because he is trying to 
obtain a higher amount of compensation, does not necessarily amount to abuse of 
right. He argues that a landowner is entitled to sell his property at whichever price he 
wishes. The affected landowner has the prerogative to accept or refuse any offer 
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  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 43. 
38
  See s 6.3 in chap 6 below. 
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  AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” 
(2008) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 600-602. 
40
  AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” 
(2008) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 600-602. The idea that an owner is acting in an unacceptable manner 
when he insists upon removal of the encroachment is also discussed by Scott. She states that a 
landowner is not abusing his rights by insisting on removal, but is merely trying to take advantage of a 
situation when he realises how hopeless it has become. See S Scott “Recent developments in case 
law regarding neighbour law and its influence on the concept of ownership” (2005) 16 Stell LR 351-
377 at 363. For a discussion of the abuse of the right argument in the context of Dutch law, see s 6.3 
in chap 6 below. 
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made to him for the property.41 In the absence of legislation obliging a landowner to 
accept a specific price according to a determined basis like market value, the owner 
can thus refuse any price offered. What this effectively means is that an owner who 
resists the involuntary loss of ownership due to the existence of an encroachment is 
not necessarily abusing his rights. 
 
However, the same could most probably not be said for insignificant encroachments, 
where insisting upon removal may be inappropriate and unreasonable due to the 
size of the encroachment. Scholtens explains this by way of the Dutch case of 
Brusse v Holders.42 In this case the defendant had erected a building on his land that 
formed a minor encroachment on the plaintiff’s property. The parties were unable to 
reach an agreement about the amount of compensation and the plaintiff 
consequently applied for the removal of the encroachment. The court held that the 
plaintiff was attempting to obtain an amount of compensation which was not 
reasonable in comparison to the value of the property. Therefore, he was trying to 
use his superior bargaining power to extort a large amount of compensation for a 
minor encroachment not worth the amount. It was held that this conduct amounted to 
an abuse of right.43 Scholtens notes that at the time this judgement was given, this 
was in conflict with the law relating to ownership in terms of the Dutch civil code.44 
He observes that the plaintiff may have succeeded had the Dutch civil code been 
strictly applied. This is because the plaintiff is able to insist upon removal because he 
is the owner of the land. However, the court applied the abuse of right doctrine 
(which at the time was not codified) and protected the defendant against the 
“unreasonable and inequitable attitude of the plaintiff”.45 In this judgement the court 
went against the codified provision pertaining to ownership of land and the right to 
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  AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” 
(2008) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 601. Van der Walt uses a law-and-economics argument to substantiate 
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  JE Scholtens “Encroachment: Damages instead of removal?” (1957) 74 SALJ 84-86. 
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  JE Scholtens “Encroachment: Damages instead of removal?” (1957) 74 SALJ 84-86 at 84. 
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demand removal based on ownership. Scholtens makes the following remark about 
insisting upon removal in the case of minor encroachments: 
“The judgement of the Court of Zutphen in Brusse v Holders provides an example 
of a case where under a codified system the courts went beyond the Code in order 
to attain justice as between man and man.”46 
 
Therefore, it may be necessary in some instances to regulate when the affected 
landowner should be able to insist upon removal, for example when the encroaching 
structure is really insignificant. The remedy of removal may be completely 
unreasonable in these cases, where the limitation on ownership is so small that 
insisting upon removal may result in an abuse of right. This is especially if the 
affected landowner was willing to accept compensation and is insisting upon removal 
for the sole purpose of trying to extort unreasonable amounts from the encroacher. 
 
This guides me to the next question namely: In which cases will it be justifiable to 
limit ownership by denying the affected landowner the removal order and therefore 
leaving the encroachment in place?47 In order to answer this question it is necessary 
to look at the origins of the default remedy of removal in Roman law. In the following 
section I investigate the remedies available in Roman law with the aim of 
establishing how the remedies were received in South African law. Thereafter, I 
consider how the remedy of removal evolved and was modified in Roman-Dutch law. 
It was initially accepted in South African case law that in Roman-Dutch law, the 
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  JE Scholtens “Encroachment: Damages instead of removal?” (1957) 74 SALJ 84-86 at 86. 
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  This question forms the underlying question for this whole dissertation. The following three 
chapters will aim at answering this question in different ways. In chapter 3 I investigate the discretion 
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importantly, justified in terms of the South African Constitution. The constitutional implications of the 
limitation imposed on ownership when an encroaching structure is not removed are discussed in 
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27 
 
remedy was mitigated by the year and a day rule, which formed a defence against 
the landowner’s demand for removal and therefore a justifiable reason to limit the 
affected landowner’s ownership of the land. However, it subsequently appeared that 
the rule never formed part of general Roman-Dutch law and that it was therefore 
never adopted in South African law either. 
 
2.3 Roman law48 
Milton states that there were two remedies in terms of Roman law that were the most 
effective in the case of encroachment by building, namely the interdictum quod vi aut 
clam and the actio negatoria.49 He argues that of the two remedies, the actio 
negatoria seemed to have provided the best protection in the case of encroachment 
by building. With the actio negatoria, the affected landowner could claim removal of 
the encroachment, as well as damages.50 
 
In terms of the Digest, the intention of the builder determined which remedy would be 
available when a building was constructed on the land of another.51 A distinction was 
drawn between a bona fide possessor and a mala fide possessor.52 If someone 
knowingly erected a building on the land of his neighbour with his own building 
materials, he would be a mala fide possessor and he was deemed to have 
voluntarily parted with his materials. Therefore, the landowner upon whose land the 
building materials were erected became the owner of the building materials. 
Moreover, this landowner would not need to reimburse the encroaching landowner 
for the value of the materials or any of the labour in bringing the work into effect.53 
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  For more on Roman law, see D Johnston Roman law in context (1999); HF Jolowicz 
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  JRL Milton “The law of neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-244 at 236. 
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  JRL Milton “The law of neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-244 at 236. 
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  D 41 7 9 12. 
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  D 41 7 9 12; CG Hall Maasdorp’s institutes of South African law vol 2 The law of property 
(1976) 39. 
53
  D 41 7 9 12. 
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The situation was different in the case where the encroacher was a bona fide 
possessor. In other words, in the case where the encroacher was not aware that the 
land on which the encroachment was erected belonged to his neighbour, he could 
not be said to have voluntarily parted with his building materials.54 The remedy 
available to the affected landowner in this case depended on the nature of the 
encroachment.55 The nature of the encroachment, in turn, depended on whether the 
encroachment became part of the affected landowner’s property or merely protruded 
into the airspace over the neighbouring land. 
 
In the case where the buildings were erected on the land, and became part of the 
land, there was a “direct and intimate” relationship between the owner of the land 
and the buildings erected on his land56 and there would be a greater justification for 
self-help. Therefore, the encroacher would be able to take the law into his own 
hands and remove the encroachment himself.57 The reason why the affected 
landowner would be able to remove the encroachment himself was by virtue of the 
maxim omne quod inaedificatur solo cedit.58 In terms of this maxim the affected 
landowner could remove the encroaching structures because he has become owner 
of the structures erected on his land. This is also in line with the maxim superficies 
solo cedit, which states that everything permanently attached to land belongs to the 
owner of the land.59 
 
If the encroachment took the form of a protrusion into the airspace of a neighbouring 
property, for example a roof, an overhanging beam or an structure protruding over a 
common wall, the neighbour was precluded from taking the law into his own hands 
and removing the encroachment himself.60 The most effective remedy in this case 
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would be the actio negatoria in terms of which the affected landowner could sue for 
the removal of the encroachment.61 
 
A distinction is made in the Digest as follows: 
“If you cut off my roof which I have permitted to project over your house without 
any right; Proculus states that I am entitled to an action against you for wrongful 
damage, as you should have sued me, alleging that I had no right to have a 
projecting roof; and it is not just that I should suffer damage through your cutting 
off my timbers. A contrary rule is to be found in the Rescript of the Emperor 
Severus, who stated in said Rescript to a party through whose house an aqueduct 
was carried without any servitude existing, that he had a right to destroy it himself; 
and this seems reasonable, for the difference is that in one instance a man built 
the roof on land which belonged to him and in the other, the party built the 
aqueduct on the premises of someone else.”62 
 
From what has been discussed above, it is clear that in terms of Roman law removal 
of the encroaching structure was the default position. Therefore, the affected 
landowner could either remove the encroachment himself or apply in terms of the 
actio negatoria to have the encroachment removed. As a point of departure, this was 
also the default position in Roman-Dutch law. The Roman-Dutch law position is 
discussed in the section below. 
 
2.4 Roman-Dutch law 
Most of the Roman-Dutch law remedies in the case of building encroachments were 
taken over from Roman law.63 Roman-Dutch law recognised the maxim omne quod 
inaedificatur solo cedit, but it was not applied as rigidly as in Roman law. The reason 
for this was the existence of another principle, in terms of which no one should be 
enriched at the expense of another.64 It seems as if the point of departure remained 
the same: If anybody suffered as a result of something belonging to his neighbour 
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overhanging or encroaching on his property, he could force his neighbour to remove 
it.65 
 
Grotius, speaking in the context of acquisition of ownership through building, stated 
that ownership is transferred to an affected landowner in the case where someone 
builds on his land.66 It was clear that everyone had to build within the vertical 
boundary line of their property and anything that projected beyond that would have to 
the removed.67 According to Huber, if someone built or erected something on my 
land and the work was completed without notice, and therefore without my 
knowledge, I could sue the possessor of the building.68 Similarly, Voet provided two 
instances in which he stated disapproval of unlawfully erected buildings.69 In the first 
instance, Voet wrote about the course of action available in the case where someone 
unlawfully built on or over a common wall.70 He stated that if there was the freedom 
to build up to the middle line and the one neighbour built beyond that point without 
the consent of his neighbour, the projecting building was unlawful and would have to 
be taken down.71 
 
In the second instance Voet made a very important distinction between “[t]hings 
unlawfully let in” and things “merely projecting”.72 The premise of the distinction lies 
in the following: If anyone erects something on my land without a servitude I can 
remove it myself; but if someone lets something overhang or jut into the airspace 
above my land, I am precluded from removing it myself.73 Voet emphasised “that 
whatever someone lets into or constructs on another’s tenement becomes the 
property of him to whom the ground belongs.”74 Therefore, when you break down 
that building you are breaking down what is your own. However, in the case where a 
roof or eave projects into the airspace over your land, it does not attach to your land 
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  Van Leeuwen RDL 2 20 6. 
66
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but originates from your neighbour’s land, and therefore it belongs to the neighbour 
and you may not remove it yourself. 
 
Therefore, Voet distinguishes between an encroachment that protrudes into the 
airspace of a neighbour (or an overhanging beam) and an encroachment that 
attaches to the affected land and argues that in the case of the latter, it becomes part 
of the neighbour’s land in terms of the maxim omne quod inaedificatur solo cedit. It is 
contended that when you subsequently remove the latter kind of encroachment, you 
are demolishing not what belongs to someone else, but something that is your 
own.75 This was confirmed by Van Leeuwen, who stated that the right to have your 
balcony, bow-window or gallery projecting over the land of your neighbour is 
obtained by way of servitude.76 The specific servitude in this case was the servitus 
protegendi. Without such a servitude, you had no right to have the eaves or roof of 
your house projecting over the land belonging to another and would be compelled to 
remove it.77 However, since it does not attach to the neighbour’s land he could not 
remove it himself. 
 
However, Grotius noted that a praedial servitude could be acquired through 
prescription if it had stood unprotested for a year and a day.78 Therefore, if someone 
had erected a building on the property of another, and no objection was made within 
a year and day, a praedial servitude would come into existence and the affected 
landowner would have to accept the existence of the building in exchange for 
damages. This was confirmed by Van Leeuwen, who accepted the existence of the 
rule.79 
 
Voet had the following to say about the year and a day rule:80 
“[I]f without the establishment of a servitude a person to the knowledge of and 
without interference with the work by his neighbour does some building which 
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smacks of servitude on his own or another’s ground; or after the work has been 
finished without his knowledge, the neighbour has not then within a year and a day 
objected to it and claimed its demolition; by the statutes and customs of various 
places the rule has been that demolition is never to be ordered against the 
builder’s will, but that judgement for damages in the neighbour’s favour is to be 
given against him who built it up.”81 
 
It is clear that the year and a day rule had two legs. It had the knowledge element 
and the time element. The knowledge element required that the person should have 
known that the encroachment had existed and the time element meant that the 
affected landowner had to object to the encroachment within a year and a day. Voet 
explained that the year and a day rule was also applicable to cases where a 
landowner had unlawfully built beyond a common wall.82 He described it as follows: 
“An exception [to a demolition order] would be when local custom directs that no 
one is forced to demolish if he has had the work there for more than a year and a 
day, though it was done quite wrongfully and to the damaging of the neighbour; 
but that he is released by paying out the damages.”83 
 
There are two important conclusions that can be drawn from Voet’s commentaries. 
Firstly, Voet makes a very clear distinction between encroachments that attach to the 
affected landowner’s property and those which do not. In the cases where the 
building does attach to the affected land, and not merely projects into the airspace 
over the affected landowner’s property, it is argued that the buildings become part of 
the land and he could remove it himself. In the case where the building merely 
projects into the airspace over the affected landowner’s property, it does not become 
part of the affected land and the affected landowner would have to apply to have the 
encroachment removed. The basis for this claim would be that the encroaching 
landowner does not have a right by way of a servitude to have the encroachments 
protruding over the boundary line. 
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The second conclusion that can be drawn from Voet’s commentaries is that he 
recognises that a landowner may be precluded from demanding removal of either 
something on or over his land. This would be in terms of the year and a day rule. 
However, Voet makes it clear that the year and a day rule was only a local rule which 
was applied in certain areas by custom.84 This means that the rule was not part of 
the general Roman-Dutch law that was received in South African law.85 Nonetheless, 
the year and day rule was initially applied in early South African case law as a 
defence against the affected landowner’s right to insist upon removal. 
 
In the section below, I discuss early South African cases dealing with building 
encroachments. A distinction is made between cases where the default remedy of 
removal was awarded and cases where the year and day rule was applied as a 
defence against the right of removal. Thereafter, it is necessary to look at the 
argument of Van der Merwe and Cilliers, who showed the opinion that the year and a 
day rule is not applicable to South African law.86 After the rule was finally rejected in 
South African law, the major question in building encroachment cases centred on 
whether the court had the discretion to leave building encroachments in place and 
award compensation instead.87 
 
2.5 Early South African law 
2.5.1 Early South African cases on removal of encroaching structure as default 
 remedy 
In one of the earliest cases dealing with encroachments it was accepted that the 
default remedy is removal of the encroaching structure.88 In this case a common wall 
existed between the properties of the defendant and the plaintiff. The defendant had 
constructed a roof on the wall in such a way that it protruded over the plaintiff’s 
premises. It was established that the wall was common and that the rules pertaining 
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structural encroachments on neighbouring land?” (1994) 57 THRHR 587-593. See s 2.5.2 below. 
86
  See s 2.5.2 below. 
87
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). See chap 3 below. 
88
  Pike v Hamilton (1853-1856) 2 Searle 191. 
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to common walls were applicable. Therefore, adjacent owners were precluded from 
doing anything to or on the common wall which could cause any prejudice to a 
neighbouring landowner.89 The protrusion effectively resulted in an unlawful 
encroachment. This being the case, the court was bound by law to rule in favour of 
the plaintiff and order the removal of the encroachment.90 There seems to have been 
general consensus among all three judges that if the protrusion amounted to a 
building encroachment, it had to be removed.91 There was no doubt that once the 
protrusion forms an encroachment that the remedy is removal. 
 
In subsequent cases, the remedy of removal was confirmed as the default remedy 
when a building encroachment should occur. In Van Boom v Visser92 the court 
ordered the removal of the building encroachment which was erected on the 
plaintiff’s property.93 In Stark v Broomberg94 a wall that had been erected by the 
defendant caused an encroachment of two feet on the property of the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff applied for the removal of the encroachment, or alternatively for the payment 
of £250 for damage suffered as a result of the encroachment. The court had no 
doubt that the plaintiff suffered loss due to the existence of the encroachment, even 
though it was only a minor encroachment. The court looked at the total 
inconvenience for the plaintiff, in that he was precluded from building the number of 
cottages on his property that he would initially have been able to build had the 
encroaching wall not been there. It was decided by De Villiers CJ that the plaintiff, 
being the owner of the property on which the encroachment was built, had a prima 
facie right to claim that the encroaching structure erected on land belonging to him 
should be removed.95 
 
Theoretically, the remedy of removal gives the affected landowner the maximum 
possible protection in the case of a building encroachment. It means that a 
landowner always has the right to demand that the encroaching structure be 
                                                 
89
  Pike v Hamilton (1853-1856) 2 Searle 191 at 200. 
90
  Pike v Hamilton (1853-1856) 2 Searle 191 at 200. 
91
  Pike v Hamilton (1853-1856) 2 Searle 191 at 196, 198, 200. 
92
  (1904) 21 SC 360. 
93
  Van Boom v Visser (1904) 21 SC 360 at 361. 
94
  1904 CTR 135. 
95
  Stark v Broomberg 1904 CTR 135 at 137. 
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removed, however small or large the encroachment may be.96 The tendency in the 
early case law to regard removal as the default remedy is confirmed by the early 
literature. Under the heading of “Rights to Buildings” Wille states that a landowner 
upon whose land is encroached may order that the encroaching building or 
projection be removed.97 This is confirmed by Maasdorp who, primarily relying on 
case law as authority,98 states the situation of building encroachments as follows: “In 
such a case the owner of the ground encroached upon may demand that the 
encroachment be removed”.99 
 
2.5.2 Early South African cases applying the “year and a day rule” as a defence 
 against the remedy of removal 
There has been a great deal of controversy in early South African cases in which the 
year and a day rule was applied.100 The first part of the rule is based on the 
knowledge of the affected landowner in an encroachment case. There seems to 
have been uncertainty about whether actual knowledge of the encroachment was 
required or whether it was enough that the affected landowner merely should have 
known of the encroachment.101 
 
                                                 
96
  One of the issues which will be discussed in the following chapter is whether minor and 
significant encroachments should be treated the same. English law, which is relied upon by South 
African courts, has established a “working rule” in terms of which the size of the encroachment is a 
factor which is taken into consideration in the determination of whether the discretion should be 
exercised in favour of the encroaching owner or the affected landowner. See Shelfer v City of London 
Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287. See chap 3 below. 
97
  G Wille Principles of South African law (1937) 151. 
98
  Van Boom v Visser (1904) 21 SC 360; Pike v Hamilton (1853-1856) 2 Searle 191. 
99
  CG Hall Maasdorp’s institutes of South African law vol 2 The law of property (10th ed 1976) 
38, 41, 94. 
100
  Adam v Abdoola (1903) 24 NLR 158; Wade v Paruk (1904) 25 NLR 219; Stark v Broomberg 
1904 CTR 135; Frank and Co v Duveen 1919 CPD 299; Higher Mission School Trustees v 
Grahamstown Town Council 1924 EDL 354; Cape Town Municipality v Fletcher & Cartwrights, Ltd 
1936 CPD 347; Braunschweig Village Management Board v Frohbus 1938 EDL 25; Naudé v 
Bredenkamp 1956 (2) SA 448 (O). 
101
  The impression is that the court in Rand Waterraad placed a heavier onus on the affected 
landowner to be more aware of what is going on with his property. Although it was found in the case 
that the year and a day rule was not applicable to South African law, the court took into consideration 
that the applicants delayed in bringing the application, and decided against removal of the 
encroaching structures. 
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In the early South African cases, this part of the rule was probably based on 
estoppel,102 so that the affected landowner was estopped by his conduct from 
demanding removal of the encroachment.103 The English law principle of estoppel by 
representation (or more specifically estoppel by “encouragement” or “acquiescence”) 
was relied upon in interpreting this part of the rule.104 The idea of estoppel by 
representation involves a situation where one party wrongfully acts under the 
mistaken belief that he is entitled to do so, to the detriment of another. If the other 
party knew of the wrongful exercising of supposed rights and does nothing to stop it, 
the latter cannot later invoke his rights against the former. Applied to encroachment 
cases, it would follow that an affected landowner who was aware of the encroaching 
structure being erected on his land but did nothing to prevent it, would not be able to 
invoke his right to removal later. His failure to correct the mistaken belief of the 
encroaching owner could be an indication that he tacitly agreed to the building of the 
encroaching structure. 
 
In Higher Mission School Trustees v Grahamstown Town Council105 one of the 
grounds on which the defendant resisted the plaintiff’s claim for removal was 
acquiescence.106 The claim came about when a section of an electric power station 
was built by the defendant on the plaintiffs’ property. The court interpreted the first 
part of the rule to require actual knowledge. The mere fact that the plaintiff possibly 
should have known of the encroachment was not sufficient to succeed with a claim 
for acquiescence. Knowledge was interpreted as consent, which must be proven 
unambiguously.107 
 
                                                 
102
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 202; JRL Milton “The law of neighbours in South 
Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-244 at 239. 
103
  Adam v Abdoola (1903) 24 NLR 158 at 160. The court per Bale CJ goes as far as saying that 
an agreement was reached by the parties, and the defendant proceeded on the basis of this tacit 
consent (agreement) until such time as the action was brought. 
104
  JRL Milton “The law of neighbours in South Africa” 1969 Acta Juridica 123-244 at 239; S 
Bower Estoppel by representation (3rd ed 1977) 283-307. 
105
  1924 EDL 354. 
106
  The acquiescence argument relied upon by the defendant in this case is used more in the 
sense that the property was never fenced in or that the plaintiff never laid claim to ownership of the 
property. This was rejected for being too burdensome on landowners. See Higher Mission School 
Trustees v Grahamstown Town Council 1924 EDL 354 at 362. 
107
  Higher Mission School Trustees v Grahamstown Town Council 1924 EDL 354 at 363. 
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The second part of the rule was concerned with the exact length of time that passed 
between the erecting of the building encroachment and the bringing of the 
application for the removal of the encroachment. There was much uncertainty in 
early South African case law about how long the encroachment had to be in 
existence before the encroaching owner could raise the defence against the affected 
landowner’s demand for removal of the encroachment.108 It seems as if the duration 
of the rule was dependant on the particular “keuren” and did not form part of the ius 
generale in Roman-Dutch law.109 This lead to much uncertainty with regard to the 
application of the year and day rule. 
 
In addition to the uncertainty about the requirements for the rule highlighted above, it 
remained questionable whether the rule itself formed part of general Roman-Dutch 
law. Although the rule was applied in the early South African case law,110 it has been 
argued that the historical foundations of the rule had not been established carefully 
enough. It never formed part of general Roman-Dutch law and therefore could never 
have been received into South African law.111 Relying for the most part on the 
reasons set forth by Van der Merwe and Cilliers why the rule should not apply, the 
courts subsequently changed their stance on the applicability of the rule against the 
claim for removal of a building encroachment and it is now generally accepted that it 
does not form part of South African law. 
 
                                                 
108
  This concern was raised in Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
109
  Grotius 2 36 5; Frank & Co v Duveen 1919 CPD 299. 
110
  Wade v Paruk (1904) 25 NLR 219; Frank & Co v Duveen 1919 CPD 299; Higher Mission 
School Trustees v Grahamstown Town Council 1924 EDL 354; Cape Town Municipality v Fletcher 
and Cartwrights, Ltd 1936 CPD 347; Braunschweig Village Management Board v Frohbus 1938 EDL 
25; Naudé v Bredenkamp 1956 (2) SA 448 (O) at 451. It is interesting to note that in none of these 
cases was it explicitly argued that the rule was applicable to South African law, it was just assumed to 
be part thereof. 
111
  CG van der Merwe & JB Cilliers “The ‘year and a day rule’ in South African law: Do our courts 
have a discretion to order damages instead of removal in the case of structural encroachments on 
neighbouring land?” (1994) 57 THRHR 587-593 at 588. 
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2.6 Recent South African law 
2.6.1 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander112 
Rand Waterraad provides the first real noticeable change in the way courts dealt with 
building encroachments. In this case the applicant and the respondents were 
neighbours sharing a common boundary. The respondent inadvertently built in such 
a way that certain building structures were erected on the applicant’s property. The 
applicant subsequently applied for the removal of the encroachment, which was the 
default remedy in the case where someone built across the boundary line. 
 
The Free State High Court discussed the legal position regarding the year and a day 
rule. Before the Rand Waterraad judgment it was accepted that the year and a day 
rule was a defence against the landowner’s demand for the removal of an 
encroaching structure.113 This case provides an illustration of how the year and a day 
rule was raised by the respondent as a defence to the owner’s demand for removal 
of the encroaching structure.114 The applicability of the rule in South African law was 
questioned by the court. In its analysis of the rule the court relied on the research of 
Van der Merwe and Cilliers,115 who argued that the year and a day rule was mainly 
used for obtaining real servitudes through prescription in Roman-Dutch law. It 
provided a means for obtaining the work (opus factum) and not the land on which the 
work was built.116 Van der Merwe and Cilliers looked at the works of various Roman-
Dutch authors and concluded that the rule was not part of the ius generale of 
Roman-Dutch law that was received into South African law.117 It was not a general 
rule in Roman-Dutch law that generally applied in the province of Holland. It was part 
of local statutes and customs that applied to local areas. 
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  1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
113
  This is discussed in the s 2.5.2 above where the two legs of the rule are analysed in terms of 
how it was applied in early case law. 
114
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 126-130. 
115
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 126-130; CG van der Merwe & 
JB Cilliers “The ‘year and a day rule’ in South African law: Do our courts have a discretion to order 
damages instead of removal in the case of structural encroachments on neighbouring land?” (1994) 
57 THRHR 587-593 at 588. 
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  This aspect is discussed in s 4.3.2 in chap 4 below. 
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  CG van der Merwe & JB Cilliers “The ‘year and a day rule’ in South African law: Do our courts 
have a discretion to order damages instead of removal in the case of structural encroachments on 
neighbouring land?” (1994) 57 THRHR 587-593 at 588-591. See especially Voet’s (Voet 8 2 6) work 
in s 2.4 above. 
39 
 
 
The court also considered two reasons why the rule should be rejected in South 
Africa. The first reason is that the rule (as applied in Roman-Dutch law) was used as 
an exception to the normal ways in which real servitudes could be obtained through 
prescription. This can be deduced from the words used when referring to the rule.118 
Another argument advanced in Rand Waterraad for the denial of the rule was 
uncertainty. There was uncertainty about the exact duration of the period after which 
the affected landowner could no longer demand removal of the structures, and it was 
also unclear what the consequences of the rule were. 
 
The conclusion of Hattingh J in Rand Waterraad was that the rule does not apply in 
South African law.119 After this, the court proceeded to determine whether the 
discretion should be exercised in the particular case. The court denied the 
application and opted to exercise its discretion in favour of the encroaching owner 
and to keep the encroachment in place.120 The court recognised that the default 
remedy was removal. However, it decided that there are exceptional circumstances 
that could allow for a deviation from the common law (default) remedy. This would 
justify the court exercising its discretion in favour of the encroaching owner. The 
following factors were taken into consideration:121 
(a) Most of the structures excluding the pump were already completed. 
Therefore, the removal order would result in the demolition of completed 
buildings. 
(b) The applicant only objected to the encroachment in January 1983, although 
they had been informed of the structures in June 1980. For this reason there 
                                                 
118
  In the writings of Roman-Dutch law authors reference is made to the normal ways of obtaining 
real servitudes, but words like “but” and “notwithstanding” were used to describe prescription by 
means of the year and a day rule. See CG van der Merwe & JB Cilliers “The ‘year and a day rule’ in 
South African law: Do our courts have a discretion to order damages instead of removal in the case of 
structural encroachments on neighbouring land?” (1994) 57 THRHR 587-593 at 588. See further 
Grotius 2 36 5 in which the ways of acquiring praedial servitudes are stated. 
119
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 130, 139; CG van der Merwe 
“Law of property (including real security)” 1997 Annual Survey of SA Law 304-306 at 305; MJ De 
Waal “Sakereg” (1997) August De Rebus 537-538. 
120
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 138. 
121
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 138. These factors will be 
discussed in greater detail in chap 3 where a comprehensive study of the courts’ discretion is 
undertaken. 
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had been approximately three years before the applicants had filed the 
objection. This, the court remarked, was despite the fact that the applicants 
had argued that the encroachments posed a danger of pollution to the public. 
(c) The applicants had insisted on removal, even though respondents had offered 
to pay damages instead of removal. Furthermore, the applicants failed to 
provide any evidence for the quantification of the loss that had occurred as a 
result of the encroachment. 
(d) The applicant argued that the conduct of the respondents posed a danger of 
pollution to the public. However, even if the removal order was awarded the 
toilet and septic tanks (causing the pollution) were outside the property of the 
applicant and the pollution danger would persist even if the encroachment 
was removed. 
(e) The time period between becoming aware of the encroachment and filing the 
complaint for the removal of the encroachment, indicated to the court that 
there was lack of detriment for the affected landowner. 
(f) The applicant tolerates many other encroachments on his land. 
(g) The cost of removal of the encroachment was much less in June 1980, being 
the time at which the applicant had been sent notice of structures that had 
been erected on his land. When the encroachment was erected the cost of 
removal of the encroachment would have been R30 000. As a result of the 
long wait before the objection was filed, the cost of removal is considerably 
higher. 
(h) The loss that the applicant would suffer if the encroachment were left intact is 
much less than the loss the respondent would suffer if the encroachment is 
left in place. 
(i) The court states that every person has a duty to take reasonable steps to 
protect himself from harm. The applicant neglected to protect himself from 
harm caused by the encroachment in this case. 
(j) The removal order would practically result in the respondent’s home being 
destroyed. 
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(k) Justice and equity dictate that the tardiness with which the applicant had 
approached the whole removal process should result in the order for removal 
being denied. 
 
Therefore, the facts in Rand Waterraad were deemed to reveal the “exceptional 
circumstances”122 and the applicant was ordered to endure the encroachment. 
Moreover, the parties were called upon to reach an agreement as to the amount of 
compensation to be paid for the encroachment. In terms of the legal position of the 
parties after the order was made, it seems that the encroaching owner was 
considered to be a bona fide occupier.123 Whether this is correct is unclear. 
 
2.6.2 Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale124 
The Brian Lackey Trust case provides a good illustration of how the rigid 
enforcement of the primary remedy of removal was refused because of the 
possibility that it could produce unjust results. In this case, the plaintiff was the owner 
of two erven and the defendant owned the neighbouring erf. At the time when the 
plots were purchased they were all vacant. 
 
When the plaintiff commenced with building operations all three parcels were 
undeveloped. The intention of the plaintiff was to build in such a way that his luxury 
home would straddle his two adjacent plots, but instead the building that was erected 
straddled his one plot and the defendant’s. When the mistake was detected by a 
building inspector, operations had progressed to an advanced stage, with 80 percent 
of the property of the defendant’s land being covered by the encroachment, forming 
what the court called a “massive encroachment”. The existence of the encroachment 
effectively resulted in the property being rendered useless to the defendant. The 
plaintiff offered to buy the property for an amount which according to him was well in 
excess of the original purchase price which the defendant had paid for the property. 
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  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 138. 
123
  S Scott “Recent developments in case law regarding neighbour law and its influence on the 
concept of ownership” (2005) 16 Stell LR 351-377 at 361. 
124
  Although the crux of the judgement is discussed in great detail in chap 3, for the sake of 
comprehensiveness a factual background is provided in this section. 
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This offer was rejected by the defendant who allegedly claimed either a higher 
amount or the removal of the encroachment. The plaintiff approached the court for 
an order claiming that the defendant was not entitled to the removal of the 
encroaching structure. 
 
The Cape High Court as a point of departure stated that in the case of encroaching 
structures, the owner of land encroached upon could ordinarily claim the removal of 
the encroachment.125 This is in line with the traditional way of dealing with 
encroachments, viz demolition of encroaching structures. 
 
The main question to be considered in this case was whether the court had the 
discretion to order what amounted to an involuntary deprivation of property. The 
defendant claimed that the courts’ discretion was limited to instances where 
encroachments were small or where there was acquiescence on the part of the 
affected landowner. On the other hand, the plaintiff averred that the court had a wide 
and equitable discretion to order demolition or damages.126 
 
The law regulating building encroachments was considered and the court found 
support from the Rand Waterraad judgement. It similarly confirmed that deviation 
from the default remedy of removal was possible in certain instances.127 It found in 
favour of the plaintiff that the discretion was wide and should not only be limited to 
instances where the encroachment is small.128 It held that this was in line with the 
South African approach in other areas where judicial discretion is exercised.129 
However, the court emphasised the fact that the discretion was not unfettered. It 
stated that the strict enforcement of the default remedy of demolition of the 
encroachment could sometimes lead to unjust results, and should thus not be 
awarded in all circumstances.130 
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  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) paras 19, 32. 
126
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 20. 
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  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 27. 
128
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 29. 
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  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 27. 
130
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) paras 32-33. 
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The court proceeded to determine whether the discretion should be exercised in the 
particular case. It recognised that there were in essence two possible outcomes in 
this case. The court could order either demolition of the encroaching structure in 
favour of the defendant, or payment of compensation resulting in the encroachment 
being left in place. The aim would be to find the outcome which would lead to the 
least unjust outcome. There were two considerations that were important in this 
regard. It considered the possible prejudice for the respective parties and the 
principles of neighbour law.131 Based on proportionality of prejudice and principles of 
neighbour law, it was concluded that demolition would be unjust. 
 
The court acknowledged that the court order could lead to the loss of the defendant’s 
property, but stated that the loss that would be suffered if demolition were granted 
would be far greater for the plaintiff than the loss for the defendant should damages 
be awarded. Furthermore, it stated that, unlike the plaintiff, the defendant would be 
fully compensated if the encroachment were left in place. If the encroachment were 
demolished the plaintiff would lose his home and not be compensated for his loss. 
The court assessed the degree of prejudice by considering the fact that courts are 
generally reluctant to order removal of economically valuable building works.132 
 
The court also took principles of neighbour law into consideration.133 It stated that it 
was not willing to make an order that would potentially cause further severance of 
the relationship between the neighbours. Furthermore, judging by the fact that the 
defendant was initially willing to accept monetary compensation, a demolition order 
would increase his superior bargaining power which could allow him to extort large 
amounts of money from the plaintiff. On the basis of all the above considerations, 
Griesel J came to the conclusion in Brian Lackey Trust that compensation was the 
appropriate remedy. 
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  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 34. 
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  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 38. See also chap 3 for a 
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The conclusions reached in both Rand Waterraad and Brian Lackey Trust have far-
reaching implications. From both the cases it is clear that courts are able to order 
damages even in the case of very large encroachments. The result in Brian Lackey 
Trust furthermore creates the impression that courts are also able to award 
compensation in circumstances that result in a compulsory or involuntary loss of use 
of a significant part of the affected landowner’s property. The court’s discussion of 
this aspect was superficial and incomplete, which leads to the impression that 
perhaps this new approach to the building encroachment problem was not well 
thought through. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I provided an introduction to the law regulating building 
encroachments in South Africa. When a landowner erects a building encroachment, 
the affected neighbour is ordinarily entitled to the removal of that encroachment. This 
remedy of removal is based on the idea that a landowner is entitled to undisturbed 
use of his property, based on his right of ownership. Therefore, when an 
encroachment interferes with the affected landowner’s right to have undisturbed use 
of his property, this landowner has the right to demand removal of the encroaching 
structures. It is argued that the basis for the default remedy of removal is the right to 
enjoy ownership of the land without interference by a neighbour. The encroachment 
poses a limitation on the ownership rights of the affected landowner and therefore, at 
least in theory, the affected landowner should be able to insist that the encroachment 
is removed. 
 
In order to understand how building encroachments are regulated in South Africa 
currently, it was necessary to consider the historical origins of the default remedy of 
removal. The remedy which originated in Roman law ensured that the encroachment 
should as a point of departure be removed. This would occur in Roman law either by 
way of self-help (where the encroachment became part of the affected landowner’s 
property through attachment) or with an application for the actio negatoria (where the 
encroachment protruded into the airspace over the affected landowner’s property). 
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This remedy was taken over in Roman-Dutch law. However, the enforcement of the 
default remedy of removal was sometimes mitigated by a defence in the form of the 
year and a day rule. The order for removal was denied and the encroachment would 
remain in place if the requirements of the year and a day rule were satisfied. The 
year and a day rule ensured that in instances where a landowner has stood by for a 
year and a day and did not object to the encroachment he would subsequently be 
precluded from insisting upon removal. 
 
In South Africa, especially in the early South African case law, this defence against 
the default remedy of removal was accepted and applied. However, it subsequently 
appeared that the year and a day was a rule in fact applied only in terms of local 
statute and custom in the Netherlands and that it was not part of the ius generale of 
Roman-Dutch law, and therefore it should not be applicable in South African law.134 
Subsequently, it was decided that the rule did not form part of South African law.135 
After this, courts became more concerned with asking questions relating to whether 
it had the discretion to award compensation instead of removal of an encroaching 
structure. 
 
It seems as though an affected landowner may have to accept the continued 
existence of the encroachment in certain circumstances. This is evident from the two 
recent cases dealing with building encroachments in South Africa. The common law 
remedy of removal, which has been the age-old way of dealing with encroaching 
buildings, is no longer strictly being enforced. The affected landowner may have to 
tolerate the encroachment. This could occur despite the fact that the continued 
presence of the encroachment causes a serious limitation on the rights of the 
affected landowner, especially in cases of large or significant encroachments. 
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  CG van der Merwe & JB Cilliers “The ‘year and a day rule’ in South African law: Do our courts 
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Furthermore, it is apparent that although the remedy of removal is based on the right 
to ensure undisturbed use of the land based on ownership, courts may deny removal 
in some cases.136 Therefore, it was important to ask when it would be acceptable to 
insist upon removal of an encroaching structure on your land. Stated differently, it is 
important to determine when it would be justifiable to limit ownership by ordering that 
an encroaching structure should remain in place, even against compensation. 
 
My conclusion was that in the case of minor encroachments it may be inappropriate 
to insist upon removal. In this case the limitation on the right of ownership is 
relatively small and if the landowner insists upon removal it may be considered to 
reflect an absolutist view of ownership (abuse of right). This is primarily because 
what is being insisted upon (namely the removal of the encroachment) is 
unreasonable and disproportionate compared with the minor limitation on the 
ownership rights of the affected landowner. 
 
However, in cases where the encroachment is significant and imposes a serious 
limitation on the rights of the affected landowner it seems questionable whether it 
would amount to an abuse of right or in line with an absolutist view of ownership to 
insist upon removal. Nonetheless, it was seen this way in the Brian Lackey Trust 
case, where the court saw the demand for removal as an indication that the owner 
inappropriately viewed ownership as an absolute right. 
 
What has transpired from recent case law is that courts are willing to refuse to order 
the removal of unlawfully erected encroaching buildings, even in cases of significant 
encroachments. In both the Rand Waterraad and Brian Lackey Trust cases the 
respective courts ordered that the encroachment should remain in place, even 
though the continued existence of the encroachment resulted in a serious limitation 
of the affected landowner’s right. In the next chapter I question when it will be 
justifiable to leave an encroaching structure in place and to award compensation 
instead of removal. Therefore, I assess the discretion of the courts in the context of 
building encroachments. 
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Chapter 3: Judicial discretion 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A landowner affected by a building encroachment might comprehend how a court 
could deny an application for the removal of a neighbour’s wall that results in a minor 
encroachment on his property. However, it might be very difficult to understand how 
a court could find that it would be just and equitable that a large house partially built 
unlawfully on his property should remain in place, effectively rendering the property 
useless to him. The difference between the above-mentioned scenarios is important 
in this chapter. 
 
Judicial discretion can be seen as the highest form of power given to the judiciary to 
decide a matter based on a value judgement. Herein lies the power given to courts 
not only to decide against a claimant whose rights were infringed, but also to 
override certain established rules and law, based on what is considered just and 
equitable in a particular case. In the following section, it is established that the notion 
of judicial discretion in the framework of building encroachments is not an idea which 
is characteristic only of contemporary law pertaining to building encroachments, but 
that such a wide and equitable discretion is entirely consistent with the approach of 
our law to similar situations in other areas.1 
 
There are three questions that are relevant when considering judicial discretion in 
the context of building encroachments in South Africa. Firstly, it is necessary to 
question whether South African courts do have the discretion to deny the remedy of 
removal and leave an encroaching structure intact. South African jurisprudence will 
be investigated in this regard. Secondly, if it is accepted that the discretion does 
exist, it needs to be determined in which cases the discretion is (or should be) 
exercised. I will focus primarily on how the courts make the decision to keep an 
encroaching structure intact. The cases in which the discretion has been exercised 
                                                 
1
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 28. 
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are mapped out in order to ascertain whether there is some sort of common ground 
or similar methodology which could indicate the factors that are taken into 
consideration when the discretion is exercised. Both Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n 
Ander (“Rand Wateraad”)2 and Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale (“Brian 
Lackey Trust”)3 raised two important issues that will be addressed in the section 
below: firstly, whether South African courts have the discretion to award 
compensation instead of removal; and secondly, in which cases it would be 
appropriate to exercise the discretion and leave the encroachment in place. As with 
the Rand Waterraad decision, the Cape High Court in Brian Lackey Trust also relied 
on neighbour law principles like reasonableness and fairness to reach an outcome 
that balances the interests of the two property owners. Neighbour law principles and 
disproportionality of prejudice are justifications prevalent in the case law, and are 
consequently analysed in the chapter. It will become clear that neighbour law 
principles - such as reasonableness and fairness - that are generally used in the 
context of nuisance law are also relied upon to solve the encroachment problem.4 
The resulting confusion is highlighted below. With regard to the disproportionality of 
prejudice argument, it seems as if the rights-based paradigm (i e the party with the 
strongest right will almost always win, based on his entitlement) is being 
compromised. Instead, the courts decide to award compensation instead of removal 
by taking into consideration the potential harm that could be suffered either as a 
result of demolition or as a result of denial of a demolition order. 
 
It seems as though South African courts are influenced by English law in building 
encroachment cases.5 The exercise of discretion is not as problematic in English law 
                                                 
2
  1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
3
  2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
4
  A Pope “Encroachment or accession? The importance of the extent of encroachment in light 
of South African constitutional principles” (2007) 124 SALJ 537-556 at 552-553 questions whether 
these reasons are acceptable when solving encroachment problems. She states that these reasons 
would be more acceptable when dealing with minor encroachments, but where the affected neighbour 
is deprived of the whole of his land she argues that in terms of the test in FNB a more compelling 
reason would be necessary for the deprivation to be in line with the requirements of s 25 of the 
Constitution. See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). See further chap 
5 below. 
5
  See s 3.4.3 below. 
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as in South African law, because there is a statute authorising the discretion6 and 
because the English doctrine of estates in land makes it possible for two different 
rights in the same land to exist simultaneously.7 It will accordingly be necessary to 
look at the English law pertaining to building encroachments to see whether the 
approach in terms of English law is used or may be useful in the South African 
context. 
 
Finally, the extent of the discretion is considered. It is necessary to question what the 
ambit of the courts power is in terms of the discretion, especially considering the 
uncertainty that exists with regard to this question. The extent of the discretion is 
important because it needs to be determined what the discretion authorises the court 
to order. It will become clear in later chapters that the extent of the discretion is 
pivotal in explaining the outcome that is reached in encroachment cases.8 This is 
because the outcome in an encroachment dispute needs to be explained doctrinally 
and must be constitutionally compliant. In some cases, leaving the encroachment 
intact can result in the loss of the entitlement of use and enjoyment of the portion of 
the property on which the encroachment is erected. In other cases, where transfer of 
the affected land is explicitly ordered, the discretion-based outcome may amount to a 
forced transfer of property that needs to comply with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.9 
 
In light of the three questions mentioned above, this chapter explores the courts’ 
discretion to deviate from the long-standing common law remedy of removal and 
leave the encroachment in place. The problem with the current approach of South 
African courts is the inclination of courts to apply the discretion without substantiating 
the nature and extent of the discretion and the basis upon which the discretion is 
exercised. This is aggravated by the fact that the authority in South African law for 
the exercise of this discretion is unclear. It needs to be clear what the courts are 
                                                 
6
  See s 50 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (England & Wales), which replaced the Chancery 
Amendment Act 1858 (Lord Cairns’s Act), s 2. 
7
  See s 3.4.2 below. 
8
  See chaps 4 and 5 below. 
9
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. See chap 5 below. 
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ordering so that the consequences can be set out in a doctrinally and constitutionally 
acceptable manner. 
 
3.2 Judicial discretion in the context of building encroachments 
 in South Africa 
In 1997 the Free State High Court found in Rand Waterraad10 that it had the 
discretion to award damages instead of removal in the case of a significant building 
encroachment.11 The idea of judicial discretion was not a novel one. Prior to Rand 
Waterraad similar exercises of discretion have generally been accepted in South 
African case law pertaining to claims based on specific performance,12 enrichment13 
and interdicts.14 
 
In encroachment cases, the discretion was sometimes explicitly exercised,15 in some 
cases it was denied,16 and in other cases it was quite clear that the existence of the 
discretion did not form the ratio decidendi of the case, but was simply assumed to 
form part of South African law.17 For the purposes of understanding how the 
discretion is exercised in recent South African case law, it is necessary to analyse 
the earlier judgements where specific reference is made to awarding compensation 
instead of removal. 
                                                 
10
  1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
11
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 138. See further CG van der 
Merwe & JM Pienaar “Law of property (including real security)” 1997 Annual Survey of SA Law 304-
306; MJ de Waal “Sakereg” (1997) August De Rebus 537-538; S Scott “Recent developments in case 
law regarding neighbour law and its influence on the concept of ownership” (2005) 16 Stell LR 351-
377 at 360-362. 
12
  This is discussed in Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 31. 
The court in Brian Lackey Trust used the case of Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 
(1) SA 776 (A) 783 to show how the court exercises its discretion in the context of a claim for specific 
performance. This is confirmed later in the case of Phillips v South African National Parks Board 
(4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] par 24. 
13
  Fletcher and Fletcher v Bulawayo Waterworks Co Ltd 1915 AD 636 at 648. This case 
emphasised how the discretion is exercised in cases based on a claim for enrichment as a result of 
improvements which allegedly increase the value of the land. 
14
  CB Prest The law and practice of interdicts (1996) 233-253 at 233. 
15
  De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217 at 231; Town Council of Roodepoort-Maraisburg v Posse 
Property (Pty) Ltd 1932 WLD 78 at 87, 88. 
16
  Higher Mission School Trustees v Grahamstown Town Council 1924 EDL 354 at 366. 
17
  Stark v Broomberg 1904 CTR 135; Van Boom v Visser (1904) 21 SC 360; Naudé v 
Bredenkamp 1956 (2) SA 448 (O); Meyer v Keiser 1980 (3) SA 504 (D); Hornby v Municipality of 
Roodepoort-Maraisburg and Another 1918 AD 278. This was also identified in Rand Waterraad v 
Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 130. 
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Stark v Broomberg18 provides a good early example of how the Supreme Court, 
without explicitly mentioning it, exercised its discretion in favour of the defendant and 
ordered that an encroaching wall should remain in place. The court held that the 
plaintiff was prima facie entitled to the removal of the encroachment, but found that 
the dispute in this case could be resolved more justly without removal of the 
encroaching wall.19 In conclusion it was stated that it was not the practice of courts to 
order removal where the encroachment has been erected without any protest and 
had stood for a year or more without the affected landowner demanding removal.20 
In such a case, courts would be more inclined to order compensation instead of 
removal. 
 
Likewise, in Van Boom v Visser,21 the plaintiff applied for a court order compelling 
the defendant to remove a building that encroached on his land. In the alternative the 
plaintiff sought an order compelling the defendant to take transfer of the portion of 
property encroached upon, for a determined amount plus additional damages. The 
court found in favour of the plaintiff and ordered that the encroachments be removed. 
However, because the affected landowner was willing to accept damages instead of 
removal, the court stated that the defendant could pay damages to the plaintiff in 
exchange for removal. Therefore, in both Stark v Broomberg and Van Boom v 
Visser, the court effectively denied the landowner’s right to the removal of a building 
encroachment, inclining instead towards an award of compensation. In Stark v 
Broomberg the award of compensation instead of removal was inspired by the length 
of time for which the encroachment stood without protest; whereas in Van Boom v 
Visser, the removal order was denied because the affected landowner was willing to 
accept compensation in exchange for giving up the portion of property on which the 
encroachment stood. 
 
                                                 
18
  1904 CTR 135. 
19
  Stark v Broomberg 1904 CTR 135 at 137. 
20
  Stark v Broomberg 1904 CTR 135 at 138. The year and a day defence against an affected 
landowner’s claim for removal is discussed in chap 2 above. 
21
  (1904) 21 SC 360. 
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Meyer v Keiser22 is another case where, without actually deciding the point, the court 
assumed the existence of the discretion to award compensation. The defendant 
admitted the encroachment but claimed that it was a bona fide error and requested 
the court to exercise its discretion in favour of ordering the transfer of the plaintiff’s 
land to the defendant.23 The court rejected the defendant’s request. Although it did 
not explicitly deny that it had the discretion in certain cases to refuse to order 
removal of the encroaching structures, the court found that the transfer of property 
requested by the defendant could not be the primary remedy. Transfer of property to 
the encroaching owner would, if ordered, be merely incidental to the award of 
compensation.24 
 
The defendant in Meyer v Keiser relied strongly on the case of Christie v Haarhoff 
and Others25 and on the Van Boom judgement. In Christie v Haarhoff the facts were 
similar to those of Meyer v Keiser. The plaintiff claimed that the detriment caused by 
the encroachment was due to the defendant’s carelessness in not meticulously 
ascertaining the boundaries of his property before proceeding with building 
operations.26 The High Court of Griqualand nevertheless exercised its discretion in 
favour of the defendants and ordered that compensation be paid by the encroaching 
owner. 
 
The judgement in Hornby v Municipality of Roodepoort-Maraisburg and Another27 
once again illustrates how the issue of judicial discretion in encroachment cases is 
touched upon, but not clarified definitively. Innes CJ stated obiter that the court 
would be slow to order the removal of buildings if the justice of the case could be met 
                                                 
22
  1980 (3) SA 504 (D). 
23
  Meyer v Keiser 1980 (3) SA 504 (D) at 505. 
24
  Meyer v Keiser 1980 (3) SA 504 (D) at 507; De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217 at 233. The 
extent of the court’s discretionary power is discussed in greater detail in s 3.6 below. Already in these 
earlier judgements it is clear that the question arises as to what the discretion includes. AJ van der 
Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” (2008) 125 SALJ 592-
628 at 611, 617, points out that the courts in the early South African judgements did not always keep 
the two issues of their discretion to award damages instead of removal of the encroachment and the 
power to order transfer of the land apart. 
25
  (1886-1887) 4 HCG 349 at 356. 
26
  Christie v Haarhoff and Others (1886-1887) 4 HCG 349 at 352. 
27
  1918 AD 278. 
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by an award of damages.28 Solomon JA investigated the English law on the matter 
and found that in a similar situation the English courts would be loath to order the 
removal of the buildings. However, he left open the question whether South African 
law should be guided by English law. This point of view was confirmed in the 
subsequent case of De Villiers v Kalson.29 
 
The facts of the De Villiers case are somewhat different from the case law mentioned 
above, but the principle remains the same. Here, there had been an encroachment 
on the rights of an adjoining owner rather than a physical encroachment on the 
property of another. Graham JP stated that there was no reason why this case 
should in essence be any different in terms of the plaintiff’s rights, and found that 
much the same arguments could be advanced in relation to encroachment on rights 
as for encroachment on land.30 
 
The plaintiff in De Villiers had purchased at auction a number of building lots from 
the Municipality of East London, subject to certain restrictive conditions. One of 
these lots was sold to the defendant. One of the conditions stipulated that the owner 
of the property was precluded from erecting buildings within 8 feet of either side 
boundary. After a lengthy investigation into what exactly amounted to the “side 
boundary” of the properties, the court stated that in building in the way that he did the 
defendant had infringed on the plaintiff’s rights, raising the question whether the 
plaintiff could insist on removal of the structure that had been erected in 
contravention of the condition.31 
 
The court stated that it had discretion to give the defendant an opportunity of paying 
damages to the plaintiff. Graham J concluded: 
“After all there must surely be some discretion vested in a Court even in cases 
involving breaches of what are termed negative covenants in the English law, and 
I can find no authority in our law which states that under no circumstances can the 
                                                 
28
  Hornby v Municipality of Roodepoort-Maraisburg and Another 1918 AD 278 at 290. 
29
  1928 EDL 217. 
30
  De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217 at 230. 
31
  De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217 at 225. 
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Court exercise such a discretion. It is quite true that for the reasons stated in so 
many of the English cases, the wrongdoer who encroaches on another’s rights 
cannot be heard to say, unless there are some very special circumstances, that a 
monetary compensation is sufficient, for that would be tantamount to compelling 
the plaintiff to consent to expropriation, but on the other hand it would be equally 
inequitable to place the plaintiff in a position to extort wholly excessive 
compensation from the defendant by granting an order for the removal of the 
buildings in cases in which the facts disclose that a remedy in damages would fully 
meet the justice of the case … I therefore come to the conclusion that I have a 
discretion in this case to grant an order giving the defendant an option of paying 
damages in place of removing his buildings if the plaintiff has satisfied me that he 
has sustained damages.”32 
 
A rather different stance was taken in Higher Mission School Trustees v 
Grahamstown Town Council.33 In this case the plaintiffs had claimed the removal of 
a building the defendant council had erected partly on the property of the plaintiffs. 
The Eastern Districts Local Division confirmed that it had no discretion to “deprive 
the plaintiffs of their common law right to have the obstruction on their property 
removed.”34 It found that in the absence of any defence to trespass, the court would 
not be willing to rule in favour of the defendant and award compensation instead of 
removal. 
 
Any uncertainty regarding the existence of the discretion to award damages instead 
of removal was clarified in Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander.35 The Free State 
High Court in Rand Waterraad, after undertaking a thorough investigation of early 
South African case law in which the discretion was assumed, stated that it would be 
willing to exercise its discretion in favour of damages instead of removal.36 Similarly, 
in the subsequent case of Brian Lackey Trust, the Cape High Court exercised its 
discretion in favour of leaving the encroachment in place.37 In Brian Lackey Trust 
Griesel J identified the “crisp issue” that needed to be determined as whether or not 
                                                 
32
  De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217 at 231 (my emphasis). 
33
  1924 EDL 354. The facts of the Higher Mission case are discussed in chap 2 above with 
reference to the applicability of the year and a day rule in South African law. 
34
  Higher Mission School Trustees v Grahamstown Town Council 1924 EDL 354 at 366. 
35
  1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 139. For the facts of Rand Waterraad, see s 2.6.1 in chap 2 above. 
36
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 139. 
37
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 1. 
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the court has a discretion to order what amounts to an involuntary deprivation of 
property.38 In this case, the plaintiff had erected a house that constituted a significant 
encroachment on the property of his neighbour. The plaintiff approached the court 
for an order prohibiting the defendant from removing the encroachment. Both parties 
agreed that in general courts do have the discretion to award compensation instead 
of removal of the encroaching structures; but they disagreed on the extent of the 
discretion.39 The plaintiff argued that the discretion was wide and equitable and the 
defendant argued that the discretion was limited to instances where the 
encroachment was insignificant. The court proceeded on the assumption that the 
discretion did exist and accordingly questioned the circumstances that would be 
appropriate for the exercise of such discretion.40 The discretion of the court in the 
context of encroachments was confirmed recently in the case of Phillips v South 
African National Parks Board.41 
 
In Phillips, the Eastern Cape High Court again illustrated that the discretion to leave 
an encroachment in place does exist in South African law.42 In this case the court 
was faced with the question of whether it had the discretion to refuse an interdict for 
the removal of an encroaching fence despite the applicant having a clear right to 
removal thereof. The respondent had erected a fence on the property of the 
applicant with the initial idea of acquiring the portion of land incorporated by the 
fence (the SANParks portion) from the applicant’s predecessor in title. The sale of 
SANParks failed to take place and it was clear that the fence was an encroachment 
that resulted in the applicant losing a substantial portion of his property. When the 
applicant had purchased his property from his predecessor in title, he was aware of 
the fence and the SANParks portion on the side of the respondent’s side of the 
fence; however, Van Rooyen (the applicant’s predecessor in title) had reassured him 
                                                 
38
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 1. For the facts of Brian 
Lackey Trust, see s 2.6.2 in chap 2 above. See further A Pope “Encroachment or accession? The 
importance of the extent of encroachment in light of South African constitutional principles” (2007) 124 
SALJ 537-556 at 539-541; S Scott “Recent developments in case law regarding neighbour law and its 
influence on the concept of ownership” (2005) 16 Stell LR 351-377 at 362-364; AJ van der Walt 
“Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” (2008) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 
596-600. 
39
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 20. 
40
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 20. 
41
  (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010]. 
42
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
par 21. 
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that the sale of SANParks failed to take place. The applicant had been adamant that 
he was not willing to buy the property without the SANParks portion. 
 
The applicant applied for an interdict to remove the fence from the current position. 
He argued that the fence should be moved to the cadastral boundary between the 
two properties.43 The respondent’s initial claim was that the SANParks portion was 
sold to him by Van Rooyen. With regard to this defence, the court found that there 
was inadequate proof of the sale and therefore the question arose whether the 
encroaching fence should be removed or remain in place. The respondent claimed 
that it would be costly, inexpedient and impractical to move the fence to the cadastral 
boundary. He argued that the court has the discretion to order that an encroachment 
should remain in place on the basis of fairness.44 Furthermore, he argued that 
damages should be awarded instead of removal. 
 
The court confirmed that it had the discretion to deny a demolition order in the 
context of encroachments constructed on the land of another.45 It relied on Rand 
Waterraad and Brian Lackey Trust to assume the discretion to refuse an interdict 
even where the applicant has a clear right to removal of an encroachment.46 The 
court then proceeded with the question whether the discretion should be exercised in 
the particular case.47 Therefore, this case provides a good illustration of the courts 
discretion to leave encroachments in place in South African law. 
 
Based on the above discussion of the discretion of courts in the context of 
encroachments, it seems as though South African courts do have the discretion to 
deny the common law remedy of removal and leave the encroachment in place. It is 
clear that, while the affected landowner can approach the court for an order 
                                                 
43
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
par 2. 
44
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
par 3. 
45
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
par 21. 
46
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
par 21. 
47
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
par 21. 
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compelling removal, the court has the discretion to deny removal and leave the 
encroachment in place.48 The question surrounding the circumstances that would be 
appropriate for the exercise of such discretion is considered in the section below. 
This was an issue in the Rand Waterraad, Brian Lackey Trust and the Phillips 
judgements. In all three cases, the respective courts accepted that the discretion 
existed, but had to determine whether the discretion had to be exercised in the 
particular case.49 
 
3.3 When should the discretion be exercised? 
In Rand Waterraad, the Free State High Court questioned whether the discretion 
should be exercised in the particular case.50 It found that the discretion to deny the 
removal order was dependent upon the circumstances of the case. The 
circumstances in Rand Waterraad involved the respondent erecting several 
structures which either completely or partially encroached upon the land of the 
applicant. As a result, the applicant applied for the removal of the structures that the 
respondent had unlawfully built on his land. The court held that the facts in Rand 
Waterraad were exceptional enough to justify a departure from the default remedy of 
removal which is usually applicable in the case of building encroachments.51 The 
court did, however, attach a proviso, specifying that the discretion should be 
exercised only in exceptional circumstances.52 It took numerous factors into 
consideration in its decision to keep the encroachment in place.53 The court began 
by looking at the time lapse from the implementation of the encroaching structures 
(1979) to the lodging of the application for the first time (1983). It found that the 
applicant delayed for some 4 years in bringing the application. Moreover, the 
applicant had already been informed in 1980 by the municipality of Sasolburg of the 
existence of a servitude on their land, but neglected to question the servitude and 
only lodged the application for the denial of the servitude nine years subsequent to 
                                                 
48
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 27. 
49
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 130; Trustees, Brian Lackey 
Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) paras 17-31; Phillips v South African National Parks Board 
(4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] par 21. 
50
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
51
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 138. 
52
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 138. 
53
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 138-139. See s 2.6.1 in chap 2 
above. 
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the notification. The court regarded the tardiness with which the application was 
brought as an indication that the disadvantage suffered by the applicant was not as 
serious as it alleged. The applicant had initially claimed that the conduct of the 
respondent posed a danger of pollution to the public. Based on the delay in bringing 
the application, the court denied the applicants’ contention that the structures caused 
pollution which was a danger to the public. The court concluded that the applicant 
would have approached the situation with more urgency had there been such 
supposed danger. Additionally, the court considered the fact that the cost of removal 
was considerably higher as a result of the long time between being notified of the 
structure and the application for removal. Consideration was also given to the fact 
that the application was brought only when most of the structures had already been 
completed. Therefore, if removal was ordered, the completed (“economically 
valuable”) buildings would have to be demolished. The court emphasised that the 
applicant had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect itself from the harm it was 
complaining about. According to the court, the applicant in this case had neglected to 
do this. This view was taken on the basis that had the applicant been more prompt in 
its approach, the harm that resulted may have been prevented. The court also stated 
that the toilet and septic tanks (being the cause of the alleged pollution) were in any 
event outside the property of the applicant and would persist even if the order for 
removal was granted. 
 
After taking the above-mentioned considerations into account, the court then 
proceeded to investigate the loss that would be suffered if the encroachment were 
left intact and compared it with the loss if the encroachment were removed. In this 
case the defendant was willing to pay damages for the loss suffered by the applicant, 
but the applicant insisted on the removal of the encroachment. Therefore, the court 
concluded that the loss that the applicant would suffer if the encroachment were left 
intact was less than the loss that the defendant would suffer if the encroachment 
were removed. The court also held that the order for removal would be unjust 
because it would result in the defendant’s home being destroyed. 
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Hattingh J concluded his judgement in Rand Waterraad with perhaps the most 
compelling factor swaying the court towards awarding compensation instead of 
removal. On the basis of the ideal of fairness, the court assessed the potential 
prejudice to the encroaching owner if removal should be ordered and compared it 
with the prejudice to the affected landowner, should the claim for removal be 
denied.54 According to the court, this weighing up of potential loss is necessary in 
order to reach a fair and just outcome.55 Furthermore, the court found that the 
applicant did not prove the extent of the loss caused by the encroachment or 
quantify the loss that it suffered because of the encroachment. The court held in 
favour of the defendant after determining that the disadvantage that would have to 
be suffered by the plaintiff would be less than that of the defendant should removal 
be allowed. As a result, it ordered that the encroachment should remain intact. 
Therefore, the court found that as a result of the exceptional nature of the 
circumstances of the case, the discretion should be exercised in favour of the 
encroacher.56 The consideration of fairness emphasised in Rand Waterraad was 
illustrated even more pertinently in Brian Lackey Trust.57 
 
In Brian Lackey Trust the plaintiff sought an order precluding the defendant from 
removing the encroachment that covered 80 percent of his property. It was 
questioned whether removal should be ordered in favour of the defendant, or 
whether the court should exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant, leaving the 
encroachment in place. Both parties involved in this encroachment dispute agreed 
that the court did have the discretion to deny removal; however, there was 
disagreement about when the discretion should be exercised.58 The plaintiff claimed 
that the court has a wide and equitable discretion to grant or deny a demolition 
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  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 136. The court stated that a 
constant normative content must be given to the ideal of fairness in terms of which the actual or 
potential prejudice is distributed equally between the neighbours. In Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 35, the Cape High Court confirmed the view in Rand Waterraad, 
and found that there would be a striking disproportionality of prejudice if a demolition order was 
granted. 
55
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) at 138. This was again reiterated 
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order.59 It is was noted in Brian Lackey Trust that case law prior to Rand Waterraad 
did not provide clarity on this issue. The plaintiff relied on the judgement of Rand 
Waterraad in support of the argument that the court had a wide and equitable 
discretion to award compensation instead of removal based on the surrounding 
circumstances of the particular case.60 Therefore, on the plaintiff’s contention, the 
court can exercise its discretion even in cases where the encroachment is 
significant, provided the circumstances of the case dictate such an outcome. The 
defendant argued that the discretion was limited to instances where the 
encroachment was minor or trivial, or where there had been acquiescence or waiver 
on the part of the affected landowner.61 He relied on English law for arguing that the 
English courts have developed the good working rule for deciding between injunctive 
relief and money damages.62 This would mean that, on the basis of one of the 
indicators in terms of the good working rule as established in Shelfer, the discretion 
will only be exercised in the case of minor encroachments.63 The court rejected the 
defendant’s contention that the discretion was limited only to minor encroachments 
as indicated in terms of the English approach.64 Therefore, Griesel J stated that the 
discretion is not limited only to cases where the encroachment is minor or trivial, but 
that the discretion may be exercised in relation to any encroachment.65 He also 
stated that it can be argued that none of the earlier cases explicitly stated that as a 
matter of law the discretion was not available when dealing with serious 
encroachments.66 Therefore, the court confirmed that the discretion may be 
exercised in the case of significant encroachments. The court proceeded to 
determine whether the discretion should be exercised in the particular case after 
having overcome the hurdle of deciding whether the discretion applies to significant 
encroachments. It concluded that the main reason for exercising the discretion in 
favour of denying demolition is to ensure that removal of the encroachment would 
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not lead to an unjust outcome. Based on the circumstances of the case, the outcome 
would be unjust if demolition was awarded.67 
 
There are two important aspects of the Brian Lackey Trust judgement that need 
further consideration. Firstly, there is the reliance upon South African neighbour law 
principles in determining whether the discretion should be exercised in the particular 
case and secondly, the rejection of the defendant’s claim that the discretion is limited 
to minor or insignificant encroachments. These two aspects will be discussed in the 
section below as possible arguments in favour of the discretion to award 
compensation instead of the remedy of removal in the case of encroachment by 
building. With regard to the first aspect, namely the applicability of South African 
neighbour law principles, the following is important. The court in Brian Lackey Trust 
decided in favour of the plaintiff and denied the order for removal of the 
encroachment. It decided this on the basis of a wide and equitable discretion as 
emphasised in the Rand Waterraad judgement. In Rand Waterraad the court found 
that the discretion should be exercised when all surrounding circumstances are 
taken into consideration. If the circumstances are exceptional enough – as they were 
in Rand Waterraad – then the discretion should be exercised in favour of the 
encroacher and the encroachment should not be removed. The circumstances that 
justified leaving the encroachment intact in Brian Lackey Trust were the following two 
considerations: firstly that the prejudice for the encroaching owner should demolition 
be ordered would far outweigh the prejudice for the affected landowner should the 
demolition order be denied; and secondly of the general principles of fairness and 
reasonableness in terms of neighbour law.68 These two considerations are discussed 
in the section below. 
 
With regard to disproportionality of prejudice, the court looked at the cost of 
demolition, the cost of rebuilding the house and the inconvenience due to the lengthy 
delay before completion, and compared that with the prejudice potentially suffered by 
the plaintiff. The court took into consideration the fact that the defendant effectively 
lost all use and enjoyment of the property, but found that unlike the plaintiff, the 
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defendant would be fully compensated for his loss if compensation were awarded.69 
The court relied on neighbour law principles to justify its decision to award 
compensation instead of removal. Furthermore, an important additional 
consideration was the fact that the encroaching owner was willing to offer monetary 
compensation, but the affected landowner refused to accept it. It was found that, 
should demolition be granted, the affected landowner would be able to use his 
bargaining power to extract unreasonably high amounts from the encroaching owner. 
The conclusion in Brian Lackey Trust was that the remedy of compensation would 
fully meet the justice of the case, and that the encroachment should remain in 
place.70 The court in the Phillips case relied on Brian Lackey Trust and the balancing 
of prejudice in order to determine which outcome would be the most appropriate in 
the particular case.71 In Phillips, the prejudice for both parties was balanced by 
looking at the loss that would be suffered by the encroacher if the encroachment 
were removed and the loss for the affected landowner if the encroachment was left 
intact. The court carefully considered the arguments highlighted by the respondent, 
for example costs, environmental damage and inexpedience. On the other hand, it 
considered the loss for the applicant if the fence were allowed to remain in place. 
The court relied on the language in Brian Lackey Trust and concluded that there was 
not a “striking” disproportionality of prejudice if the fence was removed and placed on 
the cadastral boundary.72 Therefore, it found in favour of the affected landowner and 
ordered that the encroachment be removed. 
 
The second aspect that is important in Brian Lackey Trust is the court’s rejection of 
the defendant’s claim that the discretion is limited to minor or insignificant 
encroachments. As mentioned above, the defendant in this case had relied upon 
English law for his claim that the discretion is limited to instances where the 
encroachment is small. English courts have the discretion to award damages instead 
of injunctions in terms of section 50 of the Supreme Court Act.73 The court in Shelfer 
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v City of London Electric Lighting Co74 established a good working rule in terms of 
which the choice between the two remedies may be made easier. Although removal 
is still the default remedy in the case of building encroachments in terms of English 
law, damages should be preferred in lieu of injunction if (amongst other things) the 
injury to the plaintiff’s rights is small. The English approach to building encroachment 
problems will be considered below, as well as the influence that English law has had 
on early South African case law. 
 
3.4 Arguments in favour of judicial discretion 
3.4.1 South African neighbour law principles 
It was held in Rand Waterraad that courts must always endeavour to harmonize the 
neighbouring owners’ property interests.75 Similarly, it was found in Brian Lackey 
Trust that the aim of neighbour law is to achieve harmony in the relationship between 
neighbours when conflict arises between the respective owners’ interests.76 
Therefore, in both these cases the respective courts appealed to neighbour law 
principles to justify the exercise of discretion in favour of ordering compensation 
rather than removal. However, reference to these principles in the encroachment 
framework has caused uncertainty. 
 
Van der Walt considers the courts’ use of the reasonableness standard to solve 
encroachment disputes.77 He distinguishes between nuisance and encroachment 
cases.78 The reasonableness standard is fundamental in nuisance law. It is an 
objective standard that requires reciprocity, mutual respect and neighbourly 
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forbearance.79 In other words, each neighbour is required not to exceed the limits of 
his rights and unlawfully infringe upon the rights of his neighbour, but also to 
reasonably tolerate a certain level of intrusion (noise, dust) caused by the use of the 
neighbouring land.80 However, the idea of mutual forbearance and accommodation 
cannot find application in cases where a neighbour physically invades the other’s 
land by unlawful building works. In nuisance law, the idea of reasonableness rests 
on the assumption of otherwise normal and lawful use of one’s property, and an 
encroaching building is neither of those. 
 
Based on this view of reasonableness in the context of nuisance law, Van der Walt 
argues that what South African courts have in mind when they speak about 
“reasonableness” in the context of encroachment situations is something equivalent 
to the English law notion of equity.81 He further asserts that the use of the word 
“reasonableness” in encroachment cases should be restricted to what he refers to as 
a “policy call” in favour of the encroaching owner, based on the unfairness of 
enforcing removal. What courts are called upon to do is to weigh up in the particular 
case the possible loss or harm for the encroaching owner should demolition be 
ordered, as opposed to the possible loss for the affected landowner if the demolition 
order were denied. Therefore, reasonableness really means fairness in this context, 
so that the most equitable outcome is reached by assessing the harm, loss or 
inconvenience for either party in an encroachment case. 
 
The real difficulty arises when assessing the harm or loss suffered as a result of the 
encroachment. On the one hand, the affected landowner relies on the loss of his 
property right. On a strictly market related approach, the allocation of resources 
should take place independent of any property rights. Furthermore, if the 
“endowment effect” is taken into consideration it could be argued that the harm or 
loss is not only of the physical property but also the value which the affected 
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landowner places on the property lost.82 This is based on the hypothesis that 
someone values something that they already own more highly than the actual price 
necessary to acquire it. Stated differently, people will very often demand more to 
give up something than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.83 The endowment 
effect is inconsistent with the standard economic theory, in terms of which 
someone’s willingness to acquire the property should be equal to their willingness to 
accept compensation to be deprived of the property.84 
 
On the other hand, the encroaching landowner would be relying not on a right, but on 
consideration of the fact that the rigid enforcement of the common law remedy of 
removal may possibly lead to a grossly unjust outcome. The strength of this 
contention was recognised in Brian Lackey Trust, where it was stated that the strict 
application of the default remedy of removal could lead to unfair results and thus 
should not be applied without careful consideration.85 
 
Susan Scott identifies the “policy call” mentioned earlier as a value judgement.86 She 
argues that equity or fairness necessitates a value judgement in every particular 
case. However, she disagrees with the contention that so-called “billikheid” (equity or 
fairness) has a normative content as was stated in Rand Waterraad and finds it 
unnecessary for the court to have proceeded to an evaluation of equity, which tries 
to fit encroachment cases into the normal neighbour law framework.87 
 
Confusion results from the way in which both Rand Waterraad and Brian Lackey 
Trust relied on the neighbour law concept of reasonableness88 to explain or justify 
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exercising judicial discretion in favour of leaving the encroachment in place.89 It is 
clear from the conclusions drawn in Rand Waterraad with regard to reasonableness 
that the courts are applying their “normal or business-as-usual” manner of dealing 
with neighbour law cases to encroachment cases.90 However, if the principles of 
neighbour law were applied strictly, it is not at all clear that the encroaching owner 
would pass the reasonableness test. Should a reasonable objective person be 
prepared to accept a certain extent of encroachment which condemns him to the 
effective loss of the use and enjoyment of the affected property, in the same way that 
he should be willing to tolerate a certain level of noise from neighbouring land? 
 
Van der Walt criticises the use of the reasonableness standard to explain 
encroachment cases.91 He argues that the justifications for awarding compensation 
in lieu of removal can be explained along doctrinal lines and that it is unnecessary in 
these cases to use the reasonableness argument. The first argument is the 
assumption that it would be easier in principle to justify the compensation award for 
minor encroachments. An award of demolition might seem “outrageous” in cases 
where the encroachment is small.92 It is also suggested that the outcome in both the 
Rand Waterraad and Brian Lackey Trust decisions can be explained with reference 
to the conduct of the affected landowner. 
 
In Rand Waterraad, there was a long delay in the bringing of the application. 
Therefore, the choice for a compensation award could have been explained in terms 
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of some form of prescription (such as the year and a day rule) or estoppel.93 The 
delay could either give an indication of acquiescence or that the negative impact for 
the affected landowner was minimal. The result in Brian Lackey Trust could possibly 
be explained by arguing that the affected landowner was acting in bad faith by 
insisting upon demolition when it was clear that he was willing to accept money.94 
 
From the discussion above, it can be deduced that the term “reasonableness” should 
be applied with care in the context of encroachment cases. It must mean something 
different in encroachment cases than a reciprocal duty to accept the encroaching 
structures, which is what reasonableness means according to the normal nuisance 
law principles.95 The preferable argument is thus that reasonableness as used in 
encroachment cases is similar to equity or fairness and that it requires a balancing of 
the potential loss for the encroaching owner if demolition is ordered against the likely 
loss for the affected landowner if it is not. Therefore, if courts continue using 
neighbour law principles in the context of building encroachments it should be clear 
what they mean, especially if notions such as reasonableness, equity and fairness 
are used as in Rand Waterraad and Brian Lackey Trust. 
 
In the early South African judgements,96 as well as in the most recent cases,97 South 
African courts have followed the English law approach when dealing with building 
encroachments. It is necessary to look at the English law on continuing trespass in 
order to ascertain the influence of English law principles in South African law and to 
assess the acceptability of these principles in the South African context. 
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Although some academics take the stance that English law principles regulating 
property law should not be applicable to South African law,98 what appears from 
South African jurisprudence is something different. In Town Council of Roodepoort-
Maraisburg v Posse Property (Pty) Ltd99 the following statement was made in 
relation to the use of English law principles in South African law: 
“The general rule in the English law, which I shall assume to apply in this Court, … 
appears to be that where the injury done by the encroachment is capable of being 
fully compensated by a pecuniary sum while the inconvenience to the trespasser 
from granting an injunction would be serious, the Court will grant damages and not 
an injunction, but where such injury cannot be so compensated or is so serious 
and material that the restoration of things to their former condition is the only 
method by which justice can adequately be done, then an injunction will issue.”100 
 
Therefore, it is vital to determine where South African law stands in terms of 
adopting English law principles in building encroachment disputes. 
 
3.4.2 English law 
The notion of trespass can be defined in terms of English law as the “unauthorised 
and unjustifiable entry upon land in the possession of another.”101 The fundamental 
nature of trespass seems to be embedded in the fact that every citizen has a right to 
the control and enjoyment of his own property, including the right to determine who 
can and cannot enter the property.102 This common law right supposes that the law 
regards any property as sacred to the owner or possessor, and no one may enter the 
land of another without permission from the owner. Gray and Gray call this the 
“absolutist dogma” which is deep-rooted in the notion of trespass.103 
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Trespass is per se actionable, irrespective of the extent of the trespass.104 The 
remedy available depends on the type of trespass. Depending on whether the 
trespass is recurring or an isolated incident, the court has a discretion to determine 
which remedy should be awarded in the particular case. In general, the possible 
remedies are a declaration of rights, an award of damages or any form of injunctive 
relief.105 
 
What South African law would commonly call a permanent building encroachment is 
known in English law as a continuing trespass, which results in a new cause of 
action arising daily.106 The common law remedy of damages seems to be inadequate 
when dealing with a continuing trespass, as was explained in the case of Jaggard v 
Sawyer and Another.107 Here the Court of Appeal stated: 
“Historically, the remedy given by courts of common law was damages. These 
afforded retrospective compensation for past wrongs. If the wrongs were repeated 
or continued, a fresh action was needed. Courts of equity, in contrast, were able to 
give prospective relief by way of injunction or specific performance.”108 
In other words, equity requires that the remedy awarded in the case of a continuing 
trespass should go beyond the relief of common law damages.109 Injunctive relief is 
deemed to be a better option than damages in the case of a continuing trespass. 
 
Injunctive relief means one of two things: a court can issue either a negative or 
prohibitive injunction, restraining someone from doing something or alternatively, a 
mandatory injunction resulting in the reversal of the trespass.110 Therefore, if 
someone builds a permanent structural encroachment on the property of another, 
the court may issue either a prohibitive injunction to forbid further building or a 
mandatory injunction to order removal of the encroaching structures. 
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In the case of continuing trespass, English courts may deviate from the normal 
practice of granting injunctive relief according to additional powers available in terms 
of the Supreme Court Act.111 Section 50 of the Act stipulates that any court having 
jurisdiction to award injunctive relief may in terms of this provision award equitable 
damages, either in substitution for or in addition to the injunctive relief.112 The court 
can therefore decide whether to order the removal of the encroachment or to award 
equitable damages in respect of future or continuing wrongs.113 This raises the next 
question: how does the court decide whether and when to order removal or to award 
damages? 
 
Gray and Gray state that injunctive relief is not as popular as 20 years ago, and that 
the modern, but volatile, trend of courts is rather to use their power in terms of the 
Supreme Court Act114 to award damages instead of removal.115 Courts are now 
taking considerations of reasonableness, equity and social accommodation into 
account, to rule in favour of damages instead of injunctions. It is argued that the 
absolutist dogma which was originally thought to be the backbone of the law of 
trespass might slowly be weakening with owners having to accept more and more 
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interferences with their property.116 Furthermore, the modern law of trespass is being 
modified by an “overriding proviso of reasonableness”.117 This trend is evident not 
only in case law, but also in various pieces of recent legislation which have imposed 
limitations on proprietorship.118 Therefore, English courts are more readily willing to 
enforce infringements on the affected landowner’s rights based on the discretion in 
terms of the Supreme Court Act. 
 
In Burton v Winters,119 the Court of Appeal exercised its discretion against the owner 
of a property who insisted on the removal of her neighbour’s encroaching garage. 
The court denied the injunction because in the circumstances the garage resulted in 
a minor encroachment and only a slight infringement on the proprietary rights of the 
affected landowner. Therefore, the landowner had to endure the encroachment in 
exchange for the payment of damages to her. 
 
In Jaggard v Sawyer120 the court in a similar fashion found that the plaintiff had to be 
content with the interference with his property. In this case the defendant had built in 
contravention of a restrictive covenant under the mistaken belief that he was entitled 
to do so. He had purchased a plot adjoining that of the plaintiff and which formed 
part of a residential development. This residential development was served by a 
public road which formed a cul de sac. All the plots in the residential development 
were sold subject to restrictive covenants. In terms of these covenants none of the 
owners or successive owners was allowed to build anything immediately in front of 
the plot up to the centre of the roadway. The plaintiff applied for an injunction for the 
                                                 
116
  K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law (5th ed 2009) 1280. See also Jaggard v Sawyer and 
Another [1995] 1 WLR 269 at 287 where the court found that some proprietors had to endure unlawful 
interferences with their rights and be content with damages. 
117
  K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law (5th ed 2009) 1280. 
118
  K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law (5th ed 2009) 1280-1281. Gray and Gray consider 
modern statutes that have limited what they call the “rigour of trespass law”. The Access to 
Neighbouring Land Act 1992 gives a limited right of access to a neighbour’s garden or land for certain 
specified reasons. Before the passing of this Act, adjoining owners had virtually no rights to a 
neighbour’s property. The Party Wall etc Act 1996 allows an owner to obtain a injunction against his 
neighbour for the removal of a wall or fence which causes a trespass. However, if the injunction is 
refused, the claimant is precluded from taking the law into his own hands and removing the wall or 
fence himself. These are two acts that illustrate how there has been an extensive erosion of trespass 
law on account of reasonableness and social accommodation in English law. 
119
  [1993] 1 WLR 1077. 
120
  [1995] 1 WLR 269 at 272. 
72 
 
removal of the driveway which was built by the defendant and which allegedly 
formed a continuing trespass. At first instance the judge in the Weymouth County 
Court denied the plaintiff the injunction for the continuing trespass as a result of the 
breach of the covenants, and awarded damages instead.121 
 
On appeal, the main issue involved the factors to be taken into consideration in 
deciding whether to grant injunctions or to award damages instead. Millett LJ 
indicated that: 
“… it was therefore necessary for the judges to remind themselves from time to 
time that the discretion to withhold it [an injunction], which had existed as well 
before 1858 as after it, was to be exercised in accordance with settled principles; 
that a plaintiff who had established both a legal right and a threat to infringe it was 
prima facie entitled to an injunction to protect it; and that special circumstances 
were needed to justify withholding the injunction.”122 
The court analysed these “settled principles” or “special circumstances” by reference 
to the “good working rule” that was established in the Shelfer case. 
 
Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Company123 is a very important case in the 
history of English property law. It set the precedent for what has been the long 
established “good working rule” which allows for deviations from the principle of 
granting injunctive relief. In Shelfer the City of London Electric Lighting Company had 
erected powerful engines and other works on land near a house which was subject 
to a lease. As a result of the excavations for the foundations of the engines, 
structural injury was caused to the house and a substantial amount of interference 
and discomfort ensued for the lessee. The injury effectively resulted in a continuing 
trespass and the plaintiffs subsequently applied to the court for injunctive relief. In 
the Chancery Division Kekewich J held that the appropriate relief for the plaintiffs 
was damages and not an injunction.124 
 
                                                 
121
  Jaggard v Sawyer and Another [1995] 1 WLR 269 at 272. 
122
  Jaggard v Sawyer and Another [1995] 1 WLR 269 at 287. 
123
  Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287. 
124
  Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 at 300. 
73 
 
The plaintiffs appealed against the decision. AL Smith LJ reiterated in the Court of 
Appeal that the plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to injunctive relief as a prima facie 
remedy, but established a “good working rule” which was subsequently used not only 
in English cases, but also in many South African judgements. This “good working 
rule” sets out guidelines in terms of which the awarding of injunctive relief could be 
relaxed in favour of damages. The court stated that damages could be awarded in 
substitution for an injunction in the following instances: 
“(1) If the injury to the plaintiff’s legal rights is small, 
(2) And is one which is capable of being estimated in money, 
(3) And is one which can be adequately compensated by a small money 
payment, 
(4) And the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to 
grant an injunction.”125 
 
From the guidelines established in Shelfer it can be deduced that certain indicators 
will sway the court in favour of a monetary award. Gray and Gray conclude that, 
although a range of factors are considered, damages is more easily preferred when 
the impact of the trespass is small, while injunctive relief is often reserved for 
instances where the trespass is repeated or continuous.126 If it would be oppressive 
towards the encroaching owner to award an injunction,127 or if the infringement could 
easily be compensated by a monetary award,128 damages would also be the 
preferred remedy. Other factors that have favoured the award of damages include 
delay in bringing an application for an injunction,129 the willingness of the affected 
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landowner to accept compensation,130 and the fact that the claimant has tried to 
demand extortionate compensation from the encroacher.131 In terms of English law, 
if the claimant had refused a reasonable offer of compensation, a court would be 
reluctant to award injunctive relief.132 The most important reason for this is stated in 
Jaggard v Sawyer and Another: 
“The jurisdiction to grant a mandatory injunction in those circumstances cannot be 
doubted, but to grant it would subject the defendant to a loss out of all proportion 
to that which would be suffered by the plaintiff if it were refused, and would indeed 
deliver him to the plaintiff bound hand and foot to be subjected to any extortionate 
demands the plaintiff might make.”133 
 
Another indicator in favour of monetary relief is illustrated in both Jaggard v 
Sawyer134 and Bracewell v Appleby,135 namely where the granting of an injunction 
would not necessarily result in removal of an unlawful development, but would have 
the effect that the property becomes incapable of beneficial use. If an injunction is 
awarded in these cases, the affected landowner is left landlocked because he would 
not be able to access his property. Therefore, an injunction in these circumstances 
prevents the claimant from beneficial use of his property. 
 
English courts have noted that they would generally be reluctant to order injunctive 
relief where houses would be demolished.136 In Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v 
Parkside Homes Ltd,137 the plaintiffs sought an injunction to restrain the defendants 
from building if it was not in accordance with the approved lay-out plans. Additionally, 
a mandatory injunction was sought for the demolition of any building in breach of the 
covenant. The court found that although the developers had built in blatant 
contravention of a restrictive covenant, an injunction was not the appropriate remedy 
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in this case. On the basis of social and economic reasons the court denied a 
mandatory injunction that would result in the houses being demolished. Brightman J 
stated that: 
“a plaintiff is not entitled “as of course” to have everything pulled down that was 
built after the issue of the writ. The erection of the houses, whether one likes it or 
not, is a fait accompli and the houses are now the homes of people. I accept that 
this particular fait accompli is reversible and could be undone. But I cannot close 
my eyes to the fact that the houses exist. It would, in my opinion, be an 
unpardonable waste of much needed houses to direct that they now be pulled 
down and I have never had a moment’s doubt during the hearing of this case that 
such an order ought to be refused.”138 
 
Therefore, although the developer had not built according to the restrictive 
covenants, the court was unwilling to order a mandatory injunction because of the 
dire consequences that such an order would have socially and economically. With 
regard to the question whether damages should be preferred instead of a mandatory 
injunction, AL Smith LJ stated that the guidelines developed in Shelfer are not 
exhaustive and that there could be instances where, notwithstanding these 
guidelines, the court could still award injunctive relief. The examples provided in 
case law are situations where a landowner would be totally dispossessed as a result 
of the encroaching building139 or similarly where the claimant would be permanently 
deprived of a part of her property.140 
 
The granting of injunctive relief seems to be particularly apt where the harm to or 
loss of the plaintiff’s rights is significant or not easily compensable in money.141 
Although the inclination of English courts recently is to grant damages in lieu of 
injunctive relief, there are instances where injunctive relief is inevitable, especially in 
cases where the encroacher acts in blatant disregard for the rights of the claimant.142 
The attitude of the builder clearly plays an important role in the determination of the 
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appropriate remedy. In Regan v Paul Properties143 it was found that the defendants, 
when deciding to proceed with the development, had taken a calculated risk and that 
they continued the construction with their eyes open. Therefore, it was decided that 
injunctive relief was the appropriate remedy in this specific case. In Mortimer v 
Bailey144 the respondent, being the affected landowner, had warned the appellant of 
his intention to bring proceedings should the construction continue. This conduct by 
the claimant played a role in the awarding of injunctive relief rather than damages. 
An injunction was similarly awarded in Nelson v Nicholson145 where it was decided 
that, in the absence of any equitable defence, the claimant was prima facie entitled 
to an injunction. 
 
From the analysis of the English law pertaining to continuing trespass it is clear that 
a claimant, as in South African law, can seek an injunction in order to remove the 
encroaching structure. The defendant in turn can ask the court to award damages 
instead. The claimant should be entitled to the injunction if he can prove that his 
legal right has been infringed by the defendant, provided that there are no defences 
like acquiescence or estoppel that favour the defendant.146 The court has the 
discretion in terms of the Supreme Court Act to take all relevant circumstances into 
consideration before deciding whether to award an injunction or damages. Important 
considerations that influence the exercise of the discretion include the size of the 
encroachment, the attitude of the parties, delays in bringing the application to 
oppose the encroachment and the balance of the effect that awarding either removal 
or compensation would have on the parties. 
 
There is one question that has received little attention in English law. This question 
relates to the proprietary impact of awarding damages in lieu of an injunction. 
Section 50 of the Supreme Court Act empowers the court to award damages in 
addition to or in substitution for an injunction. This power imports the ability on the 
part of the court to give an equivalent for what was lost by denying the injunction.147 
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Stated differently, “[t]he measure of damages awarded in this type of case is often 
analysed as damages for loss of a bargaining opportunity or, which comes to the 
same, the price payable for the compulsory acquisition of a right.”148 It has been 
argued in the recent case of Horsford v Bird149 that what the award for damages 
amounts to is a de facto expropriation. The Council found that the expropriation 
could not be undone and concluded that damages be paid in lieu of an injunction. 
Therefore, the substitution of an injunction with damages results in a de facto 
expropriation of the portion of the property on which the encroachment stood.150 The 
Privy Council stated that neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeal recognised 
that since the encroachment was completed the respondent had exclusive use and 
enjoyment of the part of the appellant’s property on which the encroachment stood. 
Therefore, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeal emphasised the proprietary 
effect of leaving the encroachment in place. This is perhaps because the necessity 
for explaining the consequences of the order in terms of ownership of the land is less 
fraught in English than in civil law. It is necessary to analyse how ownership is 
viewed in terms of English law, because this will show why the proprietary effect of 
leaving an encroachment in place is different and arguably not such a major issue in 
English law. 
 
English law is based on the doctrine of estates in land.151 An estate is an “artificial 
proprietary construct” that explains various forms of entitlements to land.152 Gray and 
Gray state that the doctrine of estates provides an alternative to direct ownership or 
dominium.153 Therefore, they assert that “the holistic idea of dominium (or direct 
ownership of the land itself) which was part of the European heritage derived from 
Roman law” is not recognised in English law.154 Consequently, there is no 
overarching notion of ownership in terms of an absolutist idea of having ownership in 
the land itself.155 A “tenant” – being the one who holds the right in the land – is 
considered to own an estate in the land and not the land itself. By implication this 
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would mean that a claim, in terms of which you would protect a proprietary interest in 
the land, would be based on an intangible thing (i e the estate) and not a tangible 
thing (i e the land).156 This has a fundamental effect on the way one thinks about 
property rights. Generally speaking, one would say that you have property in a thing 
and not that the thing is your property.157 Gray and Gray identify certain 
characteristics of “property” that are important in order to understand why it may be 
less problematic to ask questions about the proprietary consequences of leaving a 
building encroachment in place in English law.158 In the first instance, property is 
relative.159 This means that property is not a “unitary phenomenon, monolithic in 
stature and unqualified in scope”, but rather an abstract right.160 This right in property 
may vary on a wide spectrum ranging in proprietary content. Therefore, there may be 
weaker and stronger rights even in relation to the same piece of land.161 Secondly, 
property in land is more about fact than law.162 Therefore, property is seen as a 
socially constituted fact that exists in terms of empirical realities of life, as opposed to 
an abstract theory of ownership.163 The question is rather whether a person can 
assert de facto possessory control over land because effective possession vests a 
claim of property in land. As a result possession (even if initially obtained unlawfully) 
is ultimately the root of all common law title.164 Thirdly, Gray and Gray assert that 
property is a quantum of socially approved control.165 Property is described as 
concentrations of power over things and every claim in respect of the thing 
represents a different degree of control.166 The amount of “property” that a person 
has in a thing depends on the size of the estate or interest that a person has in a 
thing.167 There is a sliding scale between maximum and minimum property value.168 
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Maximum property value would usually be fee simple, where a person holding this 
right in the property would be able to dictate matters relating to the property to a 
large extent. However, the quantum of socially accepted control is considerably less 
for someone who for example holds an easement in the property.169 Therefore, 
depending on where someone is on the sliding scale he would hold a different 
degree of control over the property. Finally, Gray and Gray emphasise that there are 
different grades of property in a resource. As a result of the gradation of property, a 
number of people could have distinct allocations of property with regard to the same 
parcel of land.170 Therefore, property is capable of fragmentation.171 
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that the way in which English law views 
ownership and property makes it less problematic to explain the proprietary effect of 
denying an injunction. The doctrine of estates in land provides an alternative to direct 
ownership of the land, and makes it possible to have different forms of entitlements 
in the same land. This means that you don’t own the land itself, but an estate in the 
land. This has a direct effect on property, because it means that you don’t own a 
thing, but property in a thing. This proprietary interest in a thing can vary depending 
on the level of socially approved control that a person has over the thing. Therefore, 
a person can have maximum property value with a stronger degree of proprietary 
content as with fee simple, or a minimum property value with a weaker degree of 
proprietary content as in the case of an easement. These two entitlements can relate 
to the same land, because property is gradable and a number of people can hold 
property in the same land. 
 
With regard to building encroachments, the person with fee simple – the affected 
landowner – would generally have the maximum claim in the property. His bundle of 
entitlements in terms of English law would allow a greater amount of socially 
approved control over the property. His proprietary rights may be curtailed by his 
duty to tolerate the encroachment.172 When courts order that the encroachment 
should remain in place, it vests an entitlement in the encroacher to continue having 
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the encroachment there. Therefore, different bundles of power may be exercisable 
over the same land.173 Consequently, apart from potential registration issues, it is 
unnecessary to explain what happens in relation to ownership of the land or the 
nature of the right that the encroacher obtains when demolition is denied.174 
 
From the discussion above, English law can be described as a well worked out 
system of dealing with a continuing trespass. Therefore, it is almost inevitable that 
“creative borrowing” will take place by other jurisdictions.175 South African law 
pertaining to building encroachments has been influenced by English law. It is 
essential to ask questions about the use of these principles by South African courts. 
 
3.4.3 English influence on South African law 
Van der Walt warns against the indiscriminate use of English law principles and 
argues that they should be approached with caution.176 The most important reasons 
provided for the warning against the adoption of English law principles are three-fold. 
The first reason is the distinction between the law of nuisance and the law of 
encroachment in the South African context. This is different from the English law 
relationship between nuisance and trespass. The relevance of this distinction is that 
reasonableness used as a justification for the deviation from the remedy of removal 
fits nicely within the notion of trespass in the English law context, whereas using 
reasonableness language for encroachment cases in the South African context could 
be confusing.177 
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The second problem, linked to the first one above, is the fact that trespass in English 
law is a wide concept that has no South African counterpart.178 Trespass is 
considered to include not only the case of buildings erected on the property of 
someone else – as illustrated as a continuing trespass - but also unlicensed entry 
onto the property of another.179 In this lies the link between the first and second 
reasons mentioned. Because trespass closely borders upon nuisance, the 
reasonableness standard is more at home in English law. In South African law the 
law of nuisance and the law of encroachments are two distinct branches of law and 
the reasonableness standard fits in the framework of the law of nuisance but not 
necessarily that of encroachment. 
 
Finally, English law, in contrast with South African law, does not have to establish 
clarity about the status of the affected land after an order is made for damages in lieu 
of an injunction, as the courts should do in South African law.180 The remedies that 
are available in the case of trespass largely depend on possession rather than title 
(or ownership).181 Based on the above reasons, Van der Walt concludes that 
although English law might seem like an attractive solution for the problem of 
building encroachments in South Africa, the institutional differences between the two 
systems provide a reason why the English law should be approached with care.182 
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In the Brian Lackey Trust judgement Griesel J warned against the acceptance of the 
English approach of the discretion to award compensation instead of removal.183 He 
stated that English law should be approached with caution, firstly because a 
damages award in English law is permitted by a statute for which there is no 
equivalent in South Africa, and secondly because of the subtle conceptual 
distinctions between South African and English law.184 Moreover, it is clearly 
established in English law that the rule is not fixed and can sometimes be 
inapplicable even though all the indications for it are present.185 Nonetheless, 
besides the apparent differences between the two systems, and the arguments 
against the adoption of English law to South African law as illustrated above, it 
seems as if South African courts are not reluctant to be influenced by English law.186 
 
However, in some cases English law has not been applied in the same way by South 
African courts. An example of this is the use of the good working rule that was 
established in Shelfer.187 English courts are clear that in terms of one of the 
indicators of the good working rule, if the encroachment is relatively small it might be 
less likely to order an injunction. Therefore, a clear distinction is drawn in English law 
between minor and large encroachments.188 Conversely, South African courts 
apparently treat all encroachments, small or large, the same.189 Griesel J said the 
following in Brian Lackey Trust in relation to the discretion in the context of 
encroachment by building: 
“In this regard, I can see no reason in principle why the existence of the Court’s 
discretion should be limited to cases of ‘trivial’ or ‘minor’ encroachments. It does 
not make sense, to my mind, to allow trivial or minor encroachments to remain, 
while being obliged to order removal of substantial or ‘massive’ encroachments, as 
in this case.”190 
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Therefore, the court concluded that the discretion is available regardless of the 
extent of the encroachment.191 
 
Van der Walt discusses the differences between small and large encroachments and 
the opinion of the court in Brian Lackey Trust with regard to the statement that all 
encroachments should be treated the same.192 He argues that it depends on whether 
courts are looking at it from the perspective of the encroaching landowner or the 
affected one. He explains that smaller encroachments cause less harm and thus in 
principle should more readily be left in place.193 This is precisely the argument that 
Milton made when he discussed the discretion of the court to deny removal.194 Milton 
stated that: 
“On principle alone there appears to be no good reason why the courts should not 
take upon themselves this discretion, especially where there is only a trifling 
encroachment. This seems to be the view of the majority of the decisions 
considered above and it is certainly only just.”195 
However, larger encroachments have a more dramatic effect for the property rights 
of the affected landowner and thus demolition should be a more serious option.196 
Similar to the English law approach, compensation should be easier to justify in the 
case of smaller encroachments. However, this cannot be the case when dealing with 
significant encroachments, where the affected landowner stands to lose all use and 
enjoyment of a substantial portion of his property. Assuming that one looks at the 
situation from the perspective of the affected landowner and the unlawful 
infringement caused by the encroaching structure, the argument advanced by the 
Brian Lackey Trust court in respect of the shared loss in terms of reasonableness 
has to be rejected.197 
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It is clear from the majority of South African cases,198 including the two most recent 
judgements dealing with building encroachments,199 that courts are empowered with 
the discretion to deny an order for removal in the case of encroachment by building. 
The discretion to leave the encroachment in place is wide and equitable and 
depends on the circumstances of the case. According to Rand Waterraad, if the 
circumstances are exceptional enough to justify a deviation from the common law 
remedy of removal, the encroachment may remain intact.200 This was confirmed in 
Brian Lackey Trust, where the court agreed with the Rand Waterraad judgement that 
there is a wide and equitable discretion to award damages instead of removal of a 
building encroachment.201 The court in Brian Lackey Trust made it clear that the 
discretion is not limited to only minor encroachments, as is the established practice 
in English law. The court rejected the argument by the defendant that the discretion 
is limited to minor encroachments as it is in terms of English law. Therefore, Brian 
Lackey Trust provides precedent for the fact that the extent of the encroachment 
does not play a role in determining whether the discretion to deny removal exists.202 
However, it is unfortunate that in the exercise of the discretion in this case, the court 
neglected to mention the extent of the encroachment as a consideration in favour of 
demolition. In fact, the court did the opposite. It considered the fact that the building 
was completed (and extensive) as a factor indicating that demolition should not be 
awarded. It was argued that courts have a natural aversion to deny demolishing 
economically valuable building works. 
 
If courts are in principle loath to order the removal of buildings that have been 
completed, it is difficult to explain other recent judgements in which demolition of 
buildings was ordered. In the South Eastern Cape Local Division, Froneman J 
ordered the demolition of offending buildings that were infringing on a neighbour’s 
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right.203 In Van Rensburg and Another v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 
and Others,204 the applicant and respondents were residential neighbours. The 
dispute arose as a result of certain buildings on the urban property that had been 
erected in blatant contravention of a restrictive covenant registered on the title 
deed.205 The applicants sought an order for the demolition of the offending buildings 
and an interdict to prevent further nuisance by the respondent. The respondent 
claimed that this was a type of encroachment for which the court had the discretion 
to award compensation instead of removal. He further argued that there is authority 
for the contention that what this amounts to is an encroachment on the rights of 
another in respect of use of adjoining property.206 The court found in Van Rensburg 
that it did have the discretion to award compensation instead of removal but, based 
on the conduct of the respondent, amongst other things, demolition would be the 
appropriate remedy.207 There have also been other recent decisions in which the 
impression has been created that courts are not shy to order the demolition of 
unlawfully erected, but nevertheless so-called “economically valuable buildings”.208 
Therefore, this argument is not conclusive as a justification for denying demolition. 
 
There is another argument that could help explain the way in which property law 
cases – specifically encroachment by building – have been decided recently. This 
argument has not been raised in South African case law, but could aid in 
understanding why one remedy is preferred over another in certain circumstances. 
This is the law and economics argument. Van der Walt argues that the law and 
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economics framework can be used to cast light on the encroachment problem.209 In 
the next section, I consider the law and economics argument for explaining why 
liability rules may be preferred over property rules in certain instances. 
 
3.5 The law and economics argument 
Law and economics theory distinguishes between property rules and liability rules.210 
The applicability and functioning of these rules were encapsulated in the influential 
article of Calabresi and Melamed,211 entitled “Property rules, liability rules, and 
inalienability: One view of the cathedral”, providing a conceptual framework within 
which property law and the law of torts can be viewed from one perspective.212 
 
From the point of departure that in a pollution situation there is usually conflict 
between a polluter and the resident affected by the pollution, Calabresi and Melamed 
argue that the primary issue in such a situation should be the determination of whose 
entitlement should initially be protected.213 Various interests or entitlements enjoy 
varying degrees of protection in law. “Entitlements” are described as rights 
established and protected by law.214 In this case there would be conflict between the 
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entitlement to be pollution-free and the entitlement to pollute.215 Two fundamental 
questions arise: How should it be determined to whom the initial entitlement should 
be assigned? And, how could (or should) that entitlement then be protected? 
 
If it is not determined to whom the initial entitlement should be assigned and how 
that entitlement should be protected, it may result in the strongest one always 
winning. This, according to Calabresi and Melamed, is problematic. Hence, they 
argue that a certain level of state intervention is necessary to solve the problem of 
“might makes right”.216 
 
Property rules protect an entitlement to the degree that the holder of the entitlement 
is assigned the initial protection and anyone who subsequently wishes to acquire 
that entitlement could negotiate with the holder thereof.217 This transaction will be 
concluded in terms of a voluntary agreement between the holder and the infringer. 
From an economic perspective, as envisaged in terms of the Coase theorem, the 
assumption is that there is a perfect market where there are no transaction costs and 
both parties negotiate on equal footing.218 Coase assumed that, if transaction costs 
are zero, the initial allocation of resources are irrelevant because private transactions 
would result in the most efficient distribution. Therefore, the party who values the 
resource the most will end up with the resource. It has been argued that society 
should limit itself to property rules if the above conditions are present.219 This is 
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important for two reasons. Firstly, it will ensure the efficient allocation of 
resources.220 Secondly, protecting entitlements to the extent that the entitlement can 
only be lost if it is given up voluntarily, is in line with the autonomist view of law.221 
The above assessment of property rules begs the question whether liability rules 
might even be necessary at all.222 Calabresi and Melamed answer this question in 
the following way: 
“In terms of economic efficiency the reason is easy enough to see. Often the cost 
of establishing the value of an initial entitlement by negotiation is so great that 
even though a transfer of the entitlement would benefit all concerned, such a 
transfer will not occur.”223 
 
Miceli, although not looking specifically at why liability rules are necessary, 
nonetheless provides an answer as to why the exclusive existence of only property 
rules would be unrealistic in any given society: 
“To this point we have considered a world in which transaction costs are zero or 
low. In most real-world settings, however, significant transaction costs are present. 
In those cases, the assignment of rights may have allocative effects, suggesting 
that property law needs to be sensitive to the bargaining cost of the parties to a 
dispute.”224 
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As a consequence, liability rules foresee the possibility that there could be 
transaction costs and externalities causing market failure. This would preclude 
voluntary transactions and as such, state intervention is essential to bypass private 
transactions.225 Therefore, instead of freely buying entitlements parties may then be 
forced to buy entitlements by state rules. In short, in terms of Calabresi and 
Melamed’s framework, property rules should generally be preferred when transaction 
costs are low, whereas liability rules should generally be preferred when transaction 
costs are high.226 Applying the above rationale they provide a framework to solve the 
pollution problem. 
 
In a clash between the interests of a polluter and that of a resident affected by the 
pollution, the application of the property rule and the liability rule can be explained 
with regard to four rules. Rule one is a property rule in terms of which the initial 
entitlement is assigned to the resident.227 This rule ensures that an injunction is 
ordered against the polluter, putting an end to the pollution. The only way that the 
polluter will be able to continue polluting is if he negotiates with the resident. 
Because of this veto right, rule one will only be functional if there are no transaction 
                                                                                                                                                        
compromised with liability rules, the subjective valuation of the entitlement may not be taken into 
consideration. 
225
  G Calabresi & A Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard LR 1089-1128 at 1092. Krier and Schwab divide transaction costs that 
preclude bargaining into two types, depending on which part of the negotiations is problematic. On the 
one hand, type 1 transaction costs focus on the possibility that there could be pre-negotiation 
difficulties. This could be for instance in cases where there are numerous parties involved in a 
dispute. On the other hand, type 2 transaction costs arise when bargaining between parties is made 
difficult because they cannot negotiate on equal footing. See JE Krier & SJ Schwab “Property rules 
and liability rules: The cathedral in another light” (1995) 70 New York University LR 440-483 at 440. 
226
  G Calabresi & A Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard LR 1089-1128. Polinsky disagrees with the a priori basis of favouring 
liability rules when transaction costs are high. He argues that in a real world situation where there are 
realistic circumstances, damage remedies are not always the best option. Furthermore, the actual 
extent of the damage caused as a result is not always certain. It is argued that this could lead to high 
assessment costs and therefore inefficient calculation of damages. Additionally, a judge might not 
always have the necessary information to determine the amount of damages correctly in terms of a 
liability rule. See AM Polinsky “Resolving nuisance disputes: The simple economics of injunctive and 
damage remedies” (1980) 32 Stanford LR 1075-1112 at 1079. Krier and Schwab agree with 
Polinsky’s view. They assert that the virtual dogma that prefers liability rules when transaction costs 
are high is problematic, given the fact that damages cannot always be assessed accurately by judges. 
See JE Krier & SJ Schwab “Property rules and liability rules: The cathedral in another light” (1995) 70 
New York University LR 440-483 at 452-454. 
227
  G Calabresi & A Melamed “Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard LR 1089-1128 at 1116; AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with 
liability rules: Encroachment by building” (2008) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 614-622. 
90 
 
costs, making negotiation possible. Rule two, a liability rule, will have the 
consequence that the initial entitlement is assigned to the resident.228 Consequently, 
although the nuisance is recognised, the polluter can continue polluting, provided he 
pays damages. The damages amount should reflect an objective assessment and 
any subjective valuation is irrelevant for the court.229 This will typically be in cases 
where there are high transaction costs that render a voluntary transaction 
impossible. The third rule, again a property rule, begins from the point of departure 
that there is no nuisance.230 The initial entitlement is assigned to the polluter, who 
can continue polluting without paying damages. 
 
Initially only these three rules were identified in the law regulating the pollution 
problem. However, Calabresi and Melamed took this approach further and proposed 
another rule that has not been given consideration in prior law and economics 
literature.231 In terms of rule four, no nuisance is recognised with regard to the 
pollution.232 The initial entitlement is assigned to the polluter, who may continue 
polluting unless the resident pays him damages to stop. In effect, the resident would 
be paying the polluter not to pollute. The practical application of this rule was 
illustrated in a nuisance case of Spur Industries, Inc v Del E Webb Dev Co.233 This 
case involved a dispute between a residential developer of a retirement community 
(Dell Webb) and a pre-existing feedlot owner (Spur Industries). Del Webb sued for 
an injunction in an attempt to shut down the feedlot because of offensive odours 
being emitted. It was argued that these odours formed the alleged nuisance. The 
Arizona State Supreme Court found that the activities did result in a nuisance.234 
However, as a result of the fact that Del Webb had come to the nuisance and had 
not been there first, Dell Webb was ordered to pay for the relocation of the feedlot to 
another area. Accordingly, Spur Industries was ordered to shut down only if Dell 
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Webb would pay the relocation costs. In essence, Dell Webb could decide whether 
the relocation of Spur Industries would cost them more than having to endure the 
pollution.235 
 
In an article honouring the contribution of Calabresi’s work to the field of law and 
economics, reference is made to two experiences in German law that can be 
explained with regard to the rules.236 The interplay or dichotomy between property 
rules and liability rules is used to explain how the legal development of 
industrialisation and the protection of privacy rights in German civil law evolved.237 
What follows below is a brief overview of the functioning of the rules in the context of 
industrialisation in Germany in the nineteenth century.238 This may be useful to 
determine how the rules are applied, which could provide clarity as to how they could 
be applied to the building encroachment problem. 
 
Nineteenth century civil law in Germany was based on the concept of absolute 
property in the ius commune.239 The nineteenth century also saw an increase in the 
development of industries in Germany as a result of the Industrial Revolution. The 
greatest fear with regard to industrialisation was that individual autonomy would be 
undermined.240 It was for this reason that there was “a conservative bias against 
industrialisation.”241 Ott and Schäfer explain in two ways what was at the heart of the 
reason why industries struggled to take form in Germany: 
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“The balancing of interests between the incompatible economic activities of the 
new industry and the traditional economy was not in accord with the concept of 
absolute property rights, which was generally accepted in Germany during the 
phase of early industrialisation.”242 
 
The second reason, which is similar to the above-mentioned one, is described as 
follows: 
“The development of nuisance law in Germany during the process of early 
industrialisation is an example of the gradual transformation of norms from an 
autonomist protection of property to a welfarist balancing of interests.”243 
 
In essence, there was inconsistency between the continued existence of the 
industries and the neighbouring landowners’ rights. Industrial use of land was not 
recognised as a defence against a traditional absolute property right.244 Accordingly, 
entitlements could not be acquired through exchange because owners would assert 
their absolute property rights and demand injunctions.245 Property rules, in terms of 
which normal exchange of the entitlements would be able to take place, became 
dysfunctional. The possibility of concluding a voluntary transaction as envisioned in 
terms of the property rules became impossible because of the high transaction costs. 
Consequently, Coasean bargaining, said to lead to efficient allocation of resources, 
was precluded.246 Legislation was enacted to protect industries, gradually moving 
towards compensation awards and away from injunctions.247 The more necessary 
the industries became for the so-called “general well-being”, the less likely it was that 
an injunction would be awarded.248 It is contended that this also marked the 
movement from autonomy, encompassing the idea of absolute protection of 
                                                 
242
  C Ott & H Schäfer “The dichotomy between property rules and liability rules: Experiences 
from German law” (2008) 1 Erasmus LR 41-58 at 47. 
243
  C Ott & H Schäfer “The dichotomy between property rules and liability rules: Experiences 
from German law” (2008) 1 Erasmus LR 41-58 at 46. 
244
  C Ott & H Schäfer “The dichotomy between property rules and liability rules: Experiences 
from German law” (2008) 1 Erasmus LR 41-58 at 47. 
245
  C Ott & H Schäfer “The dichotomy between property rules and liability rules: Experiences 
from German law” (2008) 1 Erasmus LR 41-58 at 48. 
246
  C Ott & H Schäfer “The dichotomy between property rules and liability rules: Experiences 
from German law” (2008) 1 Erasmus LR 41-58 at 48. See fn 219 above. 
247
  C Ott & H Schäfer “The dichotomy between property rules and liability rules: Experiences 
from German law” (2008) 1 Erasmus LR 41-58 at 49. 
248
  C Ott & H Schäfer “The dichotomy between property rules and liability rules: Experiences 
from German law” (2008) 1 Erasmus LR 41-58 at 48. 
93 
 
property, towards a welfare balancing of interests type of approach.249 This provides 
a classic example of the shift from property rules to liability rules envisioned in the 
framework of Calabresi and Melamed. Whether this framework can be used to 
explain the problem of encroachment by building is the next question. 
 
Van der Walt contends that “one might attempt to reformulate the different options 
presented by the four rules for solving an encroachment problem.”250 It seems as 
though the distinction between property rules and liability rules and the alleged shift 
from the former to the latter could perhaps provide a conceptual framework for 
answering questions relating to why the shift from the default remedy of removal to 
the compensation awards has taken place.251 In other words, it could be argued that 
what is happening when courts decide to deny removal and rather opt for 
compensation, can be explained using this law and economics model. 
 
When conflict arises as a result of an encroachment by building, the affected 
landowner will ordinarily assert his property right in terms of an absolute entitlement 
to enjoy undisturbed possession of his property.252 The encroaching landowner, on 
the other hand, might perhaps rely on policy and pragmatic considerations for 
seeking the denial of injunctive relief. The affected landowner could in this case try 
and hold out for a larger sum of money, due to his supreme bargaining power. A 
holdout situation created by the affected landowner results in high transaction 
costs,253 especially if it is a significant encroachment in terms of which the affected 
landowner would be less willing to give up his property.254 As a consequence, 
property rules might in this case be inefficient and a certain level of legislative or 
other regulatory intervention could be necessary where the market fails to bring 
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about an efficient result. Courts in a building encroachment situation may intervene 
to enforce an involuntary transaction between the encroacher and the affected 
landowner if it becomes apparent that a voluntary transaction is precluded by high 
transaction costs. Judging by Rand Waterraad255 and Brian Lackey Trust,256 it seems 
as though the recent tendency to prefer liability rules to property rules in settling 
building encroachment disputes may have been inspired by exactly this kind of 
argument. Perhaps the circumstances in the case are of such a nature that the 
transaction costs are too high and negotiation between the parties is impossible. As 
a result, courts need to intervene and reach an equitable outcome. In the absence of 
such intervention, the affected landowner would always be able to assert the 
property rule resulting in the removal of the encroachment. Therefore, the law and 
economics perspective provides another alternative for answering when the remedy 
of removal (in other words the property rule) should be replaced with the remedy of 
compensation (in other words the liability rule). 
 
The law and economics perspective, the English law approach and South African 
neighbour law principles (if interpreted in terms of fairness so that the most equitable 
outcome is reached) assist in understanding when one remedy should be preferred 
over another. Therefore, these explanations may all be useful when determining 
whether the discretion should be exercised in the particular case. There may be 
exceptional circumstances in a particular case that may dictate favouring one 
remedy over another.257 This may provide a degree of certainty with regard to when 
and how the discretion should be exercised. However, it does not provide clarity in 
terms of what the extent of the discretion is. In the next section, I consider whether 
courts have the additional power to order that the encroached-upon land be 
transferred to the encroacher. Therefore, the question centres on whether courts 
may deny removal and order that the encroacher take transfer of the affected land 
against compensation. This issue is analysed with the aid of case law in the following 
section. 
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  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
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  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
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3.6 The extent of the discretion 
The question that needs to be dealt with in this section concerns the power of courts 
to order that the encroacher take transfer of the encroached-upon land against the 
payment of compensation. What is evident from earlier parts of the chapter is that 
courts do have the discretion to award compensation instead of removal.258 In the 
previous section it has been argued that there are various approaches and 
arguments on the basis of which the courts could decide when to exercise this 
discretion. However, it is uncertain whether the discretion includes the power to 
order that the portion of the property on which the encroachment stands may also be 
transferred to the encroacher. 
 
This was emphasised recently in the case of Phillips v South African National Parks 
Board.259 The Phillips case demonstrates the confusion surrounding whether a court 
has the discretion to order that the encroached upon land be transferred to the 
encroacher. In this case the respondent argued that if the court ordered that the 
encroachment should remain in place, it should also make an order in terms of which 
the respondent would be entitled to the transfer of the encroached-upon land.260 Had 
the court ordered transfer of the land affected by the encroachment, there may well 
have been infringement of section 25 of the Constitution.261 The Eastern Cape High 
Court actually considered the claim for transfer of the land seriously without probing 
questions about whether such a claim can be made and whether the court can made 
such an order.262 
 
Van der Merwe states that a court can, in addition to awarding compensation instead 
of removal and if it deems it equitable, order that the portion of property encroached 
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upon be transferred to the encroaching landowner.263 The authority from which this 
power to order transfer derives is uncertain. The legal ground for the transfer of the 
property in these instances is most probably the court order, with section 33 of the 
Deeds Registries Act264 bringing the deeds register in line with the real situation. If 
this order is made against the will of the affected landowner, the court will be 
enforcing a unilateral involuntary sale of property that needs to be constitutionally 
compliant.265 Therefore, there needs to be clear authority before it can simply be 
assumed that such a power falls within the discretion of the court.266 The early South 
African case law that seems to be relied upon as authority for the view that courts 
have the discretion to order a transfer of the encroached-upon land to the 
encroacher is discussed below. It will become clear that these cases may not 
provide adequate authority for such a discretion. At best, the court in these cases 
merely facilitates a bilateral transaction between the parties where they cannot agree 
on a solution. 
 
There are four early South African decisions that may be important in determining 
the ambit of the courts’ discretion in the case of encroachment by building. In 
Christie v Haarhoff and Others267 the defendants had erected a substantial 
encroachment - approximately thirteen square metres - on the property of the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff applied for the removal of the encroachment or, in the 
alternative, damages for the trespass.268 He claimed that as a result of the 
encroachment he had been unable to dispose of his property and moreover that he 
had been deprived of the use of the property on which the encroachment stood.269 
The then High Court of Griqualand assessed the legal situation and found that: 
“In this case, however, the plaintiff very properly does not press his strict rights to 
the extreme point; and it is practically agreed that the proper course will be for the 
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plaintiff to transfer to the defendants the ground built upon, upon their paying all 
expenses of and incidental to the transfer, together with reasonable compensation 
for depriving him of the ground.”270 
 
The court exercised its discretion in favour of denying removal and awarding 
compensation instead. Additionally, it ordered the transfer of the encroached-upon 
land to the encroacher. However, this was not enforced against the will of the 
affected landowner. The parties were both amenable to the transfer. The court 
merely facilitated a bilateral transaction where the parties could not agree on a 
reasonable amount of compensation.271 
 
The next case in which the issue of transfer of the encroached-upon land was dealt 
with was Van Boom v Visser.272 In this case the court gave judgement in favour of 
the affected landowner and ordered that an encroachment be removed.273 In the 
same way as Christie v Haarhoff the plaintiff in Van Boom did not press his rights 
strictly but claimed, as an alternative to removal, that the encroacher pay £100 to 
continue having the encroachment on the affected landowner’s property.274 The 
court gave judgement in favour of the affected landowner and found that he was 
entitled to the claim for removal. However, the court stated that as an alternative the 
defendant could pay £25 for the transfer of the piece of ground on which the 
encroachment stood.275 Although the judgement is not very clear, it seems as though 
the transfer of the encroached-upon land was dependent on the consent of the 
affected landowner and was not a unilateral involuntary transfer of the land. 
 
In Meyer v Keiser276 a significant encroachment was erected on the plaintiff’s 
property and he applied for the removal of the encroachment. The defendant argued 
that the encroached-upon land should be transferred to him for an amount of 
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compensation. He relied on the fact that the court has a discretion to order that the 
encroached upon land be transferred to him. The defendant wanted the court to 
order a forced sale of the land. Therefore, the question to be determined in the 
judgement was whether a court has the discretion to order the transfer of the portion 
of the property encroached upon. The court rejected the defendant’s claim and 
stated that his argument was based on a misconception of the nature and extent of 
the courts’ discretionary authority.277 It was stated that any order which brings about 
a transfer of property to an encroaching owner is merely incidental to the awarding of 
damages.278 It was decided that damages, or compensation for loss, should be the 
primary remedy sought in these circumstances. 
 
The court in Meyer v Keiser relied on the earlier case of De Villiers v Kalson.279 In 
this case the court exercised its discretion in favour of leaving the building 
encroachment in place. However, it did not order transfer of the encroached-upon 
land to the encroacher. Therefore, this case illustrates that an order for transfer of 
property need not necessarily be made. Such an order would be ancillary, but would 
not be given if it was either impractical or impermissible by law to do so.280 
 
From what has been discussed above, it seems as though there is considerable 
confusion concerning the question whether the courts’ discretion includes the power 
to order that the encroached-upon land be transferred to the encroacher. Even after 
investigating the early South African judgements, it is still unclear whether the 
discretion includes the power to order transfer of the encroached-upon land. The 
judgements that seemingly provide authority for the contention that such a power 
does exist are not really adequate in this regard because there was consent (or at 
least the willingness to give up the property) in the cases discussed. Therefore, the 
transfer of the affected land in these cases was not against the will of the affected 
landowner. However, what is clear from De Villiers v Kalson and Meyer v Keiser is 
that the order for transfer of the encroached-upon land does not have to be made 
and the primary remedy in terms of the discretion is damages. Therefore, the 
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encroacher would always have to claim damages instead of removal as the primary 
remedy and cannot directly argue that the court should order transfer of the affected 
land. The court will then determine whether transfer should be ordered in addition to 
damages, but my guess is that this should depend on the willingness of the affected 
landowner to give up his property. Therefore, as the matter stands, there is no 
authority in either common law or legislation in terms of which the court can sanction 
a forced sale of land in the context of building encroachments. If the affected 
landowner would not want to give up the encroached-upon part of his property and 
the court orders the transfer, the involuntary transfer may be problematic in light of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution.281 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I examined three questions concerning judicial discretion in the 
context of building encroachments in South Africa. In the first instance, it was 
important to ask whether South African courts have the discretion to deny a 
demolition order and award compensation instead. After an investigation into South 
African case law, it is clear that such a discretion does exist and courts have the 
power to deviate from the default remedy of removal in the case of building 
encroachments and award compensation instead. Prior to the recent Rand 
Waterraad decision there were numerous judgements where courts merely assumed 
the power to order that the encroaching structures remain intact, and that the 
encroaching owner pay compensation to the affected landowner instead.282 
However, in Rand Waterraad the question was raised and answered in the 
affirmative. Similarly, the discretion to deny removal and award compensation 
instead of removal was accepted in the Brian Lackey Trust case. 
 
The second question that was analysed in this chapter was which circumstances 
would be appropriate for the exercise of the discretion in favour of compensation 
instead of removal. It was a difficult task to try and establish in which cases courts 
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will deny the default remedy of removal and award compensation instead. It required 
an investigation into how the discretion had been exercised in the past and a 
determination of whether there was any coherent methodology that could be 
identified. The court in Rand Waterraad questioned when it would be appropriate to 
exercise the discretion and deny removal. It found that it is important to look at the 
surrounding circumstances of the particular case to determine when the discretion 
should be exercised in favour of the encroacher. The facts in this case were deemed 
to be exceptional enough to justify a deviation from the common law remedy of 
removal. The main reason for denying the removal order in Rand Waterraad was the 
tardiness with which the applicant had approached the situation. However, the court 
also placed emphasis on the principles of neighbour law in its decision to deny 
demolition of the encroaching structures. In the Brian Lackey Trust judgement, the 
court also had to determine when the discretion may be exercised in favour of 
leaving the encroachment intact. In doing so, it was confronted with the question 
whether the discretion was limited to minor encroachments, or whether the discretion 
could be exercised even in the case of significant encroachments. The court found 
that the discretion was wide and equitable and was not only limited to minor 
encroachments. Subsequently, the court could proceed in determining whether the 
discretion should be exercised in the specific case. It relied on neighbour law 
principles and the argument of disproportionalility of prejudice to reach the 
conclusion that the encroachments should not be removed. 
 
There are three possible arguments that have been used or could be used to explain 
why (and when) it may be necessary (or justified) to deviate from the common law 
remedy of removal in terms of the courts’ discretion in a building encroachment case. 
In the first instance, South African neighbour law principles seem to have been 
provided as reasons why an encroaching structure should not be removed. The 
underlying principle is that if harmony between neighbouring landowners could be 
preserved by not demolishing encroaching structures, this should be done. Courts 
are using the neighbour law reasonableness standard to argue that the most suitable 
outcome should be sought. However, with regard to the above-mentioned argument, 
it seems as though courts probably mean fairness in the sense that there should be 
a balancing of conflicting interests to reach the most just outcome. This is assuming 
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that all the circumstances of the case are taken into consideration, including for 
example whether an affected landowner would suffer virtually no harm if the 
encroachment remained intact, while the encroacher would be greatly harmed if 
demolition was ordered. 
 
The second argument that was investigated in the chapter was English law. English 
law is being used as authority by South African courts for identifying cases where 
compensation might be favoured instead of removal. The inclination of English 
courts is to opt for the remedy of compensation even in cases where there has been 
a blatant disregard for the rights of the claimant. Similarly, this is becoming prevalent 
in encroachment cases in South Africa. However, English law has in some cases not 
been applied correctly in South African law. It seems as if South African courts are 
using English law principles as a basis for the deviation from the default remedy of 
removal, yet it has not been used in the same way as it has in English law. Although 
the English Supreme Court Act283 gives a wide discretion to award monetary instead 
of injunctive relief to reach an equitable and just outcome, the size of the 
encroachment plays a role in determining which remedy should be applicable in the 
specific case.284 The established practice or settled principles of English courts to 
award monetary instead of injunctive relief in cases where the encroachments are 
generally small, was clearly not adopted consistently in South African law.285 In fact, 
Griesel J in Brian Lackey Trust strongly warned against the use of English law in 
South African cases. Therefore, he rejected the defendant’s claim that the size of the 
encroachment would preclude the exercise of the discretion in the same way as in 
English law. Courts are apparently willing to treat all encroachments in the same 
way, whether the effect is so small that it virtually has no impact on the affected 
landowner, or whether it results in the loss of all use and enjoyment of the property 
affected by the encroachments. In the South African context, this could cause 
serious doctrinal and constitutional issues.286 
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In the final instance, law and economics arguments may be used to explain how the 
discretion is exercised. In other words, the law and economics argument could assist 
in understanding why one remedy (compensation) is preferred over another 
(removal). It is argued that the approach of courts to award compensation instead of 
removal can be explained with regard to the tendency to prefer liability rules to 
property rules in solving building encroachment disputes, where the transaction 
costs would mostly be high. The law and economics framework may help clarify why 
it would be better to prefer liability over property rules in certain cases. In cases 
where there are high transaction costs bargaining becomes difficult or impossible, 
and accordingly there should be a certain level of government intervention in the 
form of liability rules. With regard to encroachment by building, this would primarily 
occur in cases where the encroachment is significant. Therefore, a large part of what 
is happening when courts exercise its discretion in favour of compensation instead of 
removal may be explained using the law and economics arguments. 
 
The three arguments mentioned above and the rationale in Rand Waterraad in terms 
of which the surrounding circumstances of the case should be taken into 
consideration proved helpful in explaining when the discretion should be exercised in 
favour of compensation instead of removal. However, the issue of what the 
discretion includes is important for a discussion of judicial discretion in the context of 
building encroachments. In the final section of the chapter the extent of the courts’ 
discretion was examined. Even after an investigation into early South African case 
law it is uncertain whether the court has the power in terms of the discretion to order 
that the encroached-upon portion of the property be transferred to the encroacher. 
The two cases that are generally relied upon as authority for the discretion to order 
transfer of the encroached-upon land are unclear. In both Christie v Haarhoff and 
Van Boom v Visser, it seems as though the order was not made against the affected 
landowner’s will. There was some sort of indication that he would be willing to accept 
compensation for the continued existence of the encroachment and subsequently 
the loss of the encroached-upon portion of the property. There is authority for the 
fact that the order for transfer of the encroached-upon land does not have to be 
made when the discretion is exercised in favour of compensation instead of 
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removal.287 Damages would be the primary remedy in terms of the discretion. As a 
result, an encroacher cannot argue that a court should exercise its discretion in 
favour of transfer of affected land. An order like this would be ancillary to the 
damages award. This creates the impression that transfer may be awarded if the 
court, like Van der Merwe argued, deems it equitable. However, this aspect of the 
law regulating building encroachments is very unclear and consequently there may 
be implications that need to be addressed. 
 
If a court orders the transfer of the affected land to the encroacher and the affected 
landowner does not consent, this court ordered transfer results in a unilateral 
involuntary transfer of the affected property. This needs to comply with section 25(1) 
of the Constitution.288 If a court does not order transfer and the encroachment 
remains in place, it is necessary to find a doctrinal solution for explaining the rights of 
the parties to the affected land once the compensation order has been given. The 
doctrinal problem that may arise is discussed in the chapter below.
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Chapter 4: Doctrinal implications of the new 
approach to building encroachments 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Forty years ago Milton pointed out the “unsatisfactory state” of the law regulating 
building encroachments in South Africa.1 It seems as if contemporary law on the 
matter is in no better state. Anne Pope argues that a possible explanation for the 
unsatisfactory status quo is the confusion that exists between principle and policy.2 
The interplay between what Pope calls principle (supporting the default remedy of 
removal) and policy (the instances where deviation from the default remedy of 
removal is permitted), will be important in this chapter. The intention of this chapter is 
not to try and set out the most ideal property law system within which building 
encroachment problems could be solved. The idea is rather to identify some 
uncertainties in the current way courts are dealing with an encroaching structure, 
and possibly provide clarification on the issue. Therefore, in this chapter I try to 
identify the doctrinal implications of the outcomes resulting from building 
encroachment disputes. It will be important to look at the effects of keeping an 
encroaching structure in place, especially in the case where the encroachment is 
significant. 
 
Chapter 3 created a platform for highlighting the courts’ discretion in the context of 
building encroachments. It is clear that the recent tendency of courts dealing with 
building encroachment disputes is that the discretion to award compensation rather 
than order removal is more readily exercised in favour of the encroacher where 
policy considerations dictate such an outcome.3 It was established that this 
discretion is wide and equitable and dependant on the particular circumstances of 
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the case.4 It was confirmed that the discretion was not limited to minor 
encroachments but that it may be exercised even in the case of significant 
encroachments.5 It was also clear from the previous chapter that there is still 
uncertainty regarding the extent of the courts’ discretion. It remains unclear whether 
the discretion authorises only the replacement of injunctive relief with compensation 
(which could result in the effective transfer of use rights), or additionally allows the 
court to order that ownership of the affected land be transferred to the encroaching 
landowner.6 
 
In this chapter I focus on what happens when the court denies the demolition order 
but says nothing about the rights of the respective landowners in a building 
encroachment dispute. If it is possible to leave a building encroachment in place on 
policy grounds even if the encroachment is extensive, what needs to be explained is 
what happens when the land is not transferred to the encroacher when the 
encroachment remains in place. The effect is that one person owns the land and 
another the buildings erected on the land. I will question whether this is possible in 
the South African context with reference to the principle of attachment. If attachment 
takes place normally, the affected landowner would own the land and everything that 
forms part of the land. Therefore, he would be able to have the encroachment 
demolished. To explain why he does not have the right to have the encroachment 
demolished, one would have to get past the principle of attachment. I examine the 
principle of attachment in order to determine why it does not take place in the case of 
encroachment by building. 
 
Generally speaking, the principle of accession (specifically inaedificatio) governs the 
situation where buildings are erected on land.7 The rules of accession are applicable 
in cases where one person builds on the land of another.8 Encroachment indicates 
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“the situation where a building is erected wholly or substantially on a neighbour’s 
land”.9 When building materials are used in building on land, they usually attach to 
the land and the materials cease to exist independently and become part of the land. 
The owner of the land owns the structure erected on the land because it forms part 
of the land and therefore he can claim demolition of the structure. Therefore, the 
remedy of removal is based on the principle of attachment. It will become clear that 
no mention is made of the principle of attachment in the case of encroachment by 
building. The implications that these building encroachment court orders have for the 
law of attachment are identified and investigated below. It is necessary in this 
chapter to give a brief introduction to the principle of accession in South African law. 
This will be important in order to establish how it may be possible to preclude the 
normal occurrence of accession. The role of the subjective intention of the owner of 
the movable is important in this regard, especially considering recent accession case 
law in which the subjective intention of the owner of the movable was considered to 
be the deciding factor. As a result of the development that has taken place in the law 
regulating accession, it seems as though it is possible to preclude the occurrence of 
accession despite the buildings having been permanently affixed to the land, if 
accession was not in accordance with the subjective intention of the owner of the 
movable. Even when the objective, physical factors indicate that attachment did 
occur, accession could still be precluded according to the subjective test. This new 
approach in accession cases may be important in the context of encroachment by 
building. When a court refuses to order the removal of an encroachment, it is in 
effect denying the occurrence of attachment. I will consider whether the occurrence 
of accession can be precluded by arguing that it was never the intention of the 
encroacher that accession should occur. If accession did not take place, it would 
mean that the building belongs to the encroacher and the land to the affected 
landowner. This may provide a doctrinal explanation for the situation that results 
when a building encroachment is left in place. 
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Another possibility that may provide a doctrinal explanation for what happens when a 
building encroachment remains in place is the argument that accession would 
normally have taken place, but the court decides that the principle is suspended for 
policy reasons. I examine several examples of such an argument for suspension of 
the normal principles of attachment below. The first example is Pope’s approach, in 
which she looks at the likelihood of suspending the principle of attachment in limited 
instances. In terms of her approach, the extent of the encroachment should 
determine whether accession or encroachment rules should apply. Pope argues that 
encroachment rules should apply in the case of minor encroachments, in which case 
the principle of attachment is apparently suspended. This is necessary to eliminate 
the drastic consequences of accession, namely the original loss of ownership by 
operation of law. In line with Pope’s argument the normal common law principle of 
attachment is apparently suspended in some cases of encroachment by building. 
However, she limits this to instances where the encroachment is minor. By 
suspending the principle of attachment, the result is that ownership of the 
encroaching structure remains with the encroaching landowner, while ownership of 
the affected land remains with the affected landowner.10 Arguing that the 
encroaching structure does not attach to the affected land in certain cases is 
therefore a second doctrinal explanation for the fact that the encroaching structures 
do not become part of the land by operation of law.11 The alternative, namely that 
one person owns the land and another the structure that extends over it, looks quite 
foreign to the basic principles of South African law. Although this seems to be what 
happens in the above case, it is clear that courts take no cognisance of the rules of 
attachment in the case of building encroachments and consequently the doctrinal 
                                                 
10
  A Pope “Encroachment or accession? The importance of the extent of encroachment in light 
of South African constitutional principles” (2007) 124 SALJ 537-556 at 537; AJ van der Walt 
“Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” (2008) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 
603-604. 
11
  A Pope “Encroachment or accession? The importance of the extent of encroachment in light 
of South African constitutional principles” (2007) 124 SALJ 537-556 at 537; AJ van der Walt 
“Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” (2008) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 
593. In Rand Waterraad the court, relying on old authorities, stated that in the context of the ‘year and 
a day rule’, building works could be acquired through prescription. It was only the work that was 
acquired, and not the land on which the building was erected. This effectively indicates the 
suspension of the principle of attachment. See Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 
120 (O); H De Groot 1583-1645 Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleertheyd 2 5 8 (translated by 
RW Lee The jurisprudence of Holland (1926), hereafter referred to as “Grotius”); Grotius 2 36 5; 
Groenewegen De Leg Abr ad C 3 34 2 (translated and edited by B Beinart & ML Hewett A treatise on 
the laws abrogated and no longer in use in Holland and neighbouring regions vol 3 (1984) 144, 
hereafter referred to as “Groenewegen De Leg Abr ad C” ). See also s 4.3 below. 
108 
 
situation is not always explained clearly. It is necessary to determine in this chapter 
whether it would be possible to apply Pope’s rationale of suspension of the rules of 
attachment to large encroachments to explain the doctrinal effect in cases where a 
demolition order is denied. 
 
I will also consider whether Roman-Dutch law provides another example of how the 
principle of attachment is suspended in the case of praedial servitudes acquired 
through prescription. It will become clear that the right to have building works on the 
land is kept separate from the right to the land itself in the case where a praedial 
servitude is acquired through prescription. Therefore, this provides an early example 
of the principle of attachment being suspended and may help to explain what 
happens when the court leaves the encroachment in place. 
 
Pienaar and Eiselen provide another argument that looks as though it may prove that 
the principle of accession can be suspended to prevent unfair results in certain 
cases.12 They argue that it is sometimes possible that ownership of an accessory 
can remain “slumbering” until the principal and the accessory are separated. I 
investigate whether this may help to provide a doctrinal result in the case of 
encroachment by building by adding weight to the idea that the principle of 
attachment can be suspended. 
 
Therefore, in this chapter I consider two possibilities to explain what happens in the 
case where a court decides to leave a building encroachment in place. The first 
possibility is in line with the new approach in accession cases. The argument is that 
accession never took place because the encroacher did not want to transfer 
ownership. The other argument is that that the principle of attachment is suspended 
to preclude its normal consequences of accession for the sake of fairness or policy. 
Both of these results will make it possible to order compensation instead of removal, 
making it possible for the encroacher to remain in possession of the encroachment. 
However, both of these solutions cause the same problem, namely one person owns 
a building on land belonging to another without any clarity about the respective rights 
                                                 
12
  S Eiselen & G Pienaar Unjustified enrichment: A casebook (2nd ed 2005) 241. 
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to that piece of affected land. Therefore, it is unclear what the relationship is between 
the owners when the encroachment remains in place. It is also uncertain what the 
encroacher gains and the affected landowner loses when the encroaching structure 
is not demolished. Therefore, it will be necessary in the subsequent sections to 
determine what the consequence of the new approach and of the suspension 
argument is, with specific focus on the rights of each party involved in the case. 
When a court says nothing about the rights of the parties after it decides to leave the 
encroachment intact, we are left to infer what the affected landowner loses and the 
encroacher gains. This is especially problematic in the case of significant 
encroachments where, as a result of leaving the encroachment intact, the affected 
landowner stands to lose the use of a significant portion of his property. It seems as 
though it results in a transfer of a use right created by court order.13 The courts’ 
inability or failure to determine and deal with the loss that results when demolition is 
denied causes confusion and needs to be explained adequately. I will argue in this 
chapter that an explanation of the doctrinal effects of these court orders is 
imperative. 
 
4.2 New approach to the problem of building encroachments and 
the doctrinal uncertainty that it creates 
In terms of the new approach to the problem of building encroachments in South 
Africa, courts are now more inclined to keep the encroaching structures in place and 
award compensation instead.14 The remedy of removal, which was said to be the 
default remedy in the case where someone builds across the boundary line, is thus 
not applied.15 Pragmatic and policy considerations seemed to have formed the 
underlying justifications for the move away from the traditional remedy of removal.16 
It was clear from the previous chapter that it should be possible, on policy and 
fairness grounds, in some cases to deviate from the default remedy of removal and 
leave an encroaching structure in place, even in the case where the encroachment is 
extensive. In cases where the negative impact for the affected landowner is relatively 
                                                 
13
  The inferences drawn in this regard could be supported with guidelines from foreign 
jurisdictions. See chap 6 below. 
14
  See chap 3 above. 
15
  See chap 2 above. 
16
  See chap 3 above. 
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small compared with the loss that the encroaching owner would suffer if demolition 
was ordered, leaving the encroachment in place may be a likely outcome.17 This is 
more complex in the case of large encroachments; however, I found in the previous 
chapter that it should be possible in exceptional circumstances to allow even 
substantial encroachments to remain intact.18 The particular circumstances in the 
case would obviously be important in this regard. 
 
In some cases courts have gone even further and ordered the transfer of the 
encroached-upon land to the encroacher.19 The right that the affected landowner 
obtains is clearer in the case where transfer of the affected land is ordered. In that 
case, the right that the encroacher obtains is ownership of the land on which the 
encroachment is erected. Although it is questionable whether this order may be 
made, at least in the case where transfer is ordered the right that the encroacher 
obtains is certain. However, my main concern in this chapter is with the instances 
where we are left to guess what rights the encroacher obtains, in other words where 
the court says nothing about the transfer of rights to the encroacher. If demolition is 
denied and the court says nothing about the rights of the parties in the dispute, the 
question here is how to explain what happens when the land is not transferred but 
the encroachment is left in place. The effect is that one person owns the land and 
another the building erected on the land. This is only possible in our law if the person 
who owns the building has a use right (either personal or real) over the affected land. 
 
Therefore, there are two important issues that are unclear about the outcome that 
results when demolition is denied in a building encroachment dispute. The first 
question concerns the principle of attachment and why it does not occur in the case 
of encroachment by building. Generally, buildings erected on land accede to the land 
in terms of the principle of attachment. The building materials lose their 
independence and become part of the land and the owner of the land is owner of 
everything erected on the land. If demolition is denied, the occurrence of attachment 
                                                 
17
  AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” 
(2008) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 606. 
18
  See chap 3 above. 
19
  The uncertainty with regard to the extent of the discretion to award compensation instead of 
removal is discussed in s 3.6 in chap 3 above. 
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is denied, because if attachment principles were applicable in the case of building 
encroachments, the owner of the land would be able to claim demolition of anything 
built on his land. In the next section I consider the basic principles of attachment in 
South African law, and then proceed to identify the doctrinal problems that the 
outcomes in encroachment disputes have for the principle of attachment. 
 
The second uncertainty that is created when demolition of the building encroachment 
is denied are the rights of the parties involved in the dispute. Currently, it is uncertain 
what the nature of the right is that the encroacher obtains when he is allowed to have 
continued possession of the encroachment. In section 4.3 below I discuss the 
uncertainty surrounding the right that indirectly comes into existence when 
demolition is denied. 
 
4.3 Accession 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In terms of South African common law, if someone builds a permanent structure on 
the land of another, the principle of accession or more specifically inaedificatio is 
applicable.20 If the building is permanent, the building materials lose their 
independence and attach to the immovable property (land). The owner of the land 
owns the previously independent building materials and the structure erected on his 
land, as part of his land, by operation of law. 
 
The underlying foundation of this principle is the Roman law maxim superficies solo 
cedit – also referred to as omne quod inaedificatur solo cedit - which states that that 
which attaches permanently to land accedes to and becomes part of the land.21 
                                                 
20
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 247; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 147. Pope discusses the relationship 
between encroachment and accession. She distinguishes between on the one hand, complete or 
large partial encroachments (in other words significant encroachments) and on the other hand, small 
partial encroachments. She argues that the large partial encroachments should be treated as 
instances of accession and should be removed according to the rules of attachment. A Pope “The 
importance of the extent of encroachment in light of South African constitutional principles” (2007) 124 
SALJ 537-556 at 537. 
21
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 247; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 147. 
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Therefore, the owner of the land is also owner of everything attached to the land 
through accession. Since a landowner affected by a building encroachment would, 
according to the principle of accession, be the owner of the land and everything 
attached to the land, he can demand removal of the attachments. Therefore, the 
principle of attachment forms the foundation of the common law remedy of removal 
in the case of encroachment by building. As owner of the land and permanent 
structures on the land, the landowner can demand removal of structures he does not 
wish to have on his land. 
 
Accession, which is considered a form of original acquisition of ownership in South 
African law, does not occur through transfer from one owner to another. Transfer of 
ownership is derivative rather than original acquisition of ownership because the 
acquirer derives his title from the transferor.22 In the case of accession the owner of 
the movable building materials does not transfer ownership in them to the affected 
landowner; they lose their independent existence by operation of law and therefore, 
in so far as the landowner ‘acquires’ ownership of the movables when they accede to 
his land, the acquisition is original and independent of the cooperation or title of the 
previous owner. 
 
The distinction between these two forms of acquisition of ownership is sometimes 
blurred.23 It has been argued that this is caused when courts place too much 
emphasis on intention as a factor in determining whether accession has occurred.24 
When the courts attach too much weight to the intention of the annexor to decide 
whether accession has occurred, they are in essence moving away from the very 
                                                 
22
  For derivative acquisition (or transfer) of ownership of land in general, see CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 333-345; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s 
The law of property (5th ed 2006) 201-239. See further CG van der Merwe “Law of property (including 
mortgage and pledge)” 1977 Annual Survey of South African Law 231-237 at 235. 
23
  DL Carey Miller “Fixtures and auxiliary items: Are recent decisions blurring real and personal 
rights?” (1984) 101 SALJ 205-211 at 210; C Lewis “Superficies solo cedit – sed quid est superficies?” 
(1979) 96 SALJ 94-107 at 106; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 257. 
24
  DL Carey Miller “Fixtures and auxiliary items: Are recent decisions blurring real and personal 
rights?” (1984) 101 SALJ 205-211 at 210; C Lewis “Superficies solo cedit – sed quid est superficies?” 
(1979) 96 SALJ 94-107 at 106; CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 257. 
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premise of the principle of accession, namely that it does not depend on an act of will 
but takes place by operation of law.25 
 
Accession will occur if it can reasonably be ascertained that the movable is 
permanently affixed to the immovable.26 There are two objective factors and one 
subjective factor that indicate whether accession was permanent. In Olivier & Others 
v Haarhof & Co27 a test was established to confirm whether the building in the 
particular case had attached to the land. It was found that the occurrence of 
accession depends on the nature and purpose of the attached thing, the manner and 
degree of the attachment and the intention of the owner of the movable.28 This three-
factor test was given the stamp of approval by the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court in the subsequent case of MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom 
Dairies & Industries Co Ltd.29 The court in Newcastle Collieries Co Ltd v Borough of 
Newcastle30 stated that each case depended on its own set of facts, but confirmed 
that the elements established in Olivier v Haarhof could prove helpful in determining 
whether the materials had attached to the land.31 It is usually said that the two 
objective factors should be decisive, but as the discussion below indicates, there has 
been a shift towards the importance of the subjective intention of the owner of the 
movable in recent case law on accession. 
 
For purposes of building encroachments, the question is: Can someone preclude the 
occurrence of accession - which happens by operation of law - by claiming that it 
was never his or her intention that accession should happen and that ownership of 
the movables should be lost? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to look 
                                                 
25
  DL Carey Miller “Fixtures and auxiliary items: Are recent decisions blurring real and personal 
rights?” (1984) 101 SALJ 205-211 at 210; C Lewis “Superficies solo cedit – sed quid est superficies?” 
(1979) 96 SALJ 94-107 at 106. 
26
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 248: “Ten eerste moet die aard van die saak 
sodanig wees dat dit permanent met die grond of ander onroerende saak verbind kan word”; 
MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO & The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 at 466: 
“The thing must be in its nature be capable of acceding to realty.” 
27
  1906 TS 497 at 500. 
28
  Olivier & Others v Haarhof & Co 1906 TS 497 at 500. 
29
  1915 AD 454 at 466. 
30
  1916 AD 561 at 564. 
31
  Newcastle Collieries Co Ltd v Borough of Newcastle 1916 AD 561 at 564. 
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at each factor as it has typically been used in the determination of the occurrence of 
accession. 
 
The importance of the nature of the movable thing may be self-evident from the 
inquiry.32 An example of such a movable is cement.33 Cement, as a building material, 
can be assumed to have been attached permanently and become immovable once it 
has become part of a building erected on land, unless the contrary can be proven.34 
However, it would be very difficult to prove that building materials like cement did not 
become part of land once a building is completed. 
 
The manner of annexation is the second factor that can indicate whether a 
permanent attachment has taken place. It depends on the way in which the movable 
has been attached to the soil or the structure.35 There are two questions to be asked 
here. Firstly, it needs to be determined whether and to what extent the attached thing 
had been fixed to the land or the permanent structure in such a way that it lost its 
identity and inherently became part of the immovable. Secondly, the attachment 
must have secured itself to the land to such an extent that separation would cause 
substantial injury to either the movable or the immovable or both.36 Once it can 
reasonably be determined that the movable has become part of the immovable to 
such an extent that separation would cause substantial injury to either the movable 
or immovable, it can objectively be assumed that accession has occurred. 
 
The intention of the owner of the movable should generally be determined by looking 
at the nature and purpose of the movable thing as well as the manner and degree of 
the annexation. The intention of the owner of the movable, which is assumed to be 
indicated by the nature of the movable and the manner of the annexation, is 
                                                 
32
  MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO & The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 at 
466. 
33
  PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 
2006) 147. 
34
  PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 
2006) 147. 
35
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 249-251; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 148. 
36
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 250; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 148. 
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commonly referred to the “inferred” or “imputed” intention. Lewis emphasises the 
distinction between the “inferred” or “imputed” intention, which can be deduced from 
the physical factors, and the so-called “professed” or “stated” intention of the 
annexor.37 The difference between the inferred and the professed intention becomes 
problematic in cases where the inferred intention that is deduced from the physical 
facts is different from the professed intention of the annexor. In these cases, it 
seems as though the “professed intention of the owner cannot be allowed to 
contradict the realities of a given fact-situation.”38 Stated differently, it is argued that 
“the stated intention, must give way to the inferred or imputed intention.”39 However, 
in recent case law this distinction has become blurred and more emphasis was 
placed on the stated intention, even when it apparently contradicted the objective 
factors. 
 
The first two factors are typically considered to be the objective determinants of 
accession, whereas the intention of the owner of the movable is considered to 
subjectively indicate accession. None of the Roman-Dutch law authors provided a 
detailed analysis of what constituted an accession. Voet wrote that the focus should 
be on the physical circumstances as the primary indication of accession.40 Grotius 
confirmed this by stating that the builder’s state of mind or his intention does not 
affect the result from a proprietary point of view.41 The intention of the builder only 
becomes relevant at the determination of compensation that can be claimed on the 
basis of unjustified enrichment.42 Determining how much weight should be attached 
                                                 
37
  C Lewis “Superficies solo cedit – sed quid est superficies?” (1979) 96 SALJ 94-107 at 99. 
38
  PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 
2006) 149. 
39
  C Lewis “Superficies solo cedit – sed quid est superficies?” (1979) 96 SALJ 94-107 at 99. 
Lewis relies on the statement of Van Winsen AJA in Standard Vacuum Refining Co of SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Durban City Council 1961 (2) SA 669 (A) at 678. 
40
  Voet 1647-1713 Commentarius ad pandectas 41 1 24 (translated by P Gane Commentary on 
the pandect (1955-1958), hereafter referred to as “Voet”). 
41
  Grotius 2 10 6-8. Specifically s 7 of chap 10 states: “Therefore, if any one builds upon his 
land, with another man’s timber or stone, he is held to be owner of the building, so long as it stands, 
provided that he is bound to compensate the owner of the material: but if the building happens to fall 
to pieces, then the owner of the material may take possession of or reclaim his property: this rule was 
introduced because it is to the common interest that houses once built should not be torn down.” 
42
  See W de Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (2nd ed 1971) 94, where 
De Vos draws a distinction between someone who knowingly builds on someone else’s property – a 
mala fide possessor – and someone who accidently builds on the property of another – a bona fide 
possessor. In the latter case accession still takes place, but the builder is entitled to fair compensation 
for the building materials lost on the basis of unjustified enrichment. The intention of the builder thus 
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to each of the factors has proved problematic in the past.43 The biggest issue was 
whether the intention of the owner of the movable can override what is evident from 
the physical factors. 
 
In the development of the law regulating the principle of attachment in South Africa 
there seems to be inconsistency in the relative importance attached to the three 
factors. Initially, the traditional approach was that the intention of the owner of 
movable only became relevant to prove accession if the first two factors were 
inconclusive or ambiguous.44 In other words, if the first two objective factors gave a 
clear indication that attachment had occurred, it could reasonably be assumed that 
accession did in fact occur. In these circumstances it would be unnecessary to look 
at the intention of the owner of the movable. In any event, it was assumed that the 
intention of the owner of the movable was unlikely to change the situation. 
 
This approach was nicely illustrated in the case of R v Mabula,45 where the court 
stated that: 
“The main elements of that test have been repeatedly indicated by this court. The 
nature of the structure, the manner of its annexation to the realty, and the intention 
of the person who annexed it; these are the factors chiefly to be considered. But it 
                                                                                                                                                        
plays a role in determining whether and to what extent compensation would be paid. See also D 41 7 
9 12: “On the other hand, if anyone constructs a building on the land of another with his own 
materials, the building will become the property of the person to whom ground belongs. If he knew 
that the land was owned by another, he is understood to have lost ownership of the materials 
voluntarily; and therefore if the house is demolished he will have no right to claim them.” See further 
Grotius 2 10 8: “Again, if any one builds upon another’s ground with his own timber or stone, he loses 
the ownership, which lapses to the owner of the land. But the owner of the land is bound to 
compensate him, if he built thinking that he was owner, or as lessee, unless the building was erected 
not for need or profit, but for pleasure, in which case the landowner has the option of keeping the 
building with compensation, or of permitting the builder to remove it: but if a person has built in bad 
faith he has no recourse save for necessary expenses.” 
43
  Olivier & Others v Haarhof & Co 1906 TS 497 at 500; MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO & The 
Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 at 466; Newcastle Collieries Co Ltd v 
Borough of Newcastle 1916 AD 561 at 564; R v Mabula 1927 AD 159 at 161; Standard-Vacuum 
Refining Co of SA (Pty) Ltd v Durban City Council 1961 (2) SA 669 (A) at 677; Western Bank Bpk v 
Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk & Andere NNO 1977 (2) SA 1008 (O) at 1020; Theatre Investments (Pty) 
Ltd & Another v Butcher Bros Ltd 1978 (3) SA 682 (A); Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal 
Pension Fund (Tvl) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W); Senekal v Roodt 1983 (2) SA 602 (T); Sumatie (Edms) Bpk 
v Venter en ‘n Ander NNO 1990 (1) SA 173 (T); Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie 
(WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A); Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) 
SA 986 (T). 
44
  CG van der Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 254-256; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 148-149. 
45
  1927 AD 159. 
117 
 
by no means follows that they all require consideration equally or at all in every 
case. In many instances the nature of the thing or the mode of attachment may 
conclude the enquiry. But where the application of these is indecisive the element 
of intention may settle the matter.”46 
 
From this it can be concluded that at least in some cases the intention of the owner 
of the movable did not even need to be considered.47 However, where the physical 
factors were inconclusive, the intention of the owner of the movable would determine 
the outcome in the case.48 
 
In one of the earliest cases dealing with the issue of inaedificatio the above point 
was illustrated.49 MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom Dairies & 
Industries Co Ltd50 confirmed the traditional approach.51 It was reiterated that if the 
two objective factors did not give a definite indication of attachment then the intention 
of the annexor/owner could be the deciding factor.52 The appellant company in this 
case had appealed against the decision of the Transvaal Provincial Division in which 
it was found that because the defendant had installed the machinery with the 
intention that it should remain permanently, it had become immovable.53 The 
defendant company had owned a portion of an erf in Potchefstroom on which a dairy 
plant was erected. After selling the whole plant to a syndicate of which Jacobson 
was a member, Jacobson concluded a contract with the appellants for the purchase 
of machinery. In terms of the contract, even upon installation of the machinery, 
ownership thereof would not be transferred to the defendants until the full purchase 
price was paid. Jacobson subsequently fell into arrears with the payments and his 
estate was sequestrated. The appellants applied for the removal of the machinery, 
                                                 
46
 R v Mabula 1927 AD 157 at 161. 
47
  Newcastle Collieries Co Ltd v Borough of Newcastle 1916 AD 561; R v Mabula 1927 AD 157. 
48
  MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO & The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 45; 
Van Wezel v Van Wezel’s Trustee 1924 AD 409; Western Bank Bpk v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk & 
Andere NNO 1977 (2) SA 1008 (O) at 1020. 
49
  MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO & The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454. 
50
  1915 AD 454. 
51
  MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO & The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454. 
52
  MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO & The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 at 
467. 
53
  MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO & The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 at 
466. 
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arguing that ownership thereof still vested in them. In terms of what was evident from 
the physical factors it was described as follows: 
“Part of it is held in position by long bolts and nuts, the former embedded in a solid 
concrete foundation; another part is attached to the wall also by bolts and nuts; 
pipes connecting the various portions pass through holes in the walls, and certain 
tanks and coiled piping are supported and fixed in manner described.”54 
 
Therefore, the conclusion reached by the trial court was that the machinery could 
easily be removed without any substantial injury to the plant. The court a quo 
nevertheless found that the machinery became immovable because of Jacobson’s 
intention for it to become permanently affixed. However, the Appellate Division 
rejected the approach of the court a quo and found that where an owner/seller did 
not intend for machinery to become permanently affixed to land until all the 
payments were made, the machinery would remain movable.55 Therefore, what this 
case shows is that if there is any doubt as to whether the machinery had or had not 
become part of the realty, the intention with which the machinery was attached would 
become important.56 
 
On the other hand, courts have recently developed a “new” approach which elevates 
the intention of the owner of the movable to the most important factor in the 
determination of accession.57 This approach regards the first two criteria as 
indicative of the third factor. In terms of the new approach the imputed intention must 
be considered in light of the professed intention with the aim of determining on a 
balance of probabilities whether the movable has attached to the immovable.58 From 
the point of departure that accession occurs objectively by operation of law and thus 
independent of an act of will, it seems odd that one would be able to preclude the 
occurrence of accession through the subjective intention of the owner of the 
                                                 
54
  MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO & The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 at 
465. 
55
  MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO & The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 at 
472. 
56
  MacDonald Ltd v Radin NO & The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 at 
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movable. Yet, the question whether a movable has been permanently affixed to an 
immovable and specifically the role that intention has played has been questioned on 
numerous occasions.59 The cases that I discuss below illustrate how recent case law 
has dealt with the question of the occurrence of accession. 
 
Standard-Vacuum Refining Co of SA (Pty) Ltd v Durban City Council60 shows how 
the objective factors should give an indication of the intention with which the movable 
was affixed. In this case the imputed intention and the professed intention was the 
same; therefore the objective factors pointed to the intention of the annexor.61 The 
Standard Vacuum Refining Co of SA owned and operated an oil refinery on land that 
fell within the municipal territory of the respondent. The municipality took the tanks 
situated on the land into consideration when it valued the land. The company 
objected, arguing that the tanks were movable because it was never the intention 
that the tanks should become part of the land. The court held that the physical 
factors indicated that the tanks formed a permanent part of the land and were thus 
immovable.62 It was confirmed that only if the first two factors produced equivocal 
results should the intention of the annexor be relevant. 
 
In Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd v Butcher Brothers Ltd63 the court had to determine 
whether chairs and equipment had attached to a theatre building. The Appellate 
Division held that: 
“If a court, on a consideration of all the evidence, direct and influential, were to 
conclude on a balance of probabilities that the annexor intended a permanent 
annexation it would hold that the movable had become part of the immovable. If on 
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the other hand it were to conclude on a balance of probabilities that, in light of 
such evidence, the annexor’s intention was not to effect a permanent annexation 
or if it found itself unable to draw any inference one way or another as to the 
annexor’s intention then it would conclude that the annexed movable had not lost 
its character as such.”64 
Therefore, the subjective intention of the owner of the movable should be considered 
and weighed against the objective assessment of the physical factors to determine 
whether accession occurred. 
 
The importance of intention of the owner-annexor was emphasised in the case of 
Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Western Bank,65 as well as Konstanz Properties (Pty) 
Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (Wp) Bpk.66 In Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk, Trengove AJA 
disagreed with the court a quo in so far as it denied that intention was the most 
important element in the determination of accession.67 In the Konstanz Properties 
case it had to be determined whether an irrigation system which had been sold and 
installed onto the land had attached to it. The court held that although the pumps 
were installed, it was done in terms of a hire-purchase agreement and thus 
ownership would not be transferred until the full purchase price was paid.68 The 
intention of the annexor was the decisive factor in determining whether accession 
had taken place. Therefore, it can be deduced that recent courts consider the 
intention of the owner the movable as the most important factor to determine 
accession. 
 
Van der Merwe criticises the new approach.69 The biggest criticism put forward by 
him against the new approach is the fact that accession is a form of original 
acquisition of ownership, which means that it should in principle occur irrespective of 
the intention of the annexor.70 He argues that one should be able to determine 
whether accession has taken place objectively by looking at the relationship between 
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the building works and the land to which it has been incorporated.71 Furthermore, he 
argues that too much weight has been attached to the intention of the annexor as a 
factor in the determination of accession. As a result of this, traditio as a form of 
derivative acquisition (or loss) of ownership is arguably incorrectly applied in this 
case.72 Similarly, Carey Miller questions the “unjustifiably elevated role” that intention 
has played in the various cases dealing with attachment.73 The same view is taken 
by the authors of Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property, who argue in 
favour of the traditional approach when determining the occurrence of accession.74 
 
The authors of The principles of the law of property in South Africa argue that, when 
deciding whether accession had occurred, there is no fundamental difference 
between the traditional approach and the new approach.75 They use MacDonald v 
Radin (which is usually used to illustrate the traditional approach) and Theatre 
Investment (which is used to show how the new approach works) to emphasise that 
some degree of subjectivity played a role in both these cases in reaching the 
conclusion. In both cases the court looked at the intention of the owner of the 
movable because the objective factors did not reach a conclusive result. The authors 
suggest an approach in terms of which policy considerations should guide the court 
in determining whether accession has occurred. As a point of departure, the 
objective factors should be assessed to decide whether there was a permanent 
attachment. Accession should be confirmed if a conclusive answer is reached in 
terms of an objective assessment of the factors. The normal consequences of 
accession should follow. In other words, the buildings accede to the land, lose their 
independence and become part of the land. Ownership of the building materials 
passes to the owner of the land. However, if an objective assessment of the physical 
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factors leads to an ambiguous result and it cannot be determined whether the 
movables have been permanently affixed to the land, the court should make a policy 
decision. It can either recognise the “new composite thing” by confirming that 
accession has occurred, or the court can choose to preserve the independence of 
the movable by denying the occurrence of accession.76 Therefore, this policy-driven 
approach will either ensure upholding the publicity principle associated with original 
acquisition of ownership, or protect ownership of the movable in terms of the 
constitutional obligation not be arbitrarily deprived of your property.77 It is argued that 
either choice will result in a theoretically sound outcome, because the publicity 
principle and protection of ownership (which forms the underlying principles of 
accession) are adequately considered.78 Therefore, they argue that the subjective 
intention of the owner of the movable cannot on its own force the court to hold that 
accession had not taken place. 
 
On the other hand, Lewis, discussing various judgements dealing with accession, 
supports the judgement of Van Winsen AJA in Theatre Investments. She states: 
“It is submitted, with respect, that the approach of Van Winsen AJA in this case is 
a sound one. It is in accordance with the principle that a change in ownership 
should not be effected without an intention to change it … This is more equitable 
test than one which excludes a consideration of the annexor/owner’s ipse dixit, 
save where physical features are equivocal.”79 
Therefore, Lewis favours the approach where ownership cannot be transferred 
without the consent of the owner, even when original acquisition or loss is at stake. 
 
From the above discussion of case law it is clear that a development has taken place 
in the law regulating the principle of accession in South Africa. Initially, the 
occurrence of accession was determined according to the traditional approach. In 
terms of this approach, the objective factors are assessed and only if they are 
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inconclusive will it be necessary to look at the intention of the owner of the movable. 
However, recently courts have adopted a new approach for determining when 
accession has occurred. The nature and purpose of the movable as well as the 
manner and degree of attachment are indications of the inferred or imputed intention. 
This must be weighed against the expressed intention (ipse dixit) of the owner of the 
movable in order to establish on a balance of probabilities whether accession has 
occurred. This new approach followed by recent courts in accession cases may be 
important to answer some of the doctrinal questions present in the law regulating 
building encroachment. The approach to accession creates the possibility that the 
stated intention of the owner of the movable can override the objective factors, 
especially in cases where the objective factors are not conclusive. Therefore, the 
argument is that if the encroacher did not intend for ownership of the encroaching 
structures to pass, the court can decide that accession did not occur. The possibility 
of this argument is discussed in the section below. 
 
4.3.2 Accession and encroachment by building 
The occurrence (or denial) of accession becomes important in the context of building 
encroachment. If attachment is confirmed in an encroachment dispute, the affected 
landowner can demand removal of the encroachment because it is building works on 
his land. Therefore, the remedy of removal is based on the principle of attachment. 
The affected landowner can decide what happens in this case because it is his land 
and the building works are part of the land. If the encroacher does not want to 
remove the encroachment, he would want to argue that accession did not occur. The 
relevance of the section discussed above was to show how the first argument may 
be possible. Therefore, I tried to show how courts look at the subjective intention 
instead of objective factors in order to determine whether accession has occurred. 
This may lead to the conclusion that accession did not take place because it was not 
the intention of the encroacher for accession to occur. Therefore, even if the 
objective factors may lead to the conclusion that accession did occur, it might be 
impossible to obtain a removal order if the encroaching builder can convince the 
court that he never intended the building materials to accede to someone else’s land. 
In these instances a court may decide, in line with the new approach, that accession 
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did not take place and therefore that the building belongs to the encroacher and the 
land belongs to the affected landowner. 
 
The result would be the same where it is held that accession would normally have 
taken place, but the court decides to suspend it based on policy or fairness reasons. 
Therefore, one could argue that the normal working of accession is suspended. In 
the next section I discuss the possibility of suspending the rules of attachment in 
order to explain what happens when a building encroachment is left in place. 
 
Pope argues that the current approach to building encroachments does not give due 
consideration to the rights of the affected landowner because it does not give full 
effect to the principles of accession.80 Her argument is based on the assumption that 
the principle of accession forms the basis of the default remedy of removal. 
Therefore, if accession was applicable, the owner of the land is owner of everything 
erected on the land and would be able to demand removal thereof.81 The approach 
that she suggests requires that the extent of the interference should be determined 
as a preliminary step in the case where someone builds on another’s land. 
Therefore, the size of the encroachment should play a more significant role in 
encroachment law.82 The extent of the encroachment should give an indication 
whether the rules of accession or encroachment should be applicable.83 
 
If the encroachment is minor, encroachment rules should apply; therefore, the 
normal principles of accession are suspended and the encroachment could in 
principle be left in place. The extent of the encroachment should guide the court in 
deciding whether it should be removed or remain intact. If the discretion is exercised 
in favour of leaving the encroachment in place,84 the extent of the encroachment 
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should guide the court in assessing the amount of compensation that should be 
awarded. Therefore, encroachment rules will only be applicable in cases of minor 
encroachments, where the extent of the interference on the affected landowner’s 
property rights is small. According to Pope, the principle of attachment is suspended 
when courts make a policy judgement and leave the encroachment in place. This is 
because the normal effects of accession which would have resulted in the removal of 
the encroachment would have been unfair in the circumstances. On the other hand, 
the principle of accession should apply when dealing with significant encroachments. 
This is in effect the default common law position, where the affected landowner 
would be able to demand removal as of right because he is owner of the land and 
everything permanently attached to the land. 
 
Pope’s approach may result in the demolition of all significant encroachments. 
Therefore, the possibility is precluded of a discretion-based outcome (as illustrated in 
the previous chapter) in the case of large encroachments, even where policy 
considerations may dictate such an outcome. This is because in terms of her 
approach, once courts have determined that the encroachment is significant, 
accession rules will apply and the affected landowner may demand removal without 
the court having the discretion to decide otherwise. Courts will be bound to order 
demolition of all significant encroachments regardless of the fairness of the result. 
According to Pope, this approach will promote a principled-based structure of 
property law; one where the extent of the encroachment dictates which rules are 
applicable.85 She argues that property law should be principled, structured and 
certainty-based, but recognises that sometimes it is necessary to deviate from 
principle for policy reasons. However, this should be limited and she warns that it 
becomes problematic when the policy considerations become too flexible and cause 
great uncertainty in law. It is for this reason that she suggests that deviation from the 
common law remedy of removal should be limited to minor encroachments. 
Therefore, the encroachment rules in terms of which a court may exercise its 
discretion, should only apply when the extent of the encroachment is small. 
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Case law shows that courts are willing to deviate from the common law remedy of 
removal for policy reasons, even if the encroachment is significant.86 Therefore, it is 
important to find a doctrinal explanation for the cases where demolition for policy 
reasons is denied in all cases and not just minor encroachments as illustrated in 
Pope’s approach. The question is whether it would be possible to use the rationale of 
suspension of the principle of accession in the case of significant encroachments 
where policy reasons dictate this. This question is important in order to open up the 
possibility that the principle of attachment can be suspended even where the 
encroachment is significant, so that ownership of the land remains with the affected 
landowner whereas ownership of the buildings remains with the encroacher. If 
suspension of the principle of attachment were possible in these cases, this may 
provide an alternative solution to explain what happens in cases like Rand 
Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander (“Rand Waterraad”) and Trustees, Brian Lackey 
Trust v Annandale (“Brian Lackey Trust”). Therefore, it is necessary to consider 
further examples where attachment was suspended to see whether it would be 
possible to use this argument in the context of even large building encroachments. 
 
As mentioned above, the underlying foundation of the principle of attachment is the 
Roman law maxim of superficies solo cedit. In terms of this principle, whatever is 
permanently attached to land accedes to the land.87 Therefore, the movables lose 
their independence and become part of the land. In principle, the owner of the land 
owns everything erected on the land that forms part of the land.88 The principle of 
attachment has always been an obstacle in the way of acceptance of new forms of 
ownership such as sectional title ownership,89 a problem that was emphasised in a 
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ground-breaking article of Denis Cowen.90 The most important difficulty lay in the 
idea that parts of buildings were to be regarded as separate objects of private 
ownership.91 It was argued that the institution of sectional title departed from the 
premise of the Roman principle of superficies solo cedit (also referred to as omne 
quod inaedificatur solo cedit) in the sense that “one person or body cannot own the 
land and another person or body own the buildings or parts of the buildings on it.”92 
Cowen explained how the obstacles were overcome in order to accept sectional title 
within the ambit of traditional land ownership. Because of economic considerations, 
the need for “apartment ownership”,93 which would allow for the building and parts of 
land to be owned by different people, was too strong to avoid the development of this 
institution, even against the strong traditional notions of landownership.94 Therefore, 
although there were obstacles that made acceptance of sectional title as a form of 
landownership difficult, sectional title ownership was eventually recognised in South 
African law as a result of legislation.95 This is just one example of how apparently 
insurmountable doctrinal objections against exceptions on the accession principle 
can be overcome, if necessary through legislative intervention, to accommodate 
social and economic needs. 
 
There is evidence in early case law that the rules of attachment can be suspended 
without legislative intervention, which could prove helpful in finding a solution to the 
problem of attachment in the encroachment context.96 The court in Rand Waterraad 
had to decide on the availability of the year and a day rule as a defence against a 
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landowner’s claim for removal.97 Although it decided that the year and a day rule was 
not received into South African law because it was never a part of general Roman-
Dutch law, a very important point crystallised from this specific aspect of the case. 
The court found, without explaining it further, that in certain encroachment cases it 
was possible that the rules of attachment could be suspended. In this specific case, 
it would be acceptable if the owner of the land and the owner of the building on the 
land were two different people. This occurred in the case of praedial servitudes 
obtained through prescription, although it was clear that this was an exception to the 
normal ways of obtaining praedial servitudes.98 Grotius argued, as a point of 
departure, that when accession occurs, the building materials become part of the 
land.99 He differentiated in different chapters between acquisition by consent and 
original acquisition by birth, accession, building and cultivation.100 The exception 
would be the cases where ownership of the building materials remained vested in 
the builder and a praedial servitude was established over the affected land through 
prescription.101 If a building has stood for a year and a day, a praedial servitude 
came into existence through prescription.102 This section says nothing about transfer 
of the land to which the praedial servitude pertains. Therefore, we have to assume 
that the builder obtains the right to have his building materials on the affected 
landowner’s property. In order to assume this, it looks as though the principle of 
attachment is suspended so that ownership of the building materials remains with 
the builder and ownership of the land with the affected landowner. This means that in 
certain cases where a building had been erected on another’s property, ownership of 
the building materials did not pass to the affected landowner, but remained with the 
builder.103 
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This view of the law was supported by Groenewegen, who argued, much in the 
same manner as Grotius, that ownership of the building work was acquired through 
prescription.104 Therefore, it was clear from a very early stage that the order asked 
for in these encroachment cases was not for transfer of the land on which the 
encroaching building stood, but rather for transfer of the right to have the buildings 
on the land. The compensation awarded in terms of the court order was for the right 
acquired through prescription. 
 
Judging from the works of these authors it seems as though it was possible in at 
least this specified case of praedial servitudes that the attachment principle could be 
suspended to preclude its natural consequences, namely that ownership of the 
building materials would otherwise pass to the affected landowner. When the 
servitude comes into being, the builder acquires the servitude over the land and not 
the land itself. Therefore, suspending the principle of attachment in this case makes 
it possible to see the building materials erected on the land as distinct from the land 
itself. The encroaching owner acquires a limited right to have his buildings on the 
land of the affected landowner, while the affected owner retains ownership of the 
land. Compensation is awarded to the affected landowner for the loss as a result of 
the servitude. 
 
Eiselen and Pienaar provide a further argument for what may look like suspension of 
the rules of attachment in yet another context. They state that in Roman law, it was 
possible that ownership of the accessory did not pass to the owner of the immovable 
in certain enrichment cases.105 Ownership of the accessory remained “slumbering” 
until the principal and the accessory were separated. Once separation occurred, the 
owner of the accessory could reclaim it from the owner of the immovable. However, 
Carey Miller and Van der Merwe argue that this principle is no longer applicable in 
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South African law.106 They argue that the owner of the accessory loses ownership 
when the accessory is permanently affixed to the land. Van der Walt recognises that 
although the argument of Eiselen and Pienaar does not provide clear-cut answers for 
doctrinal questions in the context of building encroachments, it may help to “add 
weight to the notion that the effect of accession may be suspended to prevent unjust 
outcomes in specific circumstances, even when the encroachment is significant in 
size.”107 
 
If the rules of attachment were to be suspended even with regard to significant 
encroachments by building, the following line of argument becomes possible: When 
a court orders, for policy reasons, that an encroaching structure should remain in 
place, the normal principle of attachment is suspended. This will ensure that 
ownership of the building materials and ownership of the land are kept separate. The 
builder does not acquire the land itself, but retains ownership of the encroaching 
structure and, by virtue of being allowed to remain in possession of it, indirectly 
acquires a use right over the land. This would provide a defensible doctrinal 
explanation of the outcome in recent building encroachment cases in South Africa. 
Therefore, it should be possible in at least some instances to keep even significant 
encroachments in place and suspend the principle of accession if policy 
considerations are taken into account. The policy analysis may include various 
considerations that were relevant when the discretion was exercised in favour of 
leaving the encroachment in place. These may include unfairness of ordering 
demolition of the encroachment,108 delay in bringing the application,109 the duration 
for which the encroachment has stood,110 malicious intent by either parties involved 
in the dispute,111 whether the loss can adequately be compensated,112 the size of the 
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  S Eiselen & G Pienaar Unjustified enrichment: A casebook (2nd ed 2005) 241; CG van der 
Merwe Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 231; DL Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership 
(1986) 33-35. 
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  AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) chap 4. 
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  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
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  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
110
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
111
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
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  Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287. 
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encroachment, whether removal will result in people’s homes being demolished113 or 
any other factor that may be relevant in the dispute.114 All these policy considerations 
will be important to justify why it may be necessary to suspend the principle of 
accession even in the case of significant encroachments. Obviously, because the 
encroachment is significant, this argument should be approached with caution. 
However, it should be justifiable if two important qualifications are taken into account. 
Firstly, the choice to leave a significant encroachment in place and suspend the 
principle of accession must be a policy-based decision taking all the surrounding 
circumstances into consideration. In this regard, the policy considerations for 
exercising the discretion in favour of leaving the encroachment in place will be 
important to justify suspending the principle of attachment. In any event, the size of 
the encroachment will be important when considering the surrounding circumstances 
of the case. Secondly, courts will have to give due consideration to section 25(1) of 
the Constitution which proscribes arbitrary deprivation of property.115 In cases where 
the encroachments are significant, this may result in the forced transfer of use-rights 
of a substantial portion of the affected property to the encroaching landowner.116 
Therefore, suspension of the principle of attachment may provide a doctrinal solution 
to the uncertainty that exists with regard to attachment in the context of 
encroachment by building. 
 
From what has been discussed above, the situation that results when a building 
encroachment is left intact can possibly be explained doctrinally by saying that 
accession was either suspended, or that it did not take place and the encroacher 
remains owner of the building, indirectly acquiring some kind of use right over the 
affected land. This right that the encroacher indirectly obtains when the 
encroachment is not removed is not explained by the courts. Therefore, in the 
section below I discuss the uncertainty that exists in terms of the rights of the parties 
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  Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (UK); Site 
Developments (Ferndown) Ltd v Barratt Homes Ltd [2007] EWHC 415 (Ch) (UK). 
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  See chap 3 above. 
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  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(1). If the policy considerations do not 
adequately justify the infringement of the affected landowner’s property rights, it may result in the 
arbitrary deprivation of property. See chap 5 below. 
116
  AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” 
(2008) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 606. If the court order results in the compulsory transfer of property to 
the encroaching landowner it needs to comply with s 25(1) of the Constitution. See chap 5 below. 
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when demolition is denied and if one assumes that the order results in one person 
owning the land and another the building that is erected on the land. 
 
4.4 Rights of the parties when demolition is denied 
When a court denies a demolition order and the encroacher is allowed to continue 
having possession of the encroachment, he indirectly obtains a use right (either 
personal or real) to have the buildings on the affected landowner’s property. There is 
no acknowledgement by the courts of the existence of this right, nor is there an 
explanation of its nature. Therefore, it is unclear from the outcome of encroachment 
disputes in South Africa what the relationship is between the owners if the 
encroachment remains intact and nothing is said about transfer of property or 
property rights. What is clear is that one person owns the land and another the 
buildings erected on the land. As I have mentioned above, this would only be 
possible if there was some kind of use right (either personal or real) in favour of the 
person who owns the buildings. What is needed is clarity about the right that the 
encroacher gains and the affected landowner loses in this case. 
 
Speaking about the way forward for South African law relating to building 
encroachments Van der Walt suggests that: 
“South African law with regard to encroachment would benefit from several 
improvements, the most important of which would be greater clarity about the 
respective rights of the encroacher and affected landowner in cases where 
injunctive relief is denied. It would be a great improvement if it were clear that the 
encroacher acquires some kind of limited right over the affected land and that the 
landowner’s right to receive compensation equally establishes a real right over the 
encroacher’s land or building.”117 
 
Generally speaking, the need to obtain clarity with regard to this aspect is imperative 
for the law regulating building encroachments to be doctrinally sound. It needs to be 
determined what the nature of the right is that the encroacher gains when courts 
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  AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” 
(2008) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 628. 
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refuse to remove the encroachment. This right can be a personal right or a limited 
real right (if it is registered).118 If a court says nothing about the rights of the parties 
after the order is made, it seems as though the affected landowner loses the 
entitlement of use and enjoyment over the portion of the property on which the 
encroachment is erected. Obviously, in the case of significant encroachments he 
loses the use and enjoyment of a substantial portion of his land. The court is 
indirectly transferring a use right to the encroacher against the affected landowner’s 
will.119 It is clear that the right is created by court order and not by agreement. If 
compensation is awarded, this would be in exchange for the use right that was 
created. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
South African courts have, in line with modern trends in this field of law, adopted a 
new approach to the age-old problem of encroachment by building. Courts seem to 
be more inclined to leave the building encroachment in place and award 
compensation instead.120 The Cape High Court recently stated that the discretion to 
leave an encroaching structure in place may be exercised despite the size of the 
encroachment.121 Removal is denied if considerations of fairness and equity dictate 
such an outcome.122 Recent case law has also emphasised that the discretion to 
award compensation instead of removal in the case of building encroachments is 
wide and equitable and consideration should be given to the surrounding 
circumstances of the particular case.123 There may be various reasons why a move 
away from a rigid and dogmatic existing principle might be necessary. However, 
change must be clearly defined, so that the doctrinal effects can adequately be 
explained. In essence, what courts are doing is developing the common law; to give 
them the room within which they can make what seems to be the most equitable 
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order in certain encroachment cases. However, courts are doing this without clearly 
substantiating the reasons or exploring the extent and consequences thereof. For 
pragmatic reasons courts are beginning to adopt a different approach to the problem 
of building encroachments, consequently denying the idea of an absolute right to 
demand removal of the encroachment in all cases. However, this new approach is 
not clearly defined and it leaves room for confusion. The implications of these court 
orders could be far-reaching and thus need to be reconsidered. 
 
In this chapter I highlighted the uncertainty that exists when the court in a building 
encroachment dispute decides to deny removal for policy reasons and says nothing 
about the transfer of property or property rights. In effect, this order results in the 
encroacher remaining in possession of the encroachment, while the affected 
landowner owns the land on which the encroachment is erected. I questioned why 
the principle of attachment was not applicable in these instances. If the principle of 
attachment were applicable, the affected landowner would be able to demand that 
the removal order be given because it is building works on his land. Therefore, the 
remedy of removal is based on the principle of accession, because the principles of 
inaedificatio govern the situation where buildings are erected on land. Generally, that 
which is built permanently on the land accedes to the land and the building materials 
lose their independence and become part of the land. As a result, the owner of the 
land can demand removal of the building works because they become part of his 
land. If removal is denied, one would have to question why accession did not occur. 
Or, stated differently, it would need to be determined why the natural consequence 
of accession (i e original acquisition of ownership) did not occur in some cases of 
encroachment. This can be explained doctrinally either by arguing that accession did 
not take place because the encroacher did not intend for ownership to transfer, or 
that the principle of accession is suspended. 
 
With regard to the first argument, in other words that accession did not occur 
because it was not the intention of the encroacher that ownership should pass, it was 
necessary to analyse how courts have started focussing on the subjective intention 
of the owner of the movable instead of objective factors in order to determine the 
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occurrence of accession. This may lead to the conclusion that accession did not 
occur because the encroacher did not want it. Therefore, courts may, in terms of the 
new approach in accession cases, decide that accession did not take place and the 
result will be that the building belongs to the encroacher and the land to the affected 
landowner. This would provide an explanation for why attachment did not take place 
in the case of encroachment by building. 
 
The second argument that I considered in this chapter was that the normal working 
of accession is suspended. In order to establish whether this was possible, I 
considered Pope’s approach to the problem of building encroachments, Roman-
Dutch law authority pertaining to praedial servitudes obtained through prescription 
and the argument of Eiselen and Pienaar made in the context of unjustified 
enrichment. 
 
Anne Pope suggests an approach in terms of which the extent of the encroachment 
guides the court in solving this problem. She argues that in the case of large 
encroachments, the rules of accession should be applicable. Accession should 
govern the situation in so far as the owner of the land is owner of the structures on 
the land because they become part of the land; therefore the owner of the land can 
demand removal of the building works on the land. However, in the case of minor 
encroachments, the rules of encroachment should determine that a court may 
exercise its discretion either in favour of leaving the encroachment in place or 
ordering the removal thereof. If the encroachment is not removed, she provides a 
doctrinal solution to explain why accession does not occur. She argues that the 
principle of attachment should be suspended in the case of minor encroachments so 
that ownership of the encroaching structures remains with the encroaching 
landowner and ownership of the land remains with the affected landowner. 
Therefore, when courts decide to keep encroaching structures in place, the building 
materials do not attach to the affected landowners property. Instead, the encroacher 
remains owner of the encroaching structures and obtains some kind of use right to 
the property on which the encroachment is erected. This solution becomes more 
difficult to explain and justify the larger the encroachment becomes; hence her 
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suggestion that large encroachments should be governed by the rules of accession. I 
concluded that Pope’s approach would eliminate the possibility of keeping large 
encroachments in place, even in cases where policy may dictate such an outcome. 
Therefore, I found that Pope’s argument of suspension of the rules of attachment 
would have to be expanded to allow suspension even in the case where the 
encroachment is significant. However, this should be possible in cases where the 
decision to leave the significant encroachment in place is made on policy grounds 
taking all circumstances into consideration and the decision is made giving due 
consideration to section 25 of the Constitution. The policy reasons that are used to 
justify suspending the principle of accession in the case of significant encroachments 
will most probably be the same reasons for denying the removal order in terms of the 
court’s discretion. A court will have taken various factors into consideration in order 
to establish whether the encroachment should have been removed. These factors 
will again be important to explain why it would be required and justified to go against 
the common law logic of accession. The choice in terms of policy considerations will 
be sound if cognisance is taken of the constitutional prohibition against arbitrary 
deprivation of property.124 Therefore, the result is that accession would normally 
have taken place, but the court decides that it is suspended for policy reasons.  
 
Suspension of the principles of attachment was also evident in terms of Roman-
Dutch law. Ownership of a building work erected on the land of another could be 
acquired through prescription, resulting in a praedial servitude coming into existence. 
It was very clear from an early stage that the order that was made in this regard was 
for the transfer of the right to have the buildings on the land and not for transfer of 
the land on which the building work stood. Therefore, ownership of the land and 
ownership of the building works erected on the land were kept separate. This 
illustrates how the principle of attachment may be suspended. 
 
In the last instance, I looked at the argument of Eiselen and Pienaar that is made in 
the context of unjustified enrichment. They argue that ownership of the accessory 
can sometimes remain “slumbering” until the principal and accessory is separated. 
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Their argument assumes that the principal and the accessory can be separated 
which, in most cases of attachment is not always possible; however, their argument 
does add weight to the idea the principles of attachment may in certain instances be 
suspended. 
 
It is clear from this chapter that there are arguments in favour of suspending the 
principle of attachment. Therefore, in at least some cases where the court is faced 
with the decision to keep significant encroachments in place, it should be possible to 
use the rationale of suspension of the rules of attachment to explain what happens 
doctrinally when the encroachment is not removed. Both the argument in favour of 
suspension of the principle of attachment and the one that suggests that accession 
should not occur because it was not the intention of the encroacher to transfer 
ownership, may provide doctrinal solutions in the case where a building 
encroachment is left intact. However, both these explanations result in the same 
problem, namely that one person owns a building on land belonging to another 
without clarity about the respective rights to that piece of affected land. It seems as 
though a use right (which could include a right to build) is indirectly created in favour 
of the encroacher and he has continued possession of the encroachment. It is clear 
that courts have not mentioned this use right and therefore failed to explain the 
nature of the right. This results in unnecessary confusion that needs to be explained 
doctrinally. 
 
In the next chapter I consider the constitutional implications of these court orders in 
terms of which the court leaves the encroachment in place. It will be important to 
examine whether denying a removal order in the case of encroachment by building 
causes an infringement of section 25(1) of the Constitution because it results in an 
arbitrary deprivation. I will identify three outcomes that result from the new approach 
and test whether they are constitutionally valid. I focus on the deprivation that is 
suffered as a result of courts refusing the demolition order. According to the First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
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Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance (“FNB”)125 methodology 
it is necessary to determine whether the deprivation of property or property rights 
meets the requirements of section 25(1) of the Constitution. I also question whether 
the deprivation of property may result in an expropriation that needs to comply with 
section 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution. 
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  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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Chapter 5: Constitutional implications of the 
new approach to building encroachments 
 
5.1 Introduction 
What has been echoing throughout this dissertation is the uncertainty of certain 
aspects of the law regulating building encroachments in South Africa. The 
uncertainty lies in the fact that some of the consequences of the court orders made 
in the context of building encroachments are uncertain. In the previous chapter, I 
identified some of the shortcomings with regard to the doctrinal implications of the 
court orders. I considered the doctrinal implications of courts denying an affected 
landowner the right to removal. If the encroachment is left intact the most important 
questions centre on the status of the affected land and the nature of the right 
obtained by the encroacher, especially in cases where the encroachment is 
significant.1 In terms of the status of the land, it is uncertain why the principle of 
attachment does not apply in the case of encroachment by building, in other words 
why the owner of the land does not own the building materials permanently attached 
to his land.2 With regard to the nature of the right obtained if demolition is denied, it 
is difficult to determine whether the encroached-upon land is transferred to the 
encroacher (when nothing is said about transfer) or whether the encroacher merely 
obtains a use right in the form of a servitude or another right, either personal or real. 
 
In this chapter I consider the possible constitutional implications of denying a 
demolition order. The main aim of this chapter will be to determine whether the loss 
suffered as a result of these court orders may cause constitutional infringement in 
view of the property clause.3 
 
On the one hand, if the loss of property (or a right with regard to that property) 
results in a deprivation as meant in section 25(1) of the Constitution, it will have to 
                                                 
1
  See chap 4 above. 
2
  See chap 4 above. 
3
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(1). 
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comply with the requirements of that provision. In other words, the deprivation would 
have to be in terms of law of general application and it may not be arbitrary.4 On the 
other hand, if the loss of property amounts to an expropriation, section 25(2) and (3) 
need to be complied with.5 I will refer to First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Minister of Finance (“FNB”)6 in order to show how the Constitutional Court 
interpreted section 25 of the Constitution.7 FNB has highlighted how the relationship 
between deprivations and expropriations should be understood. 
 
I have distinguished three different kinds of outcomes that could follow if the court 
does not order removal of a building encroachment. The difficulty with identifying and 
discussing the problems with the different outcomes is that courts do not make 
concrete distinctions between the various outcomes. I have tried as far as possible to 
distinguish between three outcomes in order to analyse them according to section 25 
of the Constitution. With reference to FNB methodology, I will question whether 
these three outcomes could result in a deprivation of property in terms of section 25, 
and if so, whether the deprivation can be justified.8 
 
When a court exercises its discretion in favour of leaving an encroaching structure in 
place, it could result in any one of three different outcomes, each of which raises 
different issues that need to be tested for constitutional compliance. In terms of the 
courts’ discretion it will balance the interests of both parties in order to determine 
whether the discretion should be exercised in favour of the encroacher (i e denying 
                                                 
4
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(1). 
5
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(2) and (3). 
6
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
7
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). See further T Roux 
“Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 
original service Dec 2003) chap 46 at 46-2 – 46-5; AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 
71-72, 145-168. 
8
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 46. The focus will be 
specifically on the questions posed in FNB with regard to how the property clause enquiry should be 
done. See s 5.3 below. 
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removal) or in favour of the affected landowner (i e enforcing the removal order).9 
The first discretion-based outcome occurs when the court denies the affected 
landowner his right to demand removal and orders compensation instead in the case 
of insignificant encroachments. In this case, it seems as though the affected 
landowner is deprived of the use and enjoyment of a small portion of his property. I 
will question whether the deprivation that results in these instances complies with 
section 25(1). Various factors were taken into consideration when the discretion was 
exercised in favour of the encroacher. These factors were important in order to 
balance the interests of the parties involved in the dispute. The factors will again be 
relevant in order to determine whether the deprivation can be justified. 
 
In the second outcome a court exercises its discretion in favour of leaving a 
significant encroachment in place. The result is that the affected landowner loses the 
use and enjoyment of a significant part of his property on which the encroachment is 
erected. The extent of the encroachment is usually of such a nature that keeping the 
encroachment intact results in a serious restriction on the rights of the affected 
landowner. Therefore, the deprivation that results causes a serious limitation on the 
right of use and enjoyment of the property. I will question whether the permanent 
restriction on the use and enjoyment of the property results in a deprivation in terms 
of the requirements of section 25(1). Besides the scope of the encroachment, it is 
unclear what is ordered in these cases and what the practical effects of the court 
orders are. As a result of this, it may be more difficult to determine whether these 
court orders would comply with section 25 (1), (2) and (3) of the Constitution. I also 
consider whether a de facto servitude of use is created in favour of the encroacher in 
this outcome and whether this could possibly result in an expropriation of an incident 
of ownership or an expropriation of a use right. If the answer to this question is 
affirmative, the expropriation would need to comply with section 25(2) and (3) of the 
Constitution. 
 
The third outcome is more direct in the sense that one can clearly ascertain what 
order is being made. In this instance the court will not only refuse to order removal of 
                                                 
9
  See chap 3 above. In this chapter I discuss the discretion of the court to award compensation 
instead of removal. 
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the encroachment, but also order that the encroached-upon land be transferred to 
the encroacher. This kind of order has been raised and therefore it is important to 
test whether the deprivation of ownership that results complies with section 25(1) of 
the Constitution.10 Whether the court has the power to make such an order is 
questionable. Therefore, the authority for such an order is unclear and it needs to be 
determined whether the order is procedurally unfair in terms of section 25(1).11 
 
As a preliminary step before embarking on constitutional analysis of these court 
orders, there is a very important issue that needs to be considered. It concerns the 
question of whether and when the Constitution should apply in a private matter. In an 
encroachment case, it is a purely private dispute governed by common law. 
Therefore, the question whether the Constitution can or should apply is relevant. It 
needs to be considered whether horizontal application is possible and if so, whether 
it is applicable directly or indirectly. Direct horizontal application implies a direct 
reliance on the constitutional right to acquire a remedy or defence.12 The possibility 
of direct horizontal application in the case of building encroachments is important for 
this chapter.13 Van der Walt argues that the law regulating building encroachments 
may be the place in property law where direct horizontal application would be 
possible.14 In the case of encroachment by building, the affected landowner might 
actually be able to rely directly on section 25 to found a claim that there was an 
arbitrary deprivation or an invalid expropriation without authority or compensation. In 
any event, indirect horizontal application is always possible in the form of 
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  See s 3.6 in chap 3 above. 
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  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(1). 
12
  AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 44-45. 
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  There is an academic debate about whether direct horizontal application is possible in the 
case of section 25 of the Constitution. Woolman opines that the reluctance of courts to apply a 
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constitutional duty to do so. See S Woolman “Application” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd ed 2005 original service Feb 2005) chap 31 at 31-136 – 31-161, 
where Woolman looks at various opinions about the application debate. AJ van der Walt “Normative 
pluralism and anarchy: Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 1 CCR 77-128 at 126. Van der Walt 
agrees with Woolman that the subsidiarity principle should not be interpreted too narrowly or invoked 
for the wrong reasons. “Subsidiarity should be understood in terms of its constitutional purpose and 
justification, as that has been spelled out in 2007: to preserve the constitutional power and obligation 
of the courts to control the constitutional validity of legislation, while at the same time paying due 
respect to the democratic power and legitimacy of policy makers and legislatures in giving effect to 
their reform obligations under the Constitution.” 
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  AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 144. 
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development of the common law in line with the Constitution.15 Here the parties may 
rely on the indirect application of section 25 in order to ask the court to develop the 
common law. The possible infringement of section 25 could show that in some cases 
it may be important to develop the common law so that it is in line with the 
Constitution. To question whether this is possible it is important to consider the 
subsidiarity principle, which helps to determine when to rely on the Constitution and 
when to base a claim on the common law.16 In terms of the subsidiarity principle, 
courts should rather avoid a constitutional matter when a case can be decided in a 
non-constitutional manner, ensuring that private law matters are dealt with in terms 
of private law as far as possible.17 Therefore, the first question should be whether the 
common law can be interpreted in a constitutionally compliant way or developed to 
bring it in line with the Constitution. However, sometimes the common law is 
insufficient to protect rights in the Constitution or courts are not willing or able to 
develop the common law because the extent of the development may be too difficult. 
This may be the case with significant encroachments. Therefore, development of the 
common law is not always possible and there are limits as to how and to what extent 
it can be developed. In these instances it is necessary to point out the shortcomings 
and justify specific developments, which may take the form of legislation, that are 
required to get the desired result.18 In the South African context, legislation may be 
needed to eliminate some of the uncertainties that are currently prevalent in the law 
regulating building encroachments. In this chapter I focus specifically on the 
uncertainty that may result in constitutional infringement. 
 
5.2 Analysis of three outcomes 
5.2.1 Insignificant limitations on the affected landowner’s rights 
The first possible outcome occurs when courts decide to leave insignificant 
encroachments in place according to their discretion in the context of building 
encroachments. This outcome results in a limitation on the affected landowner’s right 
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  AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 45. 
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  LM du Plessis “‘Subsidiarity’: What’s in the name for constitutional interpretation and 
adjudication?” (2006) 17 Stell LR 207-231 at 211. 
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  LM du Plessis “‘Subsidiarity’: What’s in the name for constitutional interpretation and 
adjudication?” (2006) 17 Stell LR 207-231 at 211; AJ van der Walt “Normative pluralism and anarchy: 
Reflections on the 2007 term” (2008) 1 CCR 77-128. 
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  See chap 7 below. 
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to the use and enjoyment of his property. However, the limitation is minor because 
the affected landowner only loses the use and enjoyment of a small portion of his 
property. It is evident from early South African case law19 that this outcome involves 
cases where there is an encroachment of a foundation of a wall or a really 
insignificant building encroachment that extends a few inches into the property of a 
neighbour, without any perceptible effect on his use and enjoyment of the property. 
 
5.2.2 Significant limitations on the affected landowner’s rights 
This is a difficult outcome to define because of the nuances that exist in this 
category. In this outcome a court exercises its discretion in favour of leaving a 
significant encroachment in place. Because of the considerable extent of the 
encroachment, it causes a significant limitation on the rights of the affected 
landowner. The outcome results in the permanent loss of use and enjoyment of a 
significant portion of the affected landowner’s property. The bigger the 
encroachment, the greater the implications will be for the affected landowner. In 
most cases compensation is awarded in exchange for the loss of property rights, but 
compensation does not always have to be ordered.20 The effect of this type of loss 
for the affected landowner is similar to the creation of a servitude or limited real right 
over the affected land, resulting in the landowner losing use and enjoyment of the 
portion of the property on which the encroachment stands. 
 
5.2.3 Transfer of the affected land to the encroacher 
In terms of this outcome, a court explicitly orders that the encroached-upon land be 
transferred to the encroacher. Some courts have acknowledged that these orders 
result in compulsory transfer of property that amounts to an effective acquisition of 
the defendant’s land21 or a “compulsory expropriation”.22 This outcome has featured 
in case law, although it is not common. The court in the recent Phillips case 
considered the claim for transfer of the land affected by the encroachment. It stated 
that: 
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  Adam v Abdoola (1903) 24 NLR 158; Naudé v Bredenkamp 1956 (2) SA 448 (O). 
20
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
21
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 1. 
22
  Christie v Haarhoff and Others (1886-1887) 4 HCG 349 at 356. 
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“It is indisputable that an encroachment of this nature in issue in the instant case 
constitutes an interference with the applicant’s property rights such as to constitute 
a deprivation in terms of the provisions of section 25 of the Constitution.”23 
However, the court dismissed the claim and eventually decided the case based on 
the fact that the respondent could not prove that its prejudice or other reasons for not 
demolishing the encroachment was stronger than the prejudice the applicant would 
suffer if the encroachment were left intact.24 The Eastern Cape High Court actually 
considered the claim for transfer of the land seriously without considering whether 
such an order can be made.25 
 
It is evident from early case law that the order for transfer is made in addition to the 
replacement of removal with compensation.26 Therefore, the order for compensation 
instead of removal is the primary remedy and the order for transfer is additional. 
There is uncertainty about the authority for this order, but the possibility of this kind 
of order has been raised and therefore it is necessary to test whether it is 
constitutionally compliant.27 
 
5.3 Constitutional analysis of three outcomes according to FNB 
methodology 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The Constitutional Court in FNB provided an interpretation of the property clause in 
terms of which future courts may be guided in determining whether a deprivation of 
property occurred and, if it did, whether it was unconstitutional.28 Roux argues that 
the FNB decision has added greater clarity on how the South African property clause 
                                                 
23
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) 
par 24. 
24
  For a discussion of the extent of the courts discretion in the context of building 
encroachments, see s 3.6 in chap 3 above. 
25
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
paras 22-24. 
26
  De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217; Meyer v Keiser 1980 (3) SA 504 (D) 507. 
27
  See s 3.6 in chap 3 above. 
28
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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should be interpreted to fulfil the goal of balancing private and public interests in 
property.29 
 
In FNB, the Constitutional Court developed separate stages in order to facilitate a 
property clause enquiry.30 These stages have been linked to seven questions, 
namely: 
“(a) Does that which is taken away from [the property holder] by operation of 
[the law in question] amount to property for purpose of s 25? 
(b) Has there been a deprivation of such property by the [organ of state 
concerned]? 
(c) If there has, is such deprivation consistent with the provisions of s 25(1)? 
(d) It not, is such deprivation justified under s 36 of the Constitution? 
(e) If it is, does it amount to expropriation for purpose of s 25(2)? 
(f) If so, does the [expropriation] comply with the requirements of s 25(2)(a) 
and (b)? 
(g) If not, is the expropriation justified under s 36?”31 
 
In the next section I will apply the FNB methodology to the three outcomes identified 
earlier to determine whether each of them would comply with the requirements of 
section 25 of the Constitution. 
 
                                                 
29
  T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
(2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) chap 46 at 46-2. Although it is argued that FNB provided a 
framework within which the property clause can effectively be interpreted, there are some cases 
subsequent to FNB that have not followed the FNB methodology as astutely as would have been 
expected, for example Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v 
Buffulo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive 
Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
30
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 46. 
31
  I use Roux’s formulation of the questions in FNB. See T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T 
Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) 
chap 46 at 46-3. 
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5.3.2 FNB methodology32 
5.3.2.1Does that which was taken away amount to property in terms of section 25?33 
This question centres on whether the interest that is affected amounts to property 
that should be protected for constitutional purposes. Very little attention is given in 
the FNB decision to this question.34 The court held that it would be “practically 
impossible to furnish – and judicially unwise to attempt – a comprehensive definition 
of property for purposes of section 25.”35 Therefore, the court merely accepted that 
property as envisaged in terms of section 25 should be interpreted widely.36 Van der 
Walt explains the question of “property” with regard to the property clause as follows: 
“For purposes of section 25 ‘property’ can therefore relate to a wide range of 
objects both corporeal and incorporeal, a wide range of traditional property rights 
and interests both real and personal, and a wide range of other rights and interests 
which (in civil-law tradition) have never been considered in terms of property 
before.”37 
Therefore, it seems as though “property” in terms of section 25 includes a wide 
range of rights, objects and interests in property.38 
 
In the case of building encroachment disputes, what we are dealing with is land, in 
other words tangible immovable property. If one looks at the three outcomes where 
the court decides not to demolish the encroachment, it needs to be determined 
which entitlement with regard to the land is lost in each particular case. If the court 
                                                 
32
  This is not a comprehensive analysis of the stages of interpretation in FNB; it is merely a brief 
overview of the various questions that could help in assessing whether there could be constitutional 
problems with court orders made in relation to building encroachments. For more on FNB, see T Roux 
“Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 
original service Dec 2003) chap 46. 
33
  For an extensive discussion of what constitutes “property” for purposes of s 25 of the 
Constitution, see AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) chap 3. 
34
  The fact that very little attention is given to this question is problematic because this should be 
the threshold requirement that determines entry into s 25 or not. Van der Walt foresees the possibility 
that future courts will take more cognisance of this threshold requirement. See AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property law (2005) 72. 
35
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 51. 
36
  It was found in FNB that a corporeal movable would constitute property under s 25 and that 
ownership of land should therefore “lie at the heart of our constitutional concept of property.” See First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 51. 
37
  AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 77. 
38
  AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 72-78. 
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orders that the encroaching structures should remain intact and says nothing about 
the transfer of the land on which the encroachment stands, the affected landowner 
loses the entitlement of use and enjoyment of the affected part of his property, both 
in the case of significant and insignificant encroachments.39 Therefore, the right that 
is affected in both the first and second outcomes is the entitlement of use and 
enjoyment of the property. Where the encroachment is insignificant, it results in the 
loss of use and enjoyment of a small portion of the affected property. However, 
where the extent of the encroachment is large (as in the second outcome), the 
affected landowner loses use and enjoyment of a significant portion of his property. 
In the case where the court orders that the encroaching landowner take transfer of 
the encroached-upon land, the affected landowner does not only lose the entitlement 
of use and enjoyment of his land, but also ownership of the land on which the 
encroachment is erected. In fact, it could also be argued that he also loses the 
entitlement of disposal, since the transfer takes place without his cooperation and 
against his will. This is particularly clear in the third outcome, where the court orders 
the transfer of property against the will of the affected landowner and therefore he 
loses his right to choose whether to sell or not. 
 
Therefore, depending on the particular outcome in the case there is a different 
interest at stake or entitlement that is lost when the court does not order removal of 
the encroachment. Sometimes (as in the first two outcomes) the affected landowner 
loses the entitlement of use and enjoyment of the land; whereas in the case where 
transfer of the land is ordered he may lose ownership of the land itself (as in the third 
outcome). Consequently, the property rights that are affected when a court denies a 
demolition order may either be an entitlement in the land or ownership of the land. In 
the section below I question whether the limitation of the affected landowner’s 
property rights amounts to a deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1). 
 
                                                 
39
  See s 4.4 in chap 4 above. 
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5.3.2.2 Has there been a deprivation of property? 
In FNB the court interpreted “deprivation” widely.40 Therefore, “any interference with 
the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property involves some deprivation in 
respect of the person having title or right to or in the property concerned”.41 Roux 
argues that in most cases courts will quite easily accept that a deprivation has 
occurred and proceed with the requirements of section 25(1), being the third stage in 
the FNB methodology.42 
 
The deprivation in an encroachment dispute would sometimes involve loss of use of 
the land (as in the first two outcomes) and sometimes the loss of ownership (as in 
the last outcome). The only issue is the scope of the deprivation. In insignificant 
cases, the loss is so small that it is questionable whether it should be regarded as a 
deprivation at all. There are conflicting views on this matter in case law. In Nhlabathi 
and Others v Fick (“Nhlabathi”)43 the Land Claims Court had to determine whether 
the appropriation of a grave by an occupier in terms of section 6(2)(dA) of the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act (“ESTA”)44 would deprive a landowner of the use 
of that portion of his property in a way that conflicted with section 25. The court found 
that the landowner’s undoubted loss of the entitlement of use and enjoyment 
pertained to a small portion of the affected landowner’s property. However, it still 
constituted a deprivation in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.45 Therefore, in 
terms of Nhlabathi, no matter how small the interference with the property is, it may 
amount in a deprivation of that property. In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer 
Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council of Local 
                                                 
40
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 57. See also AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) chap 4; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) chap 46 at 46-
17 – 46-20. 
41
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 57. It was stated in the 
case that “[i]f section 25 is applied to this wide genus of interference, ‘deprivation’ would encompass 
all species thereof and ‘expropriation’ would apply only to a narrower species of interference.” 
42
  T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
(2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) chap 46 at 46-2 – 46-5, 46-18, 46-23 – 46-25. 
43
  [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC). 
44
  The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
45
  Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) par 29. 
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Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others (“Mkontwana”),46 the Constitutional 
Court followed a different approach.47 It stated that in order to determine whether 
there was a deprivation, the “extent of the interference or limitation on the use, 
enjoyment and exploitation” is important.48 There would be a deprivation if it can be 
shown that there was at least a “substantial interference or limitation that goes 
beyond the normal restrictions on property use or enjoyment found in an open and 
democratic society”.49 Van der Walt criticises the approach of Yacoob J in 
Mkontwana.50 He argues that all regulatory limitations on the use and enjoyment of 
property that are legitimate will be normal in a society.51 He also rejects the 
restriction of the concept of deprivation because this is contrary to the purpose of 
section 25(1) because ‘the purpose of section 25(1) is to legitimize the imposition of 
regulatory control and the deprivation of property that goes with it generally, not only 
in excessive cases.”52 Therefore, Van der Walt suggests that the idea that a 
deprivation is only a substantial or abnormal limitation or interference of the use and 
enjoyment of property should probably be ignored and that all restrictions on the use 
and enjoyment of land should be regarded as deprivations, regardless of their 
scope.53 
 
I would argue that in the context of building encroachments, even if the 
encroachment is minor, it should still be seen as a deprivation of the entitlement of 
use and enjoyment of the property. This is in line with argument of Van der Walt and 
                                                 
46
  2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
47
  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffulo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) par 32. 
48
  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffulo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) par 32. 
49
  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffulo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) par 32. 
50
  AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 126-128. 
51
  AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 127. 
52
  AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 127. 
53
  AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 127. Van der Walt recognises the 
possibility that the de minimis principle may be applicable in some cases where the interference is 
really insignificant. The principle will ensure that these minor interferences will not be litigated. 
However, the purpose of s 25 was to prohibit any interference with property rights, no matter how 
small that interference may be. 
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the approach followed in the case of Nhlabathi,54 where the insignificant scope of the 
loss played a role in determining whether the deprivation was justifiable, instead of 
relying on the scope of the loss to decide that there was no deprivation. Therefore, 
all three outcomes may result in a deprivation of property or property rights and it is 
necessary to question whether the deprivation complies with section 25(1). 
 
5.3.2.3 Is the deprivation consistent with section 25(1)? 
Once it has been established that there was a deprivation of property, the next 
question in the FNB methodology is whether the deprivation is constitutionally valid 
in terms of section 25(1). The requirements for a valid deprivation in terms of section 
25(1) of the Constitution are two-fold.55 Firstly, the deprivation must be in terms of 
law of general application and secondly, the deprivation must not be arbitrary. 
 
In terms of the first requirement, the deprivation must be in terms of law of general 
application. The law of general application regulating building encroachments is the 
common law. The common law allows for certain instances where a court may 
deviate from the default remedy of removal and award compensation instead.56 Both 
Du Plessis v De Klerk57 and S v Thebus58 provide authority for the fact that the 
common law is law of general application.59 Therefore, it needs to be determined 
whether the second requirement of section 25(1) has been complied with in the case 
of building encroachments. 
 
The second leg of section 25(1) requires that the deprivation must not be arbitrary.60 
There are two criteria, in terms of FNB, that determine whether a deprivation is 
                                                 
54
  Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC). 
55
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(1). 
56
  See chap 3 above. This is the common law as it has developed to what I refer to as the new 
approach to the problem of building encroachments. 
57
  Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) par 44 at 876. 
58
  S v Thebus and Another 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) paras 64-65. 
59
  See Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) par 44 at 876, par 
136 at 915; S v Thebus and Another 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) paras 64-65. 
60
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(1). 
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arbitrary.61 A deprivation would be arbitrary if it is procedurally unfair62 or if there is 
insufficient reason for it.63 
 
Essentially, procedural fairness in the context of section 25(1) means that there must 
be procedural mechanisms available to ensure protection of the right to property. 
This aspect was not extensively discussed by the Constitutional Court in FNB, but it 
was examined in Mkontwana64 and touched upon briefly in Reflect-All 1025 CC and 
Others v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transfer, Road Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government and Another (“Reflect-All”).65 
 
The applicants in Mkontwana argued that section 118(1) of the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act66 was in contravention of section 25(1) of the Constitution 
because it resulted in an arbitrary deprivation of property.67 Section 118(1) of the 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act68 limited the owner’s power to transfer his 
immovable property.69 The provision limited the power to transfer in so far as the 
Registrar of Deeds was prohibited from effecting the transfer without a certificate 
from the municipality stating that all consumption charges due for a period of two 
years before the date of issue of the certificate was paid.70 The applicants argued 
                                                 
61
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 100. 
62
  The Constitutional Court in FNB merely stated that procedural fairness could play a role in 
determining whether the deprivation was arbitrary. There are two cases in which the court did find that 
a deprivation was arbitrary because due process was not followed. In Janse van Rensburg NO v 
Minister van Handel en Nywerheid 1999 (2) BCLR 204 (T) at 221, it was held “that section 8(5)(a) of 
the Harmful Business Practices Act 71 of 1988 violated section 25(1) in allowing the Minister of Trade 
and Industry to seize assets before the completion of an investigation.” Similarly, the Cape High Court 
in Director of Public Prosecutions” Cape of Good Hope v Bathgate 2000 (2) BCLR 151 (C) par 82 
found that the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996 that permitted the seizure of possessions amounted 
to an arbitrary deprivation in terms of s 25(1). 
63
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 100. 
64
  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffulo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) paras 65-67. 
65
  Reflect-All 1025 and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, Roads 
and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
66
  The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
67
  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffulo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC). 
68
  The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
69
  The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, s 118(1). 
70
  The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, sec 118(1). 
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that section 118(1) was procedurally unfair because it did not impose an obligation 
upon municipalities to keep property owners informed of the amounts owing by the 
occupiers.71 The Constitutional Court found that procedural fairness is a flexible 
concept that is dependent on all the circumstances in the case.72 The court reached 
the conclusion that it would be impractical to expect municipalities to supply the 
owner with information regarding outstanding amounts owed by occupiers of his 
property.73 Such an obligation would require additional resources and processes, of 
which the practical implications would be considerable. Moreover, the owner has a 
duty to monitor the occupation and use of the property. Therefore, the court found 
that the law was not procedurally unfair simply because it did not impose a duty on 
the municipality to furnish information about outstanding amounts.74 
 
In Reflect-All the Constitutional Court had to decide whether section 10(1) and 10(3) 
of the Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act75 were in conflict with section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. The impugned provision, which provided for planning of provincial 
roads, imposed certain restrictions on the use, enjoyment and exploitation of 
privately owned property belonging to the applicants. The court had to determine 
whether the deprivation was procedurally unfair. It confirmed, in line with 
Mkontwana, that procedural fairness is a flexible concept, which depends on all 
relevant circumstances in the case.76 The applicants argued that the roads could be 
determined without consultation with the landowners and this resulted in the process 
being procedurally unfair. They also argued that the designs of the routes should 
                                                 
71
  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffulo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) par 65. 
72
  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffulo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) par 65. 
73
  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffulo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) par 66. 
74
  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffulo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) paras 66-67. 
75
  The Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001. 
76
  Reflect-All 1025 and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, Roads 
and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) par 40. The court 
relied on Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffulo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) par 65. 
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have been reconsidered before publishing and accepting it, and neglecting to do so 
would be procedurally unfair because it did not afford them the opportunity to be part 
of the process. The Constitutional Court rejected both these arguments and found 
that section 10(1) and 10(3) was not procedurally arbitrary, because it would be 
impractical and unrealistic to follow the process argued by the applicants.77 
 
Therefore, both Mkontwana and Reflect-All illustrate that procedural fairness is 
determined in a context- and fact-sensitive analysis. It is flexible and it depends on 
the circumstances of the particular case. Therefore, to question whether the 
deprivation in the case of building encroachment was procedurally unfair one would 
have to assess this according to the circumstances of the particular case. In the 
context of encroachment by building the question will be whether the legal process 
involved is procedurally unfair. This probably means that there must be some form of 
recourse to the law for the affected landowner. The recourse would either be in the 
form of an appeal or a claim for compensation in terms of common law, or the 
affected landowner has a claim based on section 25 or 33 of the Constitution in 
terms of constitutional law. Therefore, the procedural unfairness argument is unlikely 
to succeed in the context of building encroachments, at least as long as the loss of a 
property right in terms of the common law is open to judicial control. 
 
With regard to the order for transfer of the encroached-upon land to the encroacher, 
it is important to consider whether the deprivation that results in this instance is 
procedurally unfair if the court does not have the legal authority to make the order 
involved. This would typically be in the case of the third outcome, where the court 
orders transfer of the encroached-upon land to the encroacher. In chapter three it 
was pointed out that it is uncertain what the extent of the courts’ discretion is.78 It 
transpired from an investigation into early South African cases in which transfer was 
ordered that in these cases the affected landowner was willing to give up the 
affected land in exchange for compensation. Therefore, these cases do not provide 
adequate authority for the view that the court may, in terms of its discretion, effect a 
                                                 
77
  Reflect-All 1025 and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, Roads 
and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 46-47. 
78
  See s 3.6 in chap 3. 
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forced sale of the encroached-upon land. As the matter stands, there is no authority 
in either common law or legislation in terms of which the court can sanction a forced 
sale of land in the context of building encroachments.79 If the affected landowner 
would not want to give up the encroached-upon part of his property and the court 
orders the transfer, the outcome is not authorised in these instances and therefore it 
would be procedurally unfair.80 The deprivation would be arbitrary in these 
circumstances because it does not comply with the section 25(1) requirement that 
the deprivation may not be procedurally unfair. 
 
In terms of the second criterion, the effect of the FNB decision is that a deprivation 
would be arbitrary if there is insufficient reason for it. In the context of building 
encroachments it would need to be established whether the reason for ordering 
compensation instead of removal (usually insignificance of the encroachment or 
policy reasons such as balance of convenience) is sufficient under the 
circumstances to justify the deprivation that results.81 With regard to the reasons for 
the deprivation, Van der Walt explains that: 
“In the context of encroachment, the reason that is required [to justify the 
deprivation] has to be evaluated in view of the discretion that the courts exercise in 
this regard. The question that they are obliged to ask is this: when do the 
circumstances, particularly the balance of loss and inconvenience, justify a 
solution that involves overriding ownership rights and replacing them with 
monetary compensation, purely to avoid causing greater loss for the encroaching 
party that the landowner would suffer if the encroachment is kept intact?”82 
 
                                                 
79
  See s 3.6 in chap 3. 
80
  The recent case of Phillips v South African National Parks Board also shows another aspect 
that might indicate procedural arbitrariness. In that case the respondent (the South African National 
Parks Board) may have been able to expropriate the property in terms of its public function. There is 
an argument that by allowing the respondent to acquire the land indirectly through a transfer order in 
an encroachment case would have been procedurally unfair. Fortunately the court did not allow the 
transfer but ordered that the encroachment be removed. For a discussion of Phillips v South African 
National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010], see chaps 1 and 3 above. 
81
  In chap 3 above I investigated the reasons for courts exercising their discretion in favour of 
leaving the encroaching structures intact and not ordering demolition in terms of the common law. 
82
  AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” 
(2005) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 623. 
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In the FNB case, Ackermann J applied a number of factors to determine whether a 
sufficient reason existed for the deprivation.83 These factors are discussed below in 
the context of building encroachments. 
 
The first factor identified in FNB is an evaluation of the relationship between the 
means employed and the ends sought to be achieved by the compensation order. In 
all three of the outcomes in encroachment cases identified earlier, the means 
employed in bringing about the deprivation is that the court decides to leave the 
encroaching structure intact, which results in either a deprivation of land or a 
deprivation of the entitlement of use of the land. The most important reason why a 
court would leave the encroachment in place is fairness and equity in the sense of 
preventing the encroaching owner from suffering an even greater loss than the 
affected owner would suffer if the encroachment was not removed. In other words, 
the purpose of the deprivation is to ensure that a just outcome is reached that is not 
too burdensome on only one party (even if that party is the one who unlawfully 
created the encroachment). 
 
In the case of insignificant encroachments, it seems as though there is a rational 
relationship between what courts are doing (the means) and why they are doing it 
(the ends). Considering the fact that the encroachment is minor, for example where 
the foundation of a wall or a really insignificant building encroachment extends a few 
inches into the affected property, not removing the encroachment does not have a 
significant negative effect for the affected landowner. In this case the courts will 
balance the harm and most likely come to the conclusion that less harm results if the 
encroachment is kept intact than when the encroachment is removed. In most cases 
of this nature, if the encroachment is insignificant the deprivation is justified by the 
better balance that is created when ordering compensation instead of removal. 
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  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 100. 
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When dealing with significant encroachments, it is more complex and this line of 
argument is not that obvious. Courts are deviating from the common law remedy of 
removal to reach what they regard as a fair and just outcome, but in doing so they 
leave the encroachment in place and this may be excessively burdensome for the 
affected landowner. Because of the greater complexity involved in this outcome, the 
judgement on whether the means is justified by the purpose has to be made in every 
individual case with reference to all the circumstances of the case.84 These 
circumstances may include things like the exact extent of the encroachment, its 
effect on the affected landowner, knowledge of the building works and delay in 
bringing the application, the value of the building and the loss if it was demolished, 
the conduct of the parties involved (whether the encroacher was bona fide) and 
whether the affected landowner would be sufficiently compensated by money for his 
loss. The balance of these considerations would provide the policy reasons that 
would indicate whether a particular decision to leave the encroachment in place was 
justified and would subsequently have to provide the reasons to justify the 
deprivation that results when significant encroachments are left intact. 
 
Where transfer of the encroached-upon land is ordered in addition to keeping the 
encroachment in place, the balancing of the considerations mentioned above with 
regard to the second outcome will again be necessary to determine whether the 
deprivation in the third outcome was justified. Like in the previous outcome, these 
considerations will also be important in order to justify the deprivation of property in 
this case. In some cases (assuming there is authority for the order) the judgement 
resulting in the transfer of ownership may be justified by the balancing process of all 
the considerations. 
 
The second factor deals with the complexity of relationships that need to be 
considered.85 With regard to encroachment by building there is not such a complex 
                                                 
84
  The substantive arbitrariness requirement in FNB is context-sensitive. Therefore, the test may 
vary according to the facts of the particular case. In some cases a lower level of scrutiny is required; 
whereas in other cases the test may require a higher level of scrutiny. This depends on the factors 
and the context of the particular case. See AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 153-
155. 
85
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 100. 
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web of relationships as there was in FNB. In FNB, it was found that the deprivation is 
insufficiently justified because the affected party had nothing to do with the customs 
debt for which the deprivation took place.86 For encroachment, what we are dealing 
with is an affected landowner attempting to assert his common law right of removal 
against an encroacher who argues that the rigid application of the common law 
causes extreme hardship for him. In all three outcomes this is the extent of the 
relationship between the parties. However, there is an argument for saying that the 
affected landowner (like the owner affected by the deprivation in FNB) had nothing to 
do with the encroacher’s loss and should therefore not be expected to assist in 
reducing it because it was not his fault. The affected landowner in the case of 
building encroachments had nothing to do with the encroachment, he was not 
consulted about it and in most cases he was not even aware of it. This may be an 
argument that the court can take into consideration when it balances the interests of 
the parties. Therefore, it should play a role in order to determine whether the 
deprivation is justified. However, this argument assumes that the affected landowner 
was innocent and that there was no bad faith or delay or knowledge of the 
encroachment. In some cases the affected landowner may actually benefit from the 
encroachment, especially if it is almost totally on his land and it is ordered to remain 
in place. Therefore, this argument also assumes that the affected landowner actually 
wants the encroachment removed and not to have the benefit which may be offset 
by an enrichment claim. It may assist in balancing the scale in favour of the affected 
landowner and prove that the deprivation was not justified in this particular case. 
 
The third factor states that regard must be had to the relationship between the 
purpose of the deprivation and the person whose property is affected.87 In a building 
encroachment dispute, the purpose of a deprivation is to ensure that the most fair 
and equitable outcome is reached, and that the outcome is not too burdensome on 
only one party. The party whose property is affected stands to lose either the land 
(where transfer is ordered) or a substantial right to use the land (where the order 
effectively transfers a limited real right or other right to use the land). With 
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  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 108. 
87
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 100. 
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insignificant encroachments (in other words the first outcome) the extent of the 
deprivation is small. Therefore, the limitation on the affected landowner’s property 
rights is small, in relation to the effect for the encroacher if demolition is ordered. 
However, with significant encroachments (the second outcome) and the case where 
transfer is ordered (the third outcome), the effect of leaving the encroachment in 
place is significant. The limitation on the affected landowner’s rights is substantial. 
Therefore, the deprivation that results when the encroachment is not demolished 
causes a serious burden on the affected landowner. This deprivation may be justified 
if the court balances the interests of both parties and takes various factors into 
account to ensure that the most just and fair outcome is reached. The factors will 
have to play a role in order to prove that the burdensome effect on the affected 
landowner’s property rights is justified. These may include the extent of the 
unfairness of ordering demolition of the encroachment,88 delay in bringing the 
application,89 the duration for which the encroachment has stood,90 malicious intent 
by either party involved in the dispute,91 whether the loss can adequately be 
compensated,92 the size of the encroachment, whether removal will result in people’s 
homes being demolished93 or any other factor that may be relevant in the dispute.94 
If the balancing of the various factors favours the encroacher, the purpose of the law 
causing the deprivation is reached and the deprivation will be justified. 
 
In terms of the fourth factor in FNB, the relationship between the purpose of the 
deprivation and the nature of the property as well as the extent of the deprivation 
must be considered.95 In all three outcomes it seems as though the reason why 
courts decide to leave the encroachment in place is because the common law 
remedy of removal has become too rigid, and its strict application would lead to 
unfavourable results in cases where the effect of the encroachment is significantly 
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  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
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  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
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  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
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  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
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  Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287. 
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  Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (UK); Site 
Developments (Ferndown) Ltd v Barratt Homes Ltd [2007] EWHC 415 (Ch) (UK). 
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  See chap 3 above. 
95
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 100. 
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smaller than the effect of removal. Therefore, if the reason for the deprivation is 
fairness and equity, the purpose of the deprivation is the same in all three outcomes, 
namely to prevent an unjustifiably harsh outcome for the encroacher, considering the 
extent and effect of the encroachment. In the first outcome, the encroachment is 
insignificant because the affected landowner loses only the entitlement of use and 
enjoyment of a small portion of land. A good illustration of why the courts might 
disregard such an insignificant loss is the case of Nhlabathi v Fick.96 As mentioned 
earlier, the Land Claims Court in this case had to determine whether the 
appropriation of a grave by an occupier in terms of section 6(2)(dA) of the Extension 
of Security of Tenure Act97 would deprive a landowner of the use of that portion of 
his land. After finding that there was a deprivation,98 the court questioned whether 
that deprivation was arbitrary.99 The court relied on the FNB methodology to 
determine whether the reason for the deprivation was sufficient100 and decided that 
the loss of the entitlement of use and enjoyment was insignificant because of the 
small piece of land that was affected and therefore the deprivation was justified.101 
The extent of the deprivation causing only a small limitation on the affected 
landowner’s right of use and enjoyment could also in the same way as it did in 
Nhlabathi help justify the deprivation that results in the context of insignificant 
building encroachments. 
 
However, this may not be true in the case of significant encroachments where a 
landowner loses use and enjoyment of a substantial portion of his property or even 
the whole of his land. In these instances it would be more difficult to justify the 
deprivation, because it could be excessively burdensome on the affected landowner. 
The larger the encroachment, the bigger the limitation on the entitlement of use and 
enjoyment and therefore a stronger reason is needed to justify the deprivation. The 
circumstances of the case would need to be considered and need to be exceptional 
enough to justify the deprivation considering the significant limitation on the affected 
landowner’s rights. The considerations mentioned above in terms of the third factor 
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  Nhlabathi and others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC). 
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  The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
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  See s 5.3.2.2 above. 
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  Nhlabathi and others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) paras 27-31. 
100
  Nhlabathi and others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) paras 30, 31. 
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  Nhlabathi and others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC). 
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are again important to justify the deprivation in terms of this factor. In other words, it 
will again be important to consider if it would be unfair to order demolition in the 
particular case because there was delay in bringing the application, or the 
encroachment had stood for a considerable amount of time. It should also be 
determined whether there was bad faith by either party involved in the dispute, or 
whether the loss can adequately be compensated in money. The size of the 
encroachment will obviously need to be considered, especially in order to prove who 
would suffer more harm in the particular case either if demolition was ordered or if 
the encroachment was kept intact. The nature of the property will be an important 
consideration in the context of building encroachments because courts may be 
reluctant to order removal where it may result in people’s homes being destroyed. 
Any of these factors may help balance the scale in favour of the encroacher and 
therefore justify the deprivation even in cases where it is significant. 
 
Factor five states that a more compelling purpose is needed where the deprivation 
affects the ownership of land or corporeal movables.102 In FNB the affected right was 
ownership and therefore a very strong reason for the deprivation was required in 
those circumstances. The property in question in the case of building encroachment 
is land, and the right that is affected is either an entitlement in that land (a use right) 
or ownership of the land (if transfer is ordered). Therefore, the reason for the 
deprivation would need to be more compelling when the court orders transfer of the 
affected land than when limited use rights are involved. 
 
The sixth factor requires the courts to consider the effect of the deprivation on the 
incidents of ownership.103 Where all the incidents of ownership are affected a more 
compelling reason is required. In cases where only some incidents of ownership are 
affected, or where they are only partially affected, the reason need not be as 
compelling. In the first two outcomes the affected landowner loses use and 
enjoyment of his property as a result of the encroachment not being demolished. In 
the first outcome, he loses use and enjoyment of a small portion of his property; 
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  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 100. 
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  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 100. 
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whereas in the second outcome he loses the use and enjoyment of a significant 
portion of his property. Therefore, naturally, the reason required to justify the 
deprivation in the second outcome would have to be stronger than in the first 
outcome. In Mkontwana, the court found that even if it is only one incident of 
ownership that is affected by the deprivation, that incident of ownership may be a 
significant element of ownership.104 It was found in Mkontwana that the right to 
alienate property is an important incident of ownership.105 However, in this case the 
court stated that the deprivation was minor because it was only one incident that was 
temporarily limited. Therefore, the limitation was justified. This may help to explain 
why, in the case of the first outcome, the deprivation can be justified. Although use 
and enjoyment is an important incident of ownership, the limitation on the use and 
enjoyment pertains to a small portion of property. Therefore, in the case of 
insignificant encroachments the deprivation only affects a small portion of property 
and the balance of harm in this case is on the side of the encroacher. The 
deprivation can be justified more easily in these cases.106 However, this may not be 
as easy in the case of significant encroachments. Although it is also only one 
incident of ownership in this case - namely the use and enjoyment of property - it is a 
large portion of property that is affected. Therefore, the deprivation is significant and 
stronger reasons are required to justify the deprivation. In the case where the court 
orders transfer of the encroached-upon land (the third outcome) the effect of the 
deprivation is even more intrusive. As in FNB, the affected right is ownership and all 
the incidents of ownership are affected. Therefore, a stronger reason is required to 
justify the deprivation. There are various factors that may be taken into consideration 
in order to justify the deprivation. Most of the factors that were taken into 
consideration when the decision was made to leave the encroachment in place will 
be relevant when attempting to justify the deprivation. For example, balance of harm 
or loss for either party, fairness of ordering demolition, mala fide behaviour by either 
party involved in the dispute, tardiness in bringing the application or any other factor 
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  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset and Others v Buffulo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive Council for 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) par 33. 
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  This is assuming that there is no other factor that may dictate that removal should be ordered. 
An example of this would be where there was mala fide behaviour by the affected landowner. 
163 
 
that may help to provide a more compelling reason for the deprivation. These factors 
may provide a strong enough reason to justify the deprivation in the case where the 
affected landowner loses ownership or use of a substantial portion of his land. 
 
The seventh factor requires a number of aspects to be taken into consideration when 
determining whether a sufficient reason for the deprivation exists,107 including what 
the law that causes the deprivation seeks to achieve and whether it actually achieves 
this goal. Additionally, the property or property right that is affected and the extent to 
which the property right is affected should be considered. According to these 
considerations, it can be determined whether a mere rational relationship between 
the means and ends is required or whether a proportional evaluation is necessary. 
 
In encroachment cases, the law that causes the deprivation is the common law in 
terms of which courts have the discretion to deny removal orders when a 
compensation order is more likely to ensure that the outcome is just and equitable 
and not excessively burdensome on only one party. The balance between the rights 
of the encroacher and the affected landowner would need to be proportionate.108 The 
proportionality investigation has to favour the compensation award in order for the 
court to decide to leave the encroachment in place. In other words, the balance of 
harm must be on the side of the encroacher and the compensation order must be 
able to correct the effect on the affected landowner’s rights. If this goal is reached, 
the law would be justified. This needs to be questioned in all three outcomes to 
assess whether the deprivation is justified. 
 
The area affected by insignificant encroachments is small. Sometimes it will be 
foundations of a wall that encroach or it may be a small part of a building that 
extends a few inches into the affected landowner’s property. The limitation on the 
right is generally insignificant as it pertains to a small piece of land. Therefore, the 
deprivation of use and enjoyment that results is insignificant.109 In insignificant 
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 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 100. 
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  This approach is similar to the Dutch approach. See chap 6 below. 
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  Nhlabathi and others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC). 
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encroachment cases the law that causes the deprivation could reach its goal if the 
effect of removal would have been much harsher for the encroacher than the effect 
of denying removal would be for the affected landowner. This assumption would 
hold, provided that both parties acted in good faith and there are no other factors 
indicating that demolition should be the appropriate remedy. Therefore, after a 
balance of interests is done in the case of insignificant encroachments and 
compensation is found to be the appropriate remedy, the deprivation would in most 
cases be justified. 
 
When dealing with the deprivation of the entitlement of use and enjoyment of a 
substantial portion of the property or of the ownership of the land itself, as indicated 
before, it is more difficult to justify the deprivation. The extent of the deprivation 
makes the limitation on the right significant. Therefore, a more stringent level of 
scrutiny is required in the second and third outcomes. 
 
Therefore, in all three cases the court must balance the interests of the parties 
involved in an encroachment dispute. In order to establish sufficient reason for the 
deprivation a proportional relationship between means and ends should be 
established. In this regard the court must make a proportional assessment by 
balancing the interests of both parties involved in an encroachment dispute. Where 
the balance favours a compensation award (mostly in the case of insignificant 
deprivations), the law would have reached its goal and the order would more easily 
justify the deprivation. However, the scale would not as easily favour the encroacher 
when the encroachment is significant. In this case a higher level of scrutiny is 
required to justify the deprivation. A court will need to consider whether there are 
exceptional circumstances that justified keeping the encroachment intact that will 
serve as justification for the deprivation. In this regard the last factor in the FNB 
methodology to determine sufficient reason for the deprivation is important. 
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The last factor that can be used to prove sufficient reason for the deprivation in FNB 
is the requirement that all relevant circumstances in the case should be taken into 
consideration.110 This would depend on the facts of each case. 
 
In terms of outcome one, a court leaves the encroachment in place in the case of 
insignificant encroachments. The effect is a loss of use and enjoyment of a small 
portion of the affected landowner’s property. The deprivation that results may be 
reasonably easily justified. This is because the balance of interests of the parties in 
this dispute will most likely indicate that demolition will be unduly burdensome on the 
encroacher. In most cases where the deprivation is minor this will be a good enough 
reason not to demolish the encroachment and would probably justify the deprivation. 
This is assuming that there are no circumstances that dictate that the demolition 
should occur and therefore that the deprivation would not be justified. However, in 
cases of extensive encroachments, the affected landowner loses the use and 
enjoyment of a substantial portion of his property. It becomes more difficult to justify 
this outcome because the larger the encroachment, the greater the extent of the 
deprivation. The outcome has to be calculated in every case based on its set of 
facts. The deprivation will need to be justified on a balance of all considerations and 
circumstances in the case. There is no straightforward rule that removal is or is not 
justified in the case of all significant encroachments. As is evident in case law, there 
may be exceptional circumstances that may justify keeping the encroachment intact 
and these circumstances will be important for the justification of the deprivation.111 
These may include unfairness of ordering demolition of the encroachment,112 delay 
in bringing the application,113 the duration for which the encroachment has stood,114 
malicious intent by either party involved in the dispute,115 whether the loss can 
adequately be compensated,116 the size of the encroachment, whether removal will 
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  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 100. 
111
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
112
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
113
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
114
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
115
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
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result in people’s homes being demolished117 or any other factor that may be 
relevant in the dispute.118 
 
In case law the conduct of the parties was one of the deciding factors in determining 
the encroachment dispute.119 According to the court in Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust 
v Annandale, the right of removal should not allow an affected landowner to exploit 
his power and demand removal of the encroachment out of “pure malice”.120 It is 
argued in this case that where a landowner insists upon removal in the case of a 
significant encroachment he is abusing his right to demand removal.121 This is a 
factor that would need to be taken into consideration when justifying the deprivation. 
Another reason that may be sufficient to justify the deprivation is tardiness in bringing 
the application for removal.122 If the affected landowner does not object to the 
existence of the encroachment promptly, this may justify keeping the encroachment 
in place. The delay in bringing the application could be an indication of acquiescence 
and might also show lack of detriment.123 Therefore, the conduct of the parties 
should play a role in determining which outcome would be the most suitable and 
should therefore be taken into consideration when justifying the deprivation. All the 
considerations mentioned above will be important to justify the deprivation that 
results from the continued existence of even a significant encroachment. 
 
If the court orders transfer of the encroached-upon land, as in the case of the third 
outcome, the deprivation is significant and greater justification is required for the 
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deprivation. Like FNB, ownership is the affected right and all the incidents of 
ownership are lost. Therefore, in order to prove that there is sufficient reason for the 
deprivation, a more compelling purpose is required. It is necessary to make a careful 
assessment in order to establish whether the effect on the encroacher (when the 
encroachment is demolished) is harsher than the effect on the affected landowner 
(when the encroachment remains intact). Again, the factors mentioned above will be 
important in this assessment. Therefore considerations like delay, bona fides, 
unfairness, the extent of the encroachment and whether the loss can adequately be 
compensated by money will again be important in terms of this requirement in FNB. 
All of these considerations and the circumstances of the case may determine 
whether the deprivation can be justified even if it is significant. Of course, as 
mentioned earlier the order for transfer may still be arbitrary because it is 
procedurally unfair even if it can be proven that there is sufficient reason to justify the 
deprivation. It is clear that there is uncertainty surrounding whether this order may be 
made at all.124 In the absence of clear authority, it will result in an arbitrary 
deprivation of property because it is procedurally unfair. 
 
Therefore, if it is proven that the deprivation is arbitrary, either because it is 
procedurally unfair or because there is insufficient reason for the deprivation, the 
third step of the FNB enquiry is to determine whether the arbitrary deprivation can be 
justified under section 36. 
 
5.3.2.4 Can the deprivation be justified in terms of section 36? 
According to the Constitution, any limitation of a protected right may be justified in 
terms of section 36.125 The Constitutional Court in FNB started off the justification 
question by stating that the fact that a deprivation was arbitrary may sometimes 
render the section 36 question redundant.126 Nonetheless, the court embarked on a 
section 36 enquiry and concluded that the arbitrary deprivation in that case was not 
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reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom.127 Van der Walt states that it is highly unlikely that a 
deprivation that fails the section 25(1) enquiry would ever reach the section 36 
limitation analysis if courts follow the procedure as set out in FNB.128 This is because 
deprivations that fail to meet the requirements of section 25(1) and prove to be 
arbitrary, will probably also fail to meet the requirements of section 36.129 Similarly, 
Roux argues that if the procedure of FNB is followed, it would be impossible to get 
through all the stages of FNB.130 Therefore, in all constitutional property disputes if a 
deprivation is struck down in terms of section 25(1) because of the arbitrariness 
analysis, section 36(1) will probably never be reached.131 Furthermore, Roux states 
that, depending on what end of the spectrum the conclusion about arbitrariness was 
reached, the role of section 36 will differ.132 If arbitrariness were measured in terms 
of mere rationality, this would provide the strongest case against the applicability of 
section 36.133 The reason for this is that if there is no rational connection between 
means and ends for the deprivation, it could never be justified in terms of section 
36.134 In the case where proportionality was required, like in the FNB decision, 
section 36 will generally just confirm the conclusion already reached in section 25(1), 
and the section 36 justification would probably never succeed.135 In Nhlabati v 
Fick136 the Land Claims Court nevertheless decided that the deprivation brought 
about by the appropriation of a grave in terms of section 6(2)(dA) of the Extension of 
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  T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
(2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) chap 46 at 46-27. 
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  T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
(2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) chap 46 at 46-27. 
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  T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
(2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) chap 46 at 46-27. 
136
  Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC). 
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Security of Tenure Act137 would, even if it were arbitrary, be justified in terms of 
section 36(1) because it was “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”.138 
 
If it is found in an encroachment dispute that the encroachment results in a 
deprivation that is arbitrary, the literature suggests that it would most probably not be 
justifiable in terms of section 36.139 If the loss of use and enjoyment of the property 
(the first two outcomes) or the loss of ownership (as in the last outcome) amounts to 
an arbitrary deprivation, it would probably not be reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking 
the factors listed in section 36(1) into consideration.140 If this is the case, the property 
enquiry in terms of the FNB methodology would stop here and the law would be 
deemed unconstitutional. However, if the deprivation was not arbitrary or if it can be 
justified in terms of section 36, the next step is to determine whether an expropriation 
has occurred in terms section 25(2) of the Constitution. 
 
5.3.2.5 Has there been an expropriation for purposes of section 25(2)? 
As a result of the methodology proposed in FNB it will always be necessary to test 
for deprivation before it can be established whether an expropriation took place. 
Therefore, in terms of FNB, all expropriations are deprivations, but not all 
deprivations are expropriations.141 Roux states that: 
“In South Africa, by contrast, the distinction between deprivation and expropriation 
has lost much of its significance. The FNB Court treated expropriations as a form 
                                                 
137
  The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
138
  Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) par 35. 
139
  This is assuming Van der Walt and Roux’s argument that a deprivation that is arbitrary will 
never be justified under s 36. See AJ van der Walt “The limits of constitutional property” (1997) 12 SA 
Public law 275-330 at 325-327; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) chap 46 at 46-27; AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 55-57. 
140
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 113. 
141
  T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
(2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) chap 46 at 46-2 – 46-5, 46-23 – 46-25. 
170 
 
of deprivation and insisted that an impugned law, even where it clearly provided 
for the expropriation of property, first be tested for compliance with s 25(1).”142 
 
Once it has been established that a deprivation is arbitrary and not justifiable in 
terms of section 36 that would be the end of the matter; the law that authorises the 
deprivation is unconstitutional and invalid. The deprivation in FNB was 
constitutionally invalid because it was arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) and could 
not be justified according to section 36.143 Therefore, it was unnecessary for the 
Constitutional Court to decide whether the deprivation amounted to an expropriation 
that needed to comply with section 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution. 
 
If it can be established that the deprivation has resulted in an expropriation, the 
expropriation would need to comply with the requirements of section 25(2) and (3) of 
the Constitution.144 This was shown in Nhlabati v Fick,145 where the Land Claims 
Court decided that even if the appropriation of a grave in terms of section 6(2)(dA) of 
the Extension of Security of Tenure Act,146 amounted to an expropriation without 
compensation that was in conflict with section 25 (2), it would be justifiable under 
section 36(1) of the Constitution.147 
 
When applied to encroachment cases, the deprivation that results when courts leave 
the encroaching structure in place may look like an expropriation in some instances. 
This will be especially in cases where the court decides not to order removal and the 
effect is that the affected landowner loses either the land (when transfer of the land 
is ordered) or a right to use the land (when the order effectively transfers a limited 
real or other right to use the land). Furthermore, the alternative relied on by the 
courts, namely the payment of compensation, creates the illusion that this may be an 
                                                 
142
  T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
(2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) chap 46 at 46-29. 
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  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) par 113. 
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  I do not discuss the relationship between deprivations and expropriations in detail. For a 
detailed discussion of this, see AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) chaps 4 and 5. 
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  Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC). 
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  The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
147
  Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) par 35. 
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expropriation. Therefore, it needs to be determined whether what is taking place 
when the encroachment remains in place is expropriation of either a use right or 
ownership of the land on which the encroachment is erected. 
 
With regard to the first and second outcomes, the argument would be as follows: 
When the court orders that the encroachment should not be removed and the 
affected landowner loses the right to use that portion of his land, he is effectively 
being expropriated of that right. What would be expropriated in this case is a use 
right and not ownership. It could also be argued that when a court decides to opt for 
monetary compensation instead of removal of an encroachment, it is effectively 
creating a servitude of use (a limited real right) in favour of the encroaching 
landowner. Praedial servitudes are usually created by way of agreement between 
the dominant and servient tenement owners, but the courts have the power to create 
a servitude of right of way of necessity by court order.148 Imposing this limitation on a 
landowner without his consent could arguably be seen as an expropriation of a use 
right or, possibly, a servitude.149 
 
In Nhlabathi v Fick, it was acknowledged that a permanent restriction on the use of 
property could not only amount to a deprivation of some of the landowner’s property 
rights, but also to an expropriation of those rights.150 Therefore, assuming the loss of 
property passes the section 25(1) requirement and does not amount to an arbitrary 
deprivation, the loss may amount to an expropriation of the right to use and enjoy the 
affected part of the property.151 The respondent in Nhlabathi argued that if an 
expropriation did result in this case, it would be unconstitutional and void because 
the provision authorising the appropriation of the grave did not provide for the 
payment of just and equitable compensation, which is a requirement for a valid 
                                                 
148
  Consent is a prerequisite for the creation of a praedial servitude. The only servitude that can 
be created without the consent of the owner of the servient tenement is the right of way of necessity. 
See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 
2006) 328. 
149
  A Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 61, 70-71. 
150
  Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) par 32. 
151
  A Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 70-71. Gildenhuys argues that rights can also 
form the subject of expropriation. 
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expropriation.152 Similarly, in Serole v Pienaar, which was a case also dealing with 
the appropriation of graves on property, it was found that the unilateral establishment 
of a grave on private land could be equated with the granting of a servitude over the 
property and that the granting of a servitude without the consent of a landowner may 
well constitute an expropriation. Therefore, it is possible to expropriate a right such 
as a use right or a servitude by imposing a permanent limitation on the owner’s use 
right. 
 
In the context of encroachment by building a court order that grants monetary 
compensation rather than removal of the encroachment practically amounts to the 
involuntary establishment of a permanent presence on and use of a specific part of 
the affected owner’s property, similar to the establishment of a servitude or a similar 
use right. This use right does not have to be a limited real right, it could amount to a 
sort of lease, which is a personal use right if not registered.153 In my view, it seems 
as though a better argument in these instances is that what a court does is not to 
expropriate (and therefore transfer) a use right, but rather establishes a use right in 
favour of the encroacher. As in the case of a servitude of right of way of necessity 
established by the court, a use right is created by the court in favour of the 
encroacher when the encroachment is left in place.154 The compensation that is 
awarded in this case is based on fairness and the balancing of interests, which is the 
foundation of the court’s power to establish these rights in the first place. It is not 
compensation for expropriation of the use right, because that is not authorised. 
 
The third outcome, where the court specifically orders that the encroached-upon land 
should be transferred to the encroacher, could also be seen as an expropriation of 
land. Therefore, in all three outcomes where a court decides to leave an encroaching 
                                                 
152
  S 25(2) of the Constitution requires that an expropriation is subject to just and equitable 
compensation. The authorising provision in question in Nhlabathi is s 6(2)(dA) of the Extension of 
Security of Tenure Act (“ESTA”). The court provided various possibilities of what could happen if a 
statutory provision, which allows an expropriation, did not provide compensation. One of the 
possibilities is that it can be justifiable under s 36 of the Constitution. Consequently, it was found in 
Nhlabathi that “[t]he statutory obligation of a landowner under section 6(2)(dA)” was reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. See 
Nhlabathi and Others v Fick [2003] 2 All SA 323 (LCC) paras 33-35. 
153
  This is the German approach. See chap 6 below. 
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  When a use right is established, the question that remains is what the nature of the right is. 
This is discussed in chap 4 above. 
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structure intact, it may look like an expropriation of either a use right or of ownership 
of the affected land. However, an expropriation in the context of building 
encroachment is not possible and the deprivation that results from leaving an 
encroachment in place against compensation should not be regarded as an 
expropriation. This is because, in addition to the requirements in section 25(1), which 
according to FNB should always be complied with first in any property enquiry, there 
are additional requirements for an expropriation to be constitutionally valid. There is 
a threshold requirement in terms of which the expropriation must also be imposed in 
terms of law of general application.155 Furthermore, expropriation is possible only for 
a public purpose or in the public interest156 and must be accompanied by just and 
equitable compensation.157 As will be argued below, these requirements probably 
stand in the way of accepting that the deprivation results in an expropriation in the 
context of building encroachments. 
 
In the context of building encroachment, the regulating law is the common law.158 
Therefore, the source of the deprivation is the common law and specifically common 
law principles aimed at balancing conflicting private interests in land. The common 
law allows the court, in certain instances, to leave encroaching structures in place, 
which could result in a deprivation of a use right. This clearly amounts to a 
deprivation of land rights, but there is no common law authority for expropriation. 
 
Gildenhuys argues that there must be statutory authorisation for a valid expropriation 
to occur.159 The expropriation must be undertaken by the state or any person 
authorised to do so on behalf of the state. Van der Walt relies on this argument to 
substantiate the view that the loss of property that results in the case of building 
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  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(2). 
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  It is argued that it would be highly unlikely that a law that permits an arbitrary deprivation 
would be for a public purpose or in the public interest. Therefore, a law that allows a deprivation that 
is not for a public purpose or in the public interest will generally not have passed the arbitrariness test 
of s 25(1) in the first place because there would not be sufficient reason for the deprivation. For this 
reason it is unlikely that a deprivation that failed the s 25(1) test could satisfy the s 25(2) test for 
expropriation. See AJ van der Walt “The limits of constitutional property” (1997) 12 SA Public law 275-
330 at 325-327; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of 
South Africa (2nd ed 2003 original service Dec 2003) chap 46 at 46-33; AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
property law (2005) 55-57. 
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  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25(2)(a) and (b). 
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  See fn 56 above. 
159
  A Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg (2nd ed 2001) 13. 
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encroachments being left intact can never be an expropriation, because there is lack 
of authority for such an expropriation.160 Generally speaking, expropriation is 
impossible unless a particular law authorises expropriation. In short, without explicit 
statutory authority expropriation is impossible and any common law principle (or 
action or judicial decision based on such a principle) that in effect results in an 
expropriation is invalid and unconstitutional for lack of authority. 
 
Van der Walt argues that the lack-of-authority argument could have been used in the 
Reflect-All161 case to explain why the deprivation did not amount to an 
expropriation.162 In Reflect All, the Constitutional Court had to decide whether 
section 10(1) and 10(3) of the Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act163 allowed an 
expropriation of property without just and equitable compensation. The impugned 
provisions provided for planning of provincial roads and imposed certain restrictions 
on the use, enjoyment and exploitation of privately owned property belonging to the 
applicants. The court held that the action in terms of section 10(1) and 10(3) did not 
amount to an expropriation because the state did not acquire the property rights in 
this case. Using Harkson v Lane NO and Others164 as authority, the Constitutional 
Court confirmed that a decisive way of establishing whether an expropriation had 
taken place was to determine whether the state had acquired the property in 
question.165 
 
Van der Walt criticises the narrow interpretation by the Constitutional Court for 
determining whether an expropriation occurred in this case.166 He argues that 
acquisition of property by the state is merely an indication of whether there was an 
expropriation. He uses the example of land reform to argue that in certain cases, 
although the state does not acquire the property rights, compulsory acquisition and 
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  AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” 
(2009) 125 SALJ 592-638 at 622; AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 200 & 201. 
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  Reflect-All 1025 and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, Roads 
and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
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  AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 131. 
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  The Gauteng Transport Act 8 of 2001. 
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  1998 (1) SA 300 (CC). 
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  Reflect-All 1025 and Others v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, Roads 
and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) par 64. 
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  AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (2005) 131. 
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transfer of the land can still amount to an expropriation. Furthermore, he asserts that 
a convincing argument for the reason why an expropriation did not occur in Reflect-
All was that the legislation did not authorise expropriation. The same argument can 
be made in the context of building encroachments. The common law does not 
authorise expropriation and therefore expropriation does not occur. The fact that the 
property (either the land itself or a use right) was taken from one private person (the 
affected landowner) and transferred to another (the encroacher), without the state 
acquiring any property, may be an indication that a forced transfer of the property 
took place, but not an expropriation. 
 
The Constitutional Court in Reflect-All did mention the question of whether a 
deprivation that has gone too far (so-called constructive expropriation) could amount 
to an expropriation, but failed to explore the possibility.167 Van der Walt argues that 
any regulatory restriction on property rights that goes too far should, instead of being 
regarded as a constructive expropriation, most likely be invalid because it would 
amount to an arbitrary deprivation in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.168 
Accordingly, he states that: 
“It is therefore unnecessary and misleading to even consider the question whether 
any particular regulatory restriction on the use of property, which was obviously 
not formally intended or authorised to function as an expropriation, could amount 
to an expropriation simply because it is extraordinarily harsh, unfair or 
burdensome.”169 
 
Considering the fact that there is no common law authority for the expropriation, it 
may be concluded that the compulsory transfer of property or property rights that 
results when the encroachment is not demolished can never amount to an 
expropriation. Leaving the encroachment in place may in some cases effectively 
result in forced transfer of a use right, and in certain cases it may purport to effect 
forced transfer of ownership, but it would never amount to an expropriation. 
Therefore, in encroachment cases, expropriation should not come into the picture at 
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all. Consequently the justification leg of the FNB test for expropriations does not 
need to be considered. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I emphasised the uncertainty in the outcomes reached in building 
encroachment disputes in South Africa. I distinguished three outcomes that may 
result from the new approach to the problem of building encroachments. The main 
aim of this chapter was to question the constitutional validity of these outcomes in 
order to ultimately prove that legislation is required to eliminate some of the 
uncertainties in this area of law. When courts deny the common law remedy of 
removal and leave the encroaching structures in place, there may be constitutional 
implications, especially if the encroachment is significant. If a court goes even further 
and orders that the encroached-upon land be transferred to the encroacher, this is 
even more problematic because there is not common law or statutory authority for 
such an order. 
 
The justification for denying demolition of an encroachment seems to be 
considerations of equity and fairness. In other words, if the encroachment were 
removed it would lead to unjust results which would be too burdensome on the 
encroacher; therefore compensation is deemed to be the better remedy. However, 
the consequences of these orders are not always considered adequately. Besides 
the doctrinal implications, which were discussed in the previous chapter, these court 
orders may also have constitutional implications. The deprivation of property or 
property rights that occurs as a result of leaving the encroachment in place needs to 
comply with section 25 of the Constitution. 
 
In the case of insignificant encroachments, this is generally reasonably easy to justify 
because the limitation on the affected landowner’s property rights is reasonably 
small. The affected right in this case is the entitlement of use and enjoyment of the 
small portion of property on which the encroachment stands. Therefore, the result is 
a deprivation of a use right pertaining to a small portion of the affected landowner’s 
177 
 
property. This deprivation, however small, must comply with the requirements of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution. It is clear from FNB that the smaller the extent of 
the encroachment, the smaller the limitation on the right affected and the easier it 
becomes to justify the encroachment. However, a careful assessment of the facts of 
the case is still necessary. If a balance of interests shows that demolition would be 
unduly harsh for the encroacher, this could be a reason to justify the deprivation that 
may result from not ordering removal of the encroachment. This balancing of 
interests is context-sensitive; therefore, there is no clear-cut rule that all insignificant 
encroachments will always remain in place because the size of the encroachment is 
of such an extent that greater harm will result if demolition is ordered. There may be 
exceptional circumstances that may indicate that demolition should be the 
appropriate remedy even in the case of insignificant encroachments, for example 
mala fide behaviour by the encroacher. However, because of the insignificant nature 
of the encroachment, the goal of reaching the most equitable outcome will no doubt 
be achieved by replacing demolition with compensation in the majority of cases 
where the encroachment is insignificant. In most cases where the encroachment is 
really insignificant, the means employed – leaving the encroachment in place 
resulting in the deprivation – will be justified, provided all things are equal and there 
is no other factor that dictates that demolition should be ordered. In these 
circumstances the deprivation that results from leaving really insignificant 
encroachments in place, would not amount to an arbitrary deprivation. 
 
In the case of significant encroachments, the problem becomes more complex. If a 
court orders that a significant encroachment should remain in place, it causes a 
deprivation of the entitlement of use and enjoyment of a substantial portion of the 
affected landowner’s property. If we assume that the encroachment is significant 
enough to cause a substantial limitation on the right of use and enjoyment of the 
affected landowner’s property, an arbitrary deprivation may result if that deprivation 
is not adequately justified. It was established in this chapter that although it is only 
one incident of ownership that is affected in this case, namely the use and enjoyment 
of the portion of the property on which the encroachment is erected, the use and 
enjoyment is affected to a significant extent in so far as the deprivation of the use 
and enjoyment of the property pertains to a large part of the affected landowner’s 
178 
 
property. It is clear that the larger the encroachment, the greater the limitation on the 
affected right and the more difficult it is to justify the deprivation. Obviously, this 
enquiry is different depending on the circumstances in each case. When balancing 
the interests of the parties in this dispute, it will be more difficult to prove that the 
effect that demolition would have would be harsher for the encroacher than the result 
for the affected landowner if demolition was denied. Other factors will have to be 
taken into consideration to prove that the balance should favour the encroacher. This 
may help to justify keeping even a significant encroachment in place, even if it 
causes a deprivation of property to a significant extent. The examples that I 
illustrated are evident from case law, namely delay, the duration for which the 
encroachment had stood as a sign of acquiescence or lack of detriment, bad faith, if 
the result would be demolition of people’s home, if the loss can adequately be 
compensated in monetary terms and any other factor that may assist in the 
balancing of the interests of the parties involved in the dispute. I emphasised that it 
would be impossible to furnish extensive examples of when a deprivation that results 
from significant encroachments would be justifiable, because it depends on the 
circumstances of each case. However, judging from case law it seems as though it 
should be possible in exceptional circumstances to leave a significant encroachment 
in place even if it results in a significant deprivation of property. Due consideration of 
the circumstances in the particular case should ensure that this outcome does not 
result in an arbitrary deprivation. 
 
In terms of the third outcome, the court orders transfer of the encroached-upon land 
to the encroacher. This outcome is the most problematic outcome to justify in terms 
of section 25(1), because the affected right is ownership for which a more compelling 
purpose is required in terms of FNB. In this outcome, like in FNB, the affected 
landowner loses ownership and all the incidents thereof. Therefore, a very strong 
reason is required in these circumstances. Again, all the considerations and 
circumstances would need to be balanced in order to prove that the deprivation is 
justified. However, even if it can be proven that the deprivation is justified because 
there is sufficient reason for the deprivation, the deprivation that results from this 
outcome may prove to be arbitrary on the basis of procedural unfairness. It was 
found in this chapter that there is inadequate authority for such an order. Therefore, 
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section 25(1) will possibly not be complied with in this case, because it is 
procedurally unfair. 
 
I also questioned whether the deprivation could amount to an expropriation. In all 
three outcomes where a court decides to leave an encroaching structure intact, it 
may look like an expropriation of either a use right (i e the first two outcomes) or of 
ownership of the affected land (i e the third outcome). However, an expropriation in 
the context of building encroachment is not possible. Therefore, the deprivation that 
results from leaving an encroachment in place against compensation should not be 
regarded as an expropriation. The reason why the deprivation could not be 
considered an expropriation of either a use right or an expropriation of land itself in 
the case of building encroachments is because the common law does not authorise 
the expropriation and there is no legislation to authorise such an order either. 
Therefore, the possibility that this could amount to an expropriation is not accepted. 
 
In conclusion, the new approach to the problem of building encroachment has 
proved that there are some shortcomings in the court orders made in building 
encroachment disputes. There is uncertainty and inability to explain what happens 
as a result of the encroachments being left in place. At least in some cases it should 
be possible to leave encroaching structures in place. However, in terms of 
constitutional compliance, the deprivation that results needs to be justified 
adequately. Legislation may be needed to eliminate some of the uncertainties that 
currently exist in the law regulating building encroachments. 
 
Foreign law provides good examples of effective approaches to the problem of 
building encroachments; therefore in the next chapter I consider the Australian, 
German and Dutch approaches to building encroachment disputes. The Australian 
Encroachment of Buildings Act170 helps to see what an encroachment statute might 
look like. It contains a list of factors that may assist the court in making the choice 
between demolitions and keeping the encroachment in place. However, it does not 
take us further in terms of doctrinal and constitutional issues which are important in 
                                                 
170
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW). 
180 
 
the South African context. The German and Dutch approaches help in this regard. 
Therefore, in the next chapter I undertake a comparative analysis with these three 
jurisdictions with the aim of finding a solution to some of the problems in the context 
of South African law. 
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Chapter 6: Comparative analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
It has become evident from the previous chapters that South African courts are 
adopting a new approach to the problem of encroachment by building. The new 
approach denies the affected landowner the right to demand removal as of right in 
some encroachment cases and grants courts the discretion to decide to leave the 
encroachment in place, generally against the payment of compensation. This is in 
line with the global trend in this area of law. However, there are some difficulties with 
the approach in South African law. 
 
I have argued throughout the dissertation that this new approach has resulted in 
uncertainty regarding certain doctrinal and constitutional questions. Generally, 
ownership of land and the buildings erected on that land vests in the same person. 
However, in the case of encroachment by building it seems as though this does not 
happen. The only explanation of what happens when the encroachment is left in 
place is to say that accession is precluded, either because it does not come into 
existence in line with the new approach in accession cases, or accession would 
normally have taken place, but the court decides that it is suspended for policy 
reasons. Therefore, what ordinarily happens by operation of law, namely that 
permanent attachments to land belong to the landowner, is precluded in both cases 
to make it possible to order compensation instead of removal. However, this 
assumption about what actually happens when the encroachment remains in place 
poses further questions. These questions relate primarily to the right that the 
encroacher obtains when the encroachment is not demolished. Directly related to 
this is the right that the affected landowner loses when demolition is denied. These 
are doctrinal questions that remain unanswered because insufficient consideration is 
given to them in the case law. In the South African context it is important to ask 
questions concerning the land on which the encroachment is erected, the rights to 
the encroached-upon land and the rights to the building materials which are attached 
to that land. In terms of English law, from where the discretion was borrowed, it is 
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perfectly feasible to have land rights in horizontal layers of land, so that the buildings 
belong to one person and the land to another.1 However, this is only possible in 
South African law if the person who owns the building has a use-right (either 
personal or real). It was emphasised that the courts say nothing about the nature of 
the rights, but it is clear that the encroacher has continued possession of the 
encroachment. Therefore, when a court says nothing about the rights of the parties 
after a demolition order is denied, we are left to infer what the encroacher obtains 
and the affected landowner loses in this case. 
 
A further issue that I addressed in the previous chapter was the constitutionality of a 
court order that leaves a building encroachment in place. In terms of constitutional 
validity, once it has been established what right the affected landowner is deprived 
of, that deprivation needs to comply with section 25 of the Constitution. Therefore, 
whether the affected landowner loses the remedy of demolition, is forced to give up 
the right to use the encroached-upon land or actually loses ownership of the portion 
of property on which the encroachment stands, it needs to be justified in terms of the 
Constitution. It seems as though it should be fine in certain cases to keep the 
encroachment in place. Where the encroachment is insignificant, it may be explained 
and justified relatively easily. However, in the case of large encroachments, the loss 
suffered becomes more difficult to explain and justify. Without adequate justification, 
the deprivation that results may be in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution. It 
has been argued that it is difficult to justify the deprivation without greater clarity 
about the use right that is presumably established when the encroacher is left in 
possession of the encroachment against compensation. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that the courts probably do not have the authority at all to order transfer of 
the affected land and that such an order may amount to arbitrary deprivation in any 
event. 
 
To my mind, these problems can be solved with legislation. Therefore, it is the 
ultimate aim of this dissertation to suggest legislation to regulate the matter in South 
African law. How such legislation might look and what such provisions would 
                                                 
1
  See s 3.4.2 in chap 3 above. 
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encompass are investigated in this chapter by way of a comparative analysis of the 
German, Dutch and Australian approaches. The comparative analysis done in this 
chapter is solution based; therefore the analysis is sensitive to the institutional 
differences between the jurisdictions. The jurisdictions selected, namely Germany, 
the Netherlands and Australia, were chosen with the specific aim of establishing a 
comparative framework with reference to countries where the shift has taken place 
from the default remedy of removal to compensatory awards, similar to the recent 
shift in South Africa, but based on legislative regulation instead of leaving the matter 
to the courts to decide on the basis of a vague discretion. There are essentially two 
issues that are important in the South African context. Firstly, the factors that are 
taken into consideration when the decision is made to keep an encroaching structure 
in place need to be clear. Secondly, the consequences of the order denying 
demolition should be unambiguous. Legislation regulating building encroachment 
would need to stipulate what the consequences are of not demolishing an 
encroachment. There are some good examples in comparative law that can help 
solve the issues mentioned above. 
 
The Australian Encroachment of Buildings Act2 provides guidelines that would make 
the choice between injunctive relief and compensation easier. In other words, in 
order to understand how courts may decide to deny demolition, the Australian 
legislation may be helpful. In terms of the second issue; namely, what right the 
encroacher obtains when demolition is denied, the German and Dutch approach is 
more useful. In the case where demolition is denied in terms of the German and 
Dutch law, the rights of the parties in the dispute are made reasonably clear in the 
respective civil codes.3 
 
The German and Dutch civil codes contain specific provisions regulating the case 
where someone erects a building encroachment across the boundary line onto the 
property of another.4 It is necessary to assess these provisions in light of the 
difficulty in the South African context. Although the affected landowner is ordinarily 
                                                 
2
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW). 
3
  BGB: Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch; BW: Burgerlijk Wetboek. 
4
  BGB: Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch; BW: Burgerlijk Wetboek. 
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entitled to claim removal of the encroaching structures, he is in some cases 
precluded in terms of the German and Dutch civil codes from demanding removal.5 
The specific cases where removal would be appropriate are ascertainable from the 
provisions of the respective civil codes. In German law in the case where the 
encroachment is left intact, something equivalent to a lease in favour of the 
encroacher comes into effect. The encroacher will be liable for making annual 
payments until such time as the affected landowner wishes to sell that portion of the 
property to the encroacher. In Dutch law, a servitude is created to preserve the 
existing situation in exchange for compensation. In terms of transfer of the 
encroached-upon land, the civil codes also provide clear guidelines about transfer of 
the affected land to the encroaching builder, the approach being to leave the 
decision to transfer at the discretion of the affected landowner and not the courts or 
the encroacher. Additionally, the civil codes also prescribe that compensation should 
be paid, both for cases where land is transferred and in cases where compensation 
is awarded for interim or long-term use of the land, and prescribe how the 
compensation should be calculated. Both these approaches provide at least some 
sort of answer to the question that is uncertain in the South African context. In both 
cases it is clear what right the encroacher obtains when the encroachment is left in 
place; either a lease in the case of German law, or a servitude in terms of Dutch law. 
 
Essentially, the hypothesis is that it should be acceptable in some cases to deny 
demolition of a building encroachment. An important caveat should be attached in 
this regard based on two separate issues. Firstly, exactly how the choice is made 
between demolishing the encroachment and allowing it to remain intact. Here, 
careful consideration needs to be given to the policy and pragmatic reasons that are 
forwarded for the choice to keep the encroachment in place. I will consider the 
factors that are listed in the Australian Encroachment of Buildings Act.6 Secondly, 
when the decision is then made to deny an order for removal based on policy 
grounds, it becomes important to ask questions about the rights of the parties after 
the order is made. In this regard the German and Dutch approaches are important. 
                                                 
5
  BGB § 912; BW 5:1, 5:54. 
6
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW). 
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Both these concerns are important in the South African context and are addressed in 
this chapter. 
 
6.2 Australian law 
Some of the questions that arise from recent South African case law on building 
encroachments relate to the factors that need to be taken into consideration when 
the decision is made to keep encroaching structures in place.7 It needs to be clear 
how the policy decision is made in favour of denying a demolition order in the context 
of building encroachments in South Africa. The Australian Encroachment of 
Buildings Act8 has provisions specifically regulating how the discretion should be 
exercised and which factors should be taken into consideration. Therefore, it will be 
important to discuss some of the provisions in the Act in order to see how the 
discretion is exercised in terms of the Act. 
 
In an article on encroachment disputes in Australian law, Pam O’Connor takes the 
view that an encroachment statute is the best way to solve building encroachment 
disputes.9 In a different article addressing the possibility of building encroachments 
resulting in a private taking of land, she argues that building encroachment disputes 
require special legislation.10 She explains this as follows: 
“Building encroachments require special provision. The area of land involved is 
typically small, while the costs of removing an encroaching building may be 
prohibitively high. The non-salvageable investment made by the encroaching 
owner who builds across the boundary renders him or her vulnerable to rent-
seeking by the adjacent owner during the limitation period, or at any time if there is 
no applicable limitation period. Building encroachment laws are best suited to the 
                                                 
7
  South African authors have commented on the possible problems that could arise as a result 
of these recent developments in the law regulating to building encroachments. See S Scott “Recent 
developments in case law regarding neighbour law and its influence on the concept of ownership” 
(2005) 16 Stell LR 351-377; A Pope “Encroachment or accession? The importance of the extent of 
encroachment in light of South African constitutional principles” (2007) 124 SALJ 537-556; AJ van der 
Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” (2008) 125 SALJ 604-
640. 
8
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW). 
9
  P O‘Connor “An adjudication rule for encroachment disputes: Adverse possession or a 
building encroachment statute?” in E Cooke (ed) Modern studies in property law IV (2007) 197-217 at 
216. 
10
  P O’Connor “The private taking of land: Adverse possession, encroachment by buildings and 
improvement under a mistake” (2006) 33 Univ of Western Australia LR 31-62. 
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purpose. They give courts a wide discretion to provide relief to the encroaching 
neighbour on just terms, while also discouraging deliberate or negligent 
encroachment.”11 
 
In 1922 the Encroachment of Buildings Act was enacted in New South Wales. The 
Act came into being as a result of the “perceived need to control rent-seeking by 
adjacent landowners in cases in which buildings encroached across boundaries 
through inadvertence of the encroaching owner or through the fault of his or her 
predecessor in title.”12 The Act clearly stipulates what the ambit of the courts’ power 
is; specifically which orders can be made should a building encroachment occur.13 
The discretion of the court is entirely dependent on the circumstances of the case, 
and as such it is very difficult to provide a single approach to a building 
encroachment problem. However, the Act does provide guidelines in terms of what 
can be taken into consideration when determining which outcome would best suit the 
particular situation.14 
 
Section 3(1) of the Act provides for the possibility that both landowners involved in a 
building encroachment dispute can apply to the court for the relief encapsulated in 
the Act. In a “normal” building encroachment situation one would expect the affected 
landowner to apply for relief, based on the fact that he is ordinarily entitled to 
removal of the encroachment because of his right to ensure undisturbed use and 
enjoyment of his property. This is probably why, in the South African context, some 
                                                 
11
  P O’Connor “The private taking of land: Adverse possession, encroachment by buildings and 
improvement under a mistake” (2006) 33 Univ of Western Australia LR 31-62 at 62. This article is 
written especially with due consideration of the fact that in certain cases the building of one person’s 
materials onto the land of another could result in the private taking of land. Therefore, emphasis is 
placed on the possible involuntary loss of property. In the South African context, this is dealt with in 
chap 5 above. 
12
  P O‘Connor “An adjudication rule for encroachment disputes: Adverse possession or a 
building encroachment statute?” in E Cooke (ed) Modern studies in property law IV (2007) 197-217 at 
210; P O’Connor “The private taking of land: Adverse possession, encroachment by buildings and 
improvement under a mistake” (2006) 33 Univ of Western Australia LR 31-62 at 58. In Hardie v 
Cuthbert (1988) 65 LGRA 5 (NSWSC) it was found that the aim of the Encroachment of Buildings Act 
1922 was to ensure that innocent people were not blackmailed by their neighbours if the 
encroachment resulted from a genuine mistake or faulty surveys. 
13
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW), s 3(2). 
14
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW), s 3(3). 
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South African authors have found it “unusual”15 and “interesting”16 when an 
encroaching landowner applies for relief. Nonetheless, it has been contended that 
very little weight is attached to this factor as a consideration in encroachment cases 
in Australia.17 
 
There are numerous factors that the court may take into consideration in determining 
which outcome would be appropriate in the given case.18 The list in the Act is not 
exhaustive and other factors not listed may also be taken into account. In essence 
this means that the court has the discretion to consider anything relevant to 
determine the most suitable order, but it has to consider the factors in the list and 
therefore the discretion is not unfettered. 
 
The first interesting factor is the nature and extent of the encroachment.19 With 
regard to the nature of the encroaching structure, it could be argued that in some 
cases it would be very difficult to demolish only the encroachment. This is especially 
in instances where the encroachment is part of a house, in which case it would not 
be practically feasible to demolish a part thereof. On the other hand, when dealing 
with encroachments like walls or minor structures, demolition would not be such an 
impractical option.20 The extent of the encroachment is an equally important 
consideration in terms of the Act. It is inevitable that small and large encroachments 
have varying effects. Finer attention needs to be given in cases where the 
                                                 
15
  A Pope “Encroachment or accession? The importance of the extent of encroachment in light 
of South African constitutional principles” (2007) 124 SALJ 537-556 at 544. Pope considers it unusual 
for the encroaching landowner to apply for relief. Her main argument against an application made by 
the encroaching landowner is that there is no legal basis for the application. When an affected 
landowner brings an application for the removal of the encroachment, his claim is based on his right 
to be able to enjoy undisturbed use and enjoyment of his property. By contrast, what the encroaching 
landowner is claiming is a right to compensation on the basis of unjustified enrichment which should 
override the neighbour’s right to resist interference with possession. 
16
  AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” 
(2008) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 596. 
17
  P O‘Connor “An adjudication rule for encroachment disputes: Adverse possession or a 
building encroachment statute?” in E Cooke (ed) Modern studies in property law IV (2007) 197-217 at 
212. 
18
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW), s 3(3)(a)-(f). 
19
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW), s 3(3)(b). 
20
  A Pope “Encroachment or accession? The importance of the extent of encroachment in light 
of South African constitutional principles” (2007) 124 SALJ 537-556 at 548. Pope (commenting on 
South African law) argues that reallocation of rights can take place more readily in cases involving an 
encroaching wall. 
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encroachment is significant. This is especially the case if the consequence of the 
continued existence of the encroachment could result in the loss of all use and 
enjoyment of the encroached-upon property. Therefore, the extent of the 
encroachment will play a role when deciding whether demolition is the appropriate 
remedy. 
 
The character of the encroachment is also a factor that may play a role in the 
determination of whether the encroachment should be removed or not.21 This could 
mean that when the encroachment forms part of a home, a court should be more 
reluctant to order demolition.22 Consideration is given to the fact that although the 
encroachment is unlawful, it is someone’s home and as such demolition should be 
carefully awarded in these instances. This argument finds support in the English 
case of Wrotham Park Estate Company Limited v Parkside Homes Limited.23 This 
case concerned the contravention of the restrictive covenants, where the developer 
had built in blatant disregard of the building regulations. He was, in terms of the 
regulations, prohibited from developing without the consent of the neighbouring 
landowner. The court denied the application for a mandatory injunction and found 
that it would be inappropriate in the specific case to order demolition of the houses.24 
 
The cumulative effect of section 3(3)(d) and (e) allows courts, in exercising its 
discretion, to consider the loss that the respective parties would suffer or have 
suffered in determining what the outcome should be. This is similar to Dutch law 
(discussed below), in terms of which a balancing of interests approach is followed.25 
Consideration needs to be given to the potential or already suffered loss to ensure 
that the outcome opted for is not unnecessarily burdensome on only one party. 
Courts should also have regard for the loss that would be suffered by the affected 
landowner should the encroachment be left intact.26 
                                                 
21
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW), s 3(3)(c). 
22
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW), s 3(3)(c). 
23
  [1974] 1 WLR 798. 
24
  See s 3.4.2 in chap 3 above. 
25
  See s 6.4 below. 
26
  It could be important to consider that the loss suffered by the affected landowner is not limited 
to the loss of the value of the land on which the encroachment is standing. It needs to be considered 
that the encroachment can be so extensive that the affected landowner does not only lose the subject 
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Commenting on the criteria for exercising the discretion in terms of Australian law, 
Pam O’Connor argues that the factors should be weighed up in relation to one 
another in determining the outcome in encroachment disputes.27 She divides the 
factors into three sets.28 Firstly, the conduct of the encroaching owner should be 
considered. This, she argues, fulfils a “deterrence objective” that ensures that 
landowners take special care to avoid boundary encroachments when deciding to 
invest in improvements.29 Secondly, the conduct or response of both parties to the 
existence of the encroachment is to be taken into consideration.30 In this context, the 
following questions may be appropriate: Was there a delay in seeking relief? Does 
the delay in bringing an application for relief possibly mean that the negative impact 
of the encroachment is minimal? Did the affected landowner try to use his superior 
bargaining power to demand excessive amounts from the encroaching landowner? 
All these questions could be relevant in determining the outcome in the particular 
case. Thirdly, a number of factors should be taken into consideration in order to 
balance the interests of the respective parties. This should be done so that minimum 
cost can be ensured once an encroachment has occurred.31 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
land, but could stand to lose use and enjoyment of all his land. The existence of the encroachment, 
especially if it is significant, can also have the effect of decreasing the market value of the whole of 
the affected landowner’s property. In the South African context, in the Brian Lackey Trust case, the 
fact that the affected landowner lost all use and enjoyment of his property due to the existence of the 
encroachment was given very little attention. See Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) 
SA 281 (C). 
27
  P O‘Connor “An adjudication rule for encroachment disputes: Adverse possession or a 
building encroachment statute?” in E Cooke (ed) Modern studies in property law IV (2007) 197-217 at 
213-214. 
28
  P O‘Connor “An adjudication rule for encroachment disputes: Adverse possession or a 
building encroachment statute?” in E Cooke (ed) Modern studies in property law IV (2007) 197-217 at 
213. 
29
  P O‘Connor “An adjudication rule for encroachment disputes: Adverse possession or a 
building encroachment statute?” in E Cooke (ed) Modern studies in property law IV (2007) 197-217 at 
202. See also TJ Miceli & CF Sirmans “An economic theory of adverse possession” (1995) 5 
International Review of Law and Economics 161-170 at 164. 
30
  P O‘Connor “An adjudication rule for encroachment disputes: Adverse possession or a 
building encroachment statute?” in E Cooke (ed) Modern studies in property law IV (2007) 197-217 at 
213. 
31
  P O‘Connor “An adjudication rule for encroachment disputes: Adverse possession or a 
building encroachment statute?” in E Cooke (ed) Modern studies in property law IV (2007) 197-217 at 
213. 
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The Act does not only allow for how the discretion should be exercised, but also sets 
out how compensation should be determined.32 Section 4(1) provides for a minimum 
compensation amount in the case of encroachment by building.33 This amount is set 
equivalent to the land value of the part of the land encroached upon, assuming that 
the encroachment was not intentional or as a result of negligence. Whether the 
amount will be set at the minimum or an amount in excess of the minimum, 
determined according to the Act as three times the land value of the encroached-
upon land, will depend on the conduct of the encroaching landowner before and after 
the encroachment was erected. Judging by the wording of the compensation 
provision in the Act, it seems as though the compensation is a one-off payment, 
unlike the German approach, which allows for compensation payable in annual 
amounts.34 
 
The Encroachment of Buildings Act provides a useful insight into how legislation 
regulating building encroachment disputes might look. The Act is written specifically 
to discourage deliberate or negligent encroachments erected to purposively acquire 
another’s property.35 What is evident is that there is no standard way of dealing with 
the problem, and therefore the legislation regulating it needs to provide for a wide 
range of factors. However, the guidelines listed in the Act in terms of which courts 
can decide which outcome is the most appropriate, is useful in order to provide a 
degree of certainty regarding how the discretion should be exercised. In the South 
African context this may be helpful in order to determine how a court will exercise its 
discretion when deciding encroachment disputes. However, the uncertainty 
regarding the rights of the respective parties when demolition is denied still exists. 
The German and Dutch approaches to the problem of building encroachments are 
helpful in this regard and are therefore discussed in the sections below. 
 
                                                 
32
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW), s 4. 
33
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW), s 4(1). 
34
  See s 6.3 below. 
35
  P O’Connor “The private taking of land: Adverse possession, encroachment by buildings and 
improvement under a mistake” (2006) 33 Univ of Western Australia LR 31-62 at 58; P O‘Connor “An 
adjudication rule for encroachment disputes: Adverse possession or a building encroachment 
statute?” in E Cooke (ed) Modern studies in property law IV (2007) 197-217 at 210. This sort of 
behaviour is also precluded in terms of German and Dutch law. See s 6.3 and s 6.4 below. 
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6.3 German law 
In terms of the German civil code, parts of a thing that cannot be separated without 
one or the other thing being damaged or undergoing a change in nature, cannot be 
subject to separate property rights.36 This unity principle means that things that are 
permanently attached to the land cannot be subject to separate rights from the rights 
to the land itself.37 Stated differently, ownership of the land cannot be distinguished 
from ownership of buildings erected on the land.38 
 
The essential parts of a plot of land include those things that have been firmly 
attached to that land, for example buildings. The essential parts of a building include 
that which is inserted in order to construct the building. With this in mind, it seems as 
though the point of departure in respect of ownership of buildings and the land on 
which the buildings are erected, is that of attachment. This is confirmed when § 93 
and § 946 of the German civil code are considered together. It will have the effect 
that if a movable thing is combined with a plot of land in such a way that it becomes 
an essential part of the land, then ownership of the plot of land extends to the 
movable thing. This provides the starting point for any problem relating to buildings 
that are erected on the land of another. Consequently, it is clear that in German law 
the law of attachment regulates where ownership rests in cases where buildings are 
constructed on a plot of land belonging to someone else, similar to the position in 
South African law.39 The owner of the land may claim removal of any interference or 
may seek an injunction if further interference is feared.40 However, the claim for 
removal could be precluded if the owner is obliged to tolerate the interference.41 
 
                                                 
36
  BGB § 93. See F Baur, JF Baur & R Stürner Sachenrecht (18th ed 2009) 317; H Grziwotz, A 
Keukenschrijver & G Ring BGB Sachenrecht Vol 3: §854-1296 (2nd ed 2008) 374. 
37
  BGB § 93. See F Baur, JF Baur & R Stürner Sachenrecht (18th ed 2009) 317; H Grziwotz, A 
Keukenschrijver & G Ring BGB Sachenrecht Vol 3: §854-1296 (2nd ed 2008) 374. 
38
  This is also the basic principle in South African law. See chap 4 above. 
39
  See chap 4 above. For German law, see H Grziwotz, A Keukenschrijver & G Ring BGB 
Sachenrecht Vol 3: §854-1296 (2nd ed 2008) 608-611. 
40
  BGB § 1004(1). See H Grziwotz, A Keukenschrijver & G Ring BGB Sachenrecht Vol 3: §854-
1296 (2nd ed 2008) 780-786. 
41
  BGB § 1004(2). See F Baur, JF Baur & R Stürner Sachenrecht (18th ed 2009) 317-318; H 
Grziwotz, A Keukenschrijver & G Ring BGB Sachenrecht Vol 3: §854-1296 (2nd ed 2008) 372-375, 
608-611. 
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Building encroachment is one instance where a landowner might be compelled to 
accept the interference. If someone builds across the boundary line onto the property 
of his neighbour, the German rule is that if it was not done intentionally or as a result 
of gross negligence, then the affected landowner has a duty to tolerate the 
encroachment.42 However, an objection filed before or immediately after the 
encroachment might sway the court to decide to order removal instead of the 
affected landowner having to accept the encroachment.43 Therefore, the point of 
departure in terms of German law is that encroachments are to be tolerated and left 
in place, unless the encroacher acted intentionally or in gross negligence, or unless 
the affected landowner protested immediately. In these cases, removal is the default 
position. 
 
In cases where the affected landowner has a duty to accept the encroachment there 
is a reciprocal duty on the encroaching landowner to pay compensation.44 The 
compensation is payable in annual periodic payments to the affected landowner for 
as long as the encroachment remains in existence. The period for which the 
encroachment had stood across the boundary plays a role in the determination of the 
amount of compensation.45 
 
The burden on the affected landowner created by this encroachment, in conjunction 
with this right to receive compensation, creates a lease-like right in favour of the 
encroaching landowner. The encroacher makes annual payments to continue having 
the encroachment on the affected landowner’s property. This right to receive 
compensation is only extinguished in two instances: either as a result of the removal 
of the encroaching structure, or if the part of the land built over is offered to the 
encroaching landowner for purchase. 
                                                 
42
  BGB § 912(1). See F Baur, JF Baur & R Stürner Sachenrecht (18th ed 2009) 317; H Grziwotz, 
A Keukenschrijver & G Ring BGB Sachenrecht Vol 3: §854-1296 (2nd ed 2008) 372-373. 
43
  BGB § 912(1). The most likely explanation for this is the fact that the longer the affected 
landowner waits before filing a complaint against the existence of the encroachment, the more 
indication there is that the encroachment’s detrimental effect was minimal. See H Grziwotz, A 
Keukenschrijver & G Ring BGB Sachenrecht Vol 3: §854-1296 (2nd ed 2008) 378-379. 
44
  BGB § 912(2). See H Grziwotz, A Keukenschrijver & G Ring BGB Sachenrecht Vol 3: §854-
1296 (2nd ed 2008) 380-381. 
45
  BGB § 912(2), 913. See H Grziwotz, A Keukenschrijver & G Ring BGB Sachenrecht Vol 3: 
§854-1296 (2nd ed 2008) 388-390. 
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The encroaching structure may be removed if the court orders removal in light of the 
relevant factors in the case. However, even if the court orders that the encroachment 
should remain intact and the encroaching landowner should pay compensation to the 
affected landowner, the encroaching owner always has the option of removing the 
encroachment rather than to pay the specified compensation.46 This could occur if it 
would be more economically viable for him to have the encroachment removed than 
to pay the compensation. 
 
The decision to transfer the portion of the property on which the encroachment is 
erected is left to the affected landowner.47 The German civil code does not allow for 
the involuntary loss of the portion of land encroached upon.48 Therefore, ownership 
of the land on which the encroachment stands is only transferred if the affected 
landowner offers it to the encroacher.49 
 
There are four interesting aspects of the German approach that could be relevant for 
South African law. Firstly, § 93 and § 94 indicate the unity or attachment principle in 
terms of which the building erected on another’s property becomes part of the land. 
This appears to be based on the principle of attachment which is similar to the South 
African position in the sense that building materials erected on land essentially 
become part of the land.50 However, the encroachment provisions in German law (§ 
946 and § 1004) make it clear that the default position is tolerance of the 
                                                 
46
  H Grziwotz, A Keukenschrijver & G Ring BGB Sachenrecht Vol 3: §854-1296 (2nd ed 2008) 
380; AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” (2008) 
125 SALJ 604-640 at 619. 
47
  BGB § 915. See H Grziwotz, A Keukenschrijver & G Ring BGB Sachenrecht Vol 3: §854-1296 
(2nd ed 2008) 393-395. 
48
  See fn 47. 
49
  See fn 47. The attachment of the encroachment is suspended and the encroacher remains 
owner of the building: F Baur, JF Baur & R Stürner Sachenrecht (18th ed 2009) 318; BGH NJW 1985, 
789. 
50
  See chap 4 above. Pope argues that there are two sets of rules that apply in the case where 
someone erects a building structure on the property of another. If a part of a building is erected on the 
property of another, the rules of encroachment are applicable. However, if there is a whole building 
erected on the property of another, the rules of attachment are activated. See A Pope “Encroachment 
or accession? The importance of the extent of encroachment in light of South African constitutional 
principles” (2007) 124 SALJ 537-556 at 541. 
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encroachment, unless the encroacher was intentional, grossly negligent or the 
affected landowner had protested immediately. 
 
Secondly, the German provisions regulating the duty to tolerate building 
encroachments are explicitly clear that the compensation that is awarded in the case 
where the encroachment is not demolished is for the right to have continued 
possession of the encroachment. In other words, the affected landowner is in effect 
being paid to tolerate the encroachment until the encroachment is removed or the 
portion of the land is transferred to the encroaching landowner in terms of a 
voluntary agreement. Accordingly, the encroaching landowner pays for a use right to 
have his structures on his neighbour’s land. The use-right in the case of German law 
resembles a lease that is awarded in favour of the encroacher. 
 
The third interesting aspect of the German approach is the question about transfer of 
ownership of the encroached-upon land to the encroaching landowner. When 
German courts order that the encroachment should remain in place, it does not 
mean that ownership of the portion of the land on which the encroachment is 
standing is, or may be, transferred to the encroaching landowner by court order. In 
fact, judging by the words of § 913, compulsory transfer of ownership is explicitly 
excluded. Only if the affected landowner who is entitled to receive compensation 
offers the part of the land encroached upon to the person paying the compensation, 
can any sale and transfer of the land be effected.51 Specifically, German courts do 
not make the order for transfer, nor may the encroaching owner demand transfer. 
 
Finally, the compensation payable in terms of § 915 is not a one-off payment.52 This 
gives another indication that the encroaching landowner is not acquiring the land 
                                                 
51
 BGB § 915; see fn 47. See further AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability 
rules: Encroachment by building” (2008) 125 SALJ 604-640 at 609-610. 
52
  No mention is made in South African case law regarding how compensation should be 
determined or more specifically what the compensation amount should reflect. It is unclear whether it 
should be a one-off payment for the sale of the land or long-term annual payments for the use of the 
land. Moreover, it is uncertain whether the amount of compensation should reflect the fact that the 
affected landowner might lose all use and enjoyment of his property as a result of the encroachment 
which could even result in the decrease of the market value of the affected landowner’s land. It is 
clear from comparative law that the type of loss gives an indication of the calculation of the 
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when the court order is made to leave the encroachment intact. He is in effect buying 
the right to have his building (or part thereof) on the land of his neighbour, similar to 
a servitude or a use-right.53 Therefore, the compensation serves as interim (or long 
term) payment for the use of the land. 
 
The German approach provides adequate clarity regarding when the encroachment 
should be tolerated; the function the compensation should serve; and more 
importantly clarity in terms of the rights of the parties when the encroachment 
remains in place. For South African law this clarity in German law with regard to the 
rights obtained when demolition is denied is very important. What is evident from the 
German provisions is that the right of the encroacher relative to the affected 
landowner is clear. This is similar to the provisions of the Dutch civil code, which is 
discussed in the section below. 
 
6.4 Dutch law 
Dutch commentators discussing the problem of encroachment by building, known in 
terms of Dutch law as overbouw, usually begin from the point of departure that 
ownership is the most complete right that a person can have in relation to a thing.54 
A landowner has the exclusive right to the use of his land, the airspace over and the 
surface underneath it.55 This property right gives a landowner the sword with which 
to protect his property from interference. Therefore, in the case where the 
interference takes the form of an encroaching structure, the landowner is ordinarily 
                                                                                                                                                        
compensation. If it is merely a use right that the encroacher obtains, this will be different from the 
case where the transfer of the property occurs. See s 6.3 and s 6.4 below. 
53
  The rules of attachment would be suspended so that ownership of the building materials does 
not pass to the affected landowner by operation of law. This will allow for the possibility of ownership 
of the land and ownership of the buildings on the land to be separated. See chap 4 above. 
54
  WHM Reehuis & AHT Heisterkamp Pitlo Het Nederlands burgerlijk recht vol 3 Goederenrecht 
(12th ed 2006) 572; FHJ Mijnssen, SE Bartels & AA van Velten Mr C Assers Handleiding tot de 
beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht vol 5 Zakenrecht Eigendom en beperkte rechten (15th 
ed 2008) 147. 
55
  BW 5:1. WHM Reehuis & AHT Heisterkamp Pitlo Het Nederlands burgerlijk recht vol 3 
Goederenrecht (12th ed 2006) 572; FHJ Mijnssen, SE Bartels & AA van Velten Mr C Assers 
Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht vol 5 Zakenrecht Eigendom en 
beperkte rechten (15th ed 2008) 147; AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: 
Encroachment by building” (2008) 125 SALJ 604-640 at 608. 
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entitled to removal of the structure. However, this “exclusive” right is limited in certain 
instances in terms of BW 5:1.1.56 
 
In terms of BW 5:1.2, limitations based upon statutory rules and rules of unwritten 
law are observed.57 An example of this would be the limitation imposed in terms of 
BW 5:54.58 This provision stipulates that if a building encroachment is erected and 
removal of the encroachment would be disproportionally more prejudicial to the 
encroacher than the disadvantage of the existing situation for the affected 
landowner, then the encroachment should not be removed.59 This is different from 
the German approach discussed above, because in terms of Dutch law there is 
clearly a discretion on the courts to balance the interests of both parties in order to 
determine who would suffer more loss either by removal or by leaving the 
encroachment in place. In German law, there is no discretion or balancing of 
interests that occurs.60 
 
In terms of the Dutch law, the encroacher can demand that a servitude be granted to 
preserve the existing situation, in exchange for compensation.61 If the affected 
landowner wishes, he can offer the encroached-upon portion of the property to the 
encroacher instead. However, this provision would not apply if the encroacher had 
acted in bad faith or gross negligence when the building work was constructed.62 
Therefore, the intention of the encroacher plays a pivotal role in determining whether 
the encroachment should be removed. Essentially, the affected landowner should 
enjoy the right to claim removal if it can be proven that the encroacher acted in bad 
faith or gross negligence.63 Consequently, BW 5:54 is limited by the conduct of the 
                                                 
56
  BW 5:1.2. 
57
  BW 5:1.2. 
58
  BW 5:54. 
59
  BW 5:54.1. 
60
  See s 6.3 above. 
61
  The compensation that would have to be paid in this regard would be a one-off payment for 
the creation of a servitude over the affected landowners property. This is different from the German 
approach, where annual payments are made for the duration of the existence of the encroaching 
structures. See s 6.3 above. 
62
  BW 5:54.3. 
63
  FHJ Mijnssen, SE Bartels & AA van Velten Mr C Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van 
het Nederlands burgerlijk recht vol 5 Zakenrecht Eigendom en beperkte rechten (15th ed 2008) 147. 
See HR 28 March 2008, where the Hoge Raad found that there was gross negligence on the part of 
the encroacher. Therefore, in terms of BW 5:54.3, the encroachment would have to be removed. The 
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encroacher. This is similar to the German approach, where removal is likely to be 
awarded in cases where the encroacher’s conduct was intentional or grossly 
negligent, or where the affected landowner did not complain of the encroachment 
immediately.64 
 
An interesting part of BW 5:54 is that the court can deny a demolition order on the 
basis of a proportionality assessment. This is done by determining the loss or 
damage of either preserving the existing situation or demolishing the encroachment. 
All relevant factors would be taken into consideration in determining who would 
suffer the most loss in the particular situation. This would be one way in which the 
encroacher would be safeguarded against the right to demand removal of the 
encroachment.65 
 
There is another defence that an encroacher can use against the affected 
landowner’s right to demand removal, namely the abuse of right argument.66 The 
abuse of right argument is encapsulated in article 3:13 of the Dutch civil code.67 BW 
3:13.1 states that a holder of a right may not exercise the right to the extent that its 
                                                                                                                                                        
court acknowledged that the encroachment resulted due to the mistake of the encroacher’s architect, 
but stated that if the encroacher had taken reasonable care it would have been clear that the building 
once erected would exceed the surface area of the premises. Therefore, the court found that the 
encroacher was guilty of gross negligence. 
64
  See s 6.3 above. 
65
  This is different from German law because the point of departure is tolerance of the 
encroachment. Therefore, the balancing of interests is therefore not an issue in German law. See s 
6.3 above. 
66
  BW 3:13. It was argued in HR 15 November 2002, NJ 2003, 48 that BW 5:54 does not have 
exclusive operation, it is limited by BW 3:13. With regard to the relationship between BW 5:54 and 
BW 3:13, the Hoge Raad in HR 25 June 2004, LJN AO7805 and HR 28 March 2008 reiterated that a 
landowner who has erected a building on the land of another could defend the claim for removal 
(which would be based on BW 5:54) by relying on BW 3:13, because BW 5:54 does not have 
exclusive operation. However, in HR 28 March 2008, the defence of abuse of right could not be used 
because the encroacher had only asserted this defence on appeal and by that time gross negligence 
had already been proven. See further GE van Maanen “De grensoverschrijdende villa. Enkele 
gedachten over eigendom in deze tijd, naar aanleiding van Hoge Raad 25 juni 2004 en Hoge Raad 28 
maart 2008” (2008) 25 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht  249-254 at 250-251, where Van 
Maanen discusses why the abuse of right defence failed in this case. Van Maanen also discusses 
questions about the relationship between BW 5:54 and BW 3:13, whether the encroacher becomes 
owner of the encroached upon land and the conflicting rights of both parties in an encroachment 
dispute. See further GE van Maanen “De grensoverschrijdende villa. Enkele gedachten over 
eigendom in deze tijd, naar aanleiding van Hoge Raad 25 juni 2004 en Hoge Raad 28 maart 2008” 
(2008) 25 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht  249-254 at 252. 
67
  The relationship between BW 5:54 and BW 3:13 was investigated in HR 25 June 2004, LJN 
AO7805 and HR 28 March 2008. 
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exercise may constitute an abuse.68 Furthermore, the provision explains what “abuse 
of right” means. Someone would be abusing their right when they are attempting to 
exercise their right for the sole purpose of harming another, or where the exercise of 
the right was unreasonable because of the disproportion between the interest in its 
exercise, and the harm caused thereby.69 The balancing of the interests of both 
parties ensures that a landowner who suffers little or no loss as a result of the 
existence of the encroachment should be unable to exploit his supreme bargaining 
power and demand removal in all cases. This would be especially in cases where 
the encroachment is really insignificant and removal thereof would be 
disproportionate. 
 
If BW 3:13 were applied in the context of encroachment by building, an example of 
this would be in cases where an affected landowner is trying to enforce his removal 
right where the encroachment is insignificant or any other case where enforcement 
of the remedy of removal would be considered disproportionate to the harm caused 
by it. This was illustrated clearly by the Dutch Supreme Court, where it was decided 
that a landowner affected by an encroachment was abusing his rights by demanding 
removal in cases where the encroachment was minor or trivial.70 The court held that 
by allowing an affected landowner the right to demand removal of an encroaching 
garage, it would be allowing him to abuse his rights.71 The plaintiff in this case was 
the encroacher who had erected a garage that crossed the boundary line between 
him and his neighbour. As a result of this, the defendant had lost all use of that 
portion of the property on which the encroaching garage was erected. It was found 
that although removal was the default remedy, it could not be awarded in all cases.72 
This could be for instance in cases where there is the possibility that the defendant’s 
insistence upon removal could result in the abuse of his right. If the disadvantage 
that would be suffered by the plaintiff if removal was ordered would be substantially 
more than the loss for the affected landowner if removal was denied, the removal 
order should not be granted. Therefore, the size of the encroachment is clearly 
important in determining the outcome of encroachment cases in terms of Dutch law. 
                                                 
68
  BW 3:13. 
69
  BW 3:13.2. 
70
  HR 17 April 1970, NJ 1971, 89. 
71
  HR 17 April 1970, NJ 1971, 89. 
72
  HR 17 April 1970, NJ 1971, 89. 
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In cases where the encroachment is so minor that it has virtually no negative or 
detrimental impact on the affected landowner, he should be precluded from abusing 
his right to demand removal of the encroachment. 
 
Article 5:54 in the Dutch civil code seems to be written from the perspective of the 
encroacher, providing substantial protection against the demand for removal. There 
are two arguments that support this contention. Firstly, the code specifically allows 
for the prohibition against the abuse of power to demand removal of an encroaching 
structure in all cases. This is an exception to the default remedy of removal in the 
case of encroachment by building. However, it is clear that this is not the case and 
that specific provision is made to ensure that adequate consideration and protection 
is given to the encroacher irrespective of the fact that he initially infringed on the 
affected landowner’s property rights. Secondly, the fact that the interests are being 
weighed up to assess who suffers more disadvantage due to the existence of the 
encroachment, is an indication that the issue is not just about the infringement of a 
right that should be rectified.73 The enquiry does not simply end with the question of 
whose rights are the strongest. The fact that the encroachment is per se unlawful 
can be seen merely as a factor that is taken into consideration in determining 
whether the encroachment should remain or be removed. 
 
The recent judgments on encroachment in South Africa contain sections that bear a 
striking resemblance to the Dutch law proportionality assessment in terms of article 
5:54. In Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale,74 a substantial part of the 
judgment encapsulates exactly this idea. In deciding to exercise its discretion in 
favour of the encroaching landowner, the court had the following to say about 
(dis)proportionality of prejudice: 
                                                 
73
  I deliberately refrain from using “rights” in this regard, but rather opt for “interests”. The main 
reason for this is to avoid the inclination towards the supposition that the person with the strongest 
rights should ordinarily win. This is in essence what the Dutch civil code is aiming to do. There seems 
to be a move away from the common law way of dealing with building encroachment towards a 
modern approach requiring a more equitable outcome. All the jurisdictions recognise that as a starting 
point the affected landowner should be able to ensure no interruptions on his property, but recognise 
that in some instances this could lead to unjust results. Therefore, even if someone has a right to 
demand removal, sometimes it may be necessary to deny that right so as to protect the interest of the 
other party if justice and equity require it. 
74
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
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“Weighing up, therefore, the option of complete demolition, on the one hand, 
against payment of compensation (including a solatium), on the other, I am 
satisfied that the former option would indeed produce an unjust result.”75 
 
The Cape High Court continued by assessing the loss or damage for each party that 
would result from removal of the encroaching structure on the one hand and if the 
structure were to remain intact on the other. On this specific aspect it was decided 
that 
“the defendant would undoubtedly also suffer prejudice, in that he would inevitably 
lose his property if a demolition order were refused. However, it is clear to me that 
this would not have nearly the same disastrous consequences for the defendant 
as demolition would have for the plaintiff.”76 
 
As a result, it seems clear that sufficient consideration is being given to both 
landowners’ interests in an encroachment situation even in the South African 
context. This is contrary to the traditional approach followed in an encroachment 
situation. The court went further than the question of whose common law right has 
been infringed and should subsequently be protected.77 
 
In summary, the Dutch approach provides that a landowner is able to claim 
uninterrupted possession of his property, but this right is not absolute. The possibility 
of a landowner enforcing his right to demand removal of a building encroachment is 
specifically precluded if the demand is unreasonable or improper, or if it is done for 
the sole purpose of causing harm to the encroacher.78 The right to demand removal 
of the encroaching structures is also restricted in cases where there was either bad 
faith or gross negligence on the part of the encroacher. In these instances where 
demolition is denied, the affected landowner obtains a use-right in the form of a 
servitude in terms of which he must pay compensation to the affected landowner. It 
                                                 
75
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 34. 
76
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 36. 
77
  This is emphasised in the discussion of the shift from property rules to liability rules in the law 
and economics framework. It is asserted that although the initial assignment of rights (or entitlements) 
is important it should also be determined how the rights should be protected. See s 3.5 in chap 3 
above. 
78
  BW 3:13. 
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is clear what the rights of both parties are with regard to the land and the 
encroachments erected on the land. Therefore, the Dutch approach provides clarity 
in terms of the question which remains unclear in the South African context, namely 
the rights of the respective parties after demolition is ordered. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I assessed how three jurisdictions deal with the problem of 
encroachment by building. This was helpful to see how the problem can effectively 
be dealt with. I discussed the Australian Encroachment of Buildings Act, because it 
provided a good example of how an encroachment statute might look. I also 
considered the German and Dutch approaches, because they provide answers to 
some of the questions that are uncertain in the South African context. 
 
Any new approach to the problem of encroachment by building should essentially 
consider two important aspects. Firstly, the new approach would have to show how 
and why the decision is made to deviate from the common law remedy of removal to 
order compensation instead, keeping the encroachment in place. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, any change in the established practice would have to 
explain what the consequences of such an order would be. There may be doctrinal 
and constitutional implications that could be triggered if courts do not provide 
answers to what is effectively happening when an encroaching structure is not 
demolished. 
 
In the South African context, I am arguing in favour of legislation to eliminate some of 
the uncertainties that are currently prevalent in the law regulating building 
encroachments. The legislation envisaged would have to prescribe with at least 
some sort of certainty how and according to which criteria the discretion should be 
exercised, and also give answers to the doctrinal ambiguities and constitutional 
issues that may arise when an encroachment is left in place. The German approach 
of identifying certain instances in which removal should be ordered is very useful and 
may be followed. If the encroacher acted intentionally or grossly negligent, or if the 
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affected landowner protested immediately, the affected landowner will not be 
expected to tolerate the encroachment and removal will be the default. The German 
approach is simpler, considering that there is no discretion and no balancing of 
interests to determine which outcome would be more prejudicial. Therefore, adopting 
legislation with the German approach in mind may provide a simpler approach to the 
problem of encroachment of building. The approach to make tolerance the default 
remedy is different from Australian, English,79 Dutch and South African law,80 which 
is based on balancing of interests to justify exceptions to the default remedy of 
removal. 
 
The Australian legislation is useful to determine how and in which circumstances the 
discretion should be exercised in favour of keeping the encroachment in place; 
therefore it could help to make the choice between demolition and compensation 
easier. It gives an example of how specific legislation should be structured to 
regulate the problem. To help the court in determining which outcome would be the 
most appropriate in the specific case, there are factors in the Act that serve as 
guidelines. Having a non-exhaustive list of factors may guide the court in making the 
decision between removal and compensation. It will be clearer in which cases the 
court will – or should – let the encroachment stand and in which cases the 
encroachment should be removed. These factors will be the policy considerations 
that will ultimately be important to justify the deprivation that may result when the 
encroachment remains in place.81 The Dutch civil code provides an interesting way 
of determining whether the encroachment should be removed. In terms of BW 5:54, 
the court should balance the interests of both parties in order to assess who will 
suffer more loss by either of the outcomes in the particular case. Based on the 
assessment of possible prejudice, the court will determine whether the 
encroachment will be removed or remain intact. Therefore, both the guidelines in the 
Australian Encroachment of Buildings Act82 and article 5:54 of the Dutch civil code83 
may help the court to decide which remedy would be most appropriate in the 
circumstances. 
                                                 
79
  See chap 3 above. 
80
  See chap 3 above. 
81
  See chap 5 above. 
82
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW). 
83
  BW 5:54. 
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However, having guidelines aiding the choice between which remedy would be the 
most suitable in the particular case does not take us closer to answering questions 
concerning doctrinal or constitutional issues. Having clear answers about what 
actually happens when an encroachment is not demolished is very important in the 
South African context. Therefore, the uncertainty about the rights of the parties after 
demolition is denied still exists. The German and Dutch approaches are helpful in 
this regard. 
 
The Dutch civil code provides for a servitude to be established to preserve the 
existing situation, in exchange for an amount of compensation which is a one-off 
payment. In terms of German law, something equivalent to a lease is created, where 
the encroacher is obliged to pay an annual sum for the use of that portion of land on 
which the encroachment is erected. Therefore, there is a large degree of certainty 
regarding the rights that are lost and obtained when an encroachment is not 
demolished. It is clear in both cases that a use right is obtained with regard to the 
portion of property on which the encroachment is erected. Additionally, both German 
and Dutch law makes it clear that the choice for the transfer of the affected land 
should be with the affected landowner and not the courts or the encroacher. 
 
South African law regulating building encroachments could benefit greatly from 
greater clarity regarding pre-order considerations and post-order implications of 
leaving encroachments in place. In some cases it may be completely understandable 
that an encroaching structure will not be removed; however it should be clear under 
which circumstances this will be permissible and what the consequences of such an 
order are. Therefore, it may seem viable in certain cases to deny a demolition order 
on the basis of pragmatic and policy reasons; however, these reasons should be 
prescribed in terms of relatively strict parameters contained in legislation. In the 
following chapter I will try and establish what would be the most workable framework 
in the South African context to eliminate some of the uncertainties with the law 
regulating building encroachments. My argument is that this is the only way to 
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ensure that there is clarity about what happens when courts leave encroaching 
structures in place. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this dissertation was to highlight some of the uncertainties that are 
prevalent in the law regulating building encroachments in South Africa currently. 
South African courts have, in line with the modern trend in this field of law, adopted a 
new approach to the age-old problem of encroachment by building. Courts now 
seem to be more inclined than before to exercise their discretion on the basis of 
policy considerations in favour of leaving the encroaching structure in place and 
awarding compensation instead of demolition. However, some of the implications of 
these court orders made in the context of building encroachments are not explained 
adequately and this research project explores some of the consequences of these 
court orders. 
 
In the case of Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander (“Rand Waterraad”),1 the court 
emphasised that the discretion to award compensation instead of removal in the 
context of building encroachments is wide and equitable and consideration should be 
given to the surrounding circumstances in the particular case.2 With regard to the 
discretion of the court, the Cape High Court in Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale (“Brian Lackey Trust”)3 recently stated that the discretion to leave an 
encroaching structure in place could be exercised regardless of the size of the 
encroachment.4 In both these cases the respective courts took considerations of 
fairness and equity into account to come to the conclusion that the default remedy of 
removal should not be awarded. Therefore, the court ordered that the encroaching 
structures should remain in place in both cases. 
 
If the court orders that the encroachment should remain in place, based on policy 
reasons, and says nothing about transfer of property or property rights, the effect is 
                                                 
1
  1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
2
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
3
  2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
4
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
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that the encroacher may remain in possession of the encroachment, while the 
affected landowner owns the land on which the encroachment is erected. This 
creates uncertainty about rights in the land and the building, because the courts fail 
to explain what happens doctrinally when the encroachment is left intact. The 
doctrinal implications of the court orders resulting in the encroachment remaining in 
place are explored in this dissertation. I specifically focus on questions about the 
principle of accession and why it does not seem to take place in the case of 
encroachment by building. I also consider the fact that the courts fail to mention what 
right the encroacher obtains (and the affected landowner loses) when the 
encroachment is not demolished. South African courts have failed to provide 
doctrinal solutions to explain what happens when the discretion is exercised in 
favour of the encroacher and the result is that the encroachment remains in place. 
This leads to confusion and uncertainty. 
 
When courts deny the common law remedy of removal and leave the encroaching 
structures in place, there may also be constitutional implications, especially if the 
encroachment is significant. The conclusions reached in both Rand Waterraad and 
Brian Lackey Trust make it clear that courts may in some instances leave even 
significant encroachments in place. The result in Brian Lackey Trust furthermore 
creates the impression that courts are able to award compensation even in 
circumstances where this order results in a compulsory or involuntary loss of use of 
a significant part of the affected landowner’s property. However, the court’s 
discussion of this aspect is superficial and incomplete; therefore, it is necessary to 
establish whether these court orders could cause an infringement of section 25 of 
the Constitution.5 In the recent decision of Phillips v South African National Parks 
Board (“Phillips”),6 the court considered the possibility of ordering that the portion of 
property incorporated as a result of an encroaching fence, should be transferred to 
the encroacher.7 Therefore, it seems as though courts are actually willing to consider 
the option of transfer. If the court does order that the encroached-upon land be 
                                                 
5
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25. 
6
  (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010). See chap 3 above. 
7
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 [22 April 2010] 
paras 22-24. 
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transferred to the encroacher, it is necessary to consider whether this is possible and 
constitutionally compliant in terms of section 25 of the Constitution. 
 
The underlying assumption throughout the dissertation is that legislation is required 
in order to eliminate the uncertainty that exists in the law regulating building 
encroachments in South Africa, as the common law position seems to be inadequate 
in this regard. A comparative study was undertaken in order to see how the German, 
Dutch and Australian law deal with the problem of encroachment by building. This 
was done in order to see whether it would be feasible to adopt a similar approach in 
South Africa with legislation regulating the problem. 
 
7.2 Conclusions 
7.2.1 The law regulating building encroachments 
Chapter two provides an introduction to the law regulating building encroachments in 
South Africa. When a building encroachment is erected on the land of another, the 
affected landowner is traditionally said to be entitled to claim removal of the 
encroaching structure. The remedy of removal is premised on the idea that a 
landowner is entitled to have uninterrupted possession of his property, based on the 
right of ownership. The encroachment results in a limitation on the right of 
ownership. Therefore, in theory the landowner is entitled to insist upon removal. 
 
The remedy of removal originated in Roman law and allowed for removal of the 
encroachment as a point of departure. In Roman law removal of the encroachment 
would occur either by way of self-help (if the encroachment had become part of the 
affected landowner’s property through attachment) or with an application for the actio 
negatoria (where the encroachment protruded into the airspace over the affected 
landowner’s property). 
 
The remedy of removal was taken over in Roman-Dutch law, but was modified 
slightly. The remedy was sometimes mitigated by the defence of the year and a day 
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rule, which ensured that in instances where a landowner has stood by for a year and 
a day and did not object to the encroachment, he would be precluded from 
demanding removal of the encroachment. This rule was accepted and applied in 
early South African case law. However, as a result of the fact that the rule was only 
applied in terms of local statute and custom in the Netherlands and that it was not 
part of the ius generale of Roman-Dutch law, it was subsequently decided that the 
rule did not form part of South African law.8 Once this possible defence against the 
claim for a removal order fell away, courts became concerned with the question 
whether they had the discretion to award compensation instead of removal of the 
encroaching structure, based purely on considerations of equity or fairness. This was 
shown in two recent cases dealing with building encroachments in South Africa.9 In 
both Rand Waterraad and Brian Lackey Trust, the respective courts exercised their 
judicial discretion in favour of denying the order for removal. Therefore, the court 
ordered that the encroachment should remain intact even though the encroachment 
was significant enough to pose a serious limitation on the affected landowner’s 
rights. The encroachment situation was therefore allowed to continue despite the 
encroachment having caused a serious limitation on the rights of the affected 
landowner, especially because the encroachment in both cases was significant. 
 
Furthermore, it was suggested in Brian Lackey Trust that the affected landowner 
would be precluded in certain cases from demanding removal of the encroachment 
because it may amount to abuse of right. With regard to the abuse of right argument, 
it is considered in chapter two whether insistence by the affected landowner on the 
remedy of removal could amount to abuse of right. I argued that this may be possible 
in the case of minor encroachments, but unlikely in the case of large encroachments. 
This is because in the case of minor encroachments the limitation on the right of 
ownership is relatively small and to insist upon removal in those cases may be 
unreasonable and disproportionate, considering the minor limitation on the 
ownership rights of the affected landowner. However, in cases where the 
encroachment is significant and imposes a serious limitation on the rights of the 
affected landowner, it is questionable whether insisting upon removal could amount 
                                                 
8
  See chap 2 above. 
9
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
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to abuse of right or is informed by what the court in Brian Lackey Trust described as 
an outdated and absolutist idea of ownership. In that case, the court saw the 
demand for removal as an indication that the owner inappropriately viewed 
ownership as an absolute right when he insisted on removal of a significant 
encroachment. Therefore, the court exercised its discretion in favour of leaving the 
encroachment in place. 
 
7.2.2 Judicial discretion in the context of encroachment by building 
In the South African context, it seems as though an affected landowner may have to 
accept the continued existence of the encroachment in certain instances, even when 
the encroachment is significant. Therefore, chapter three dealt with the courts’ 
discretion in the context of building encroachments. My main aim was to determine 
when it would be justifiable for courts to order that an encroachment be left intact 
and compensation be awarded instead. Firstly, it was important to ask whether 
South African courts have the discretion to deny a demolition order and award 
compensation instead. After an investigation into South African case law, it was clear 
that such a discretion does exist and courts may deviate from the common law 
remedy of removal and award compensation instead. Prior to Rand Waterraad, there 
were various decisions in which the discretion to award compensation instead of 
removal was merely assumed, but in Rand Waterraad the question was raised and 
answered definitively. It was found that South African courts do have the discretion 
to deny the default remedy of removal in certain cases. This was confirmed in the 
Brian Lackey Trust case and more recently in the Phillips case. 
 
The second question examined in chapter three concerned the circumstances that 
would justify the exercise of the discretion in favour of compensation instead of 
removal. In other words, it was important to determine when it would be appropriate 
to deny removal and allow the encroachment to stand. It was clear that this question 
depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Courts may particularly deviate 
from the common law remedy of removal where policy grounds, such as the balance 
of equity and fairness, dictate an outcome other than removal. The court in Rand 
Waterraad considered when it would be appropriate to exercise the discretion and 
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deny removal. It found that it is important to look at the surrounding circumstances of 
the particular case to determine when the discretion should be exercised in favour of 
the encroacher. The facts in the case were deemed to be exceptional enough to 
justify a deviation from the common law remedy of removal. The court found that the 
applicant in Rand Waterraad had delayed bringing the application for removal and 
that this was an indication of lack of detriment, or even acquiescence. The court took 
principles of neighbour law into consideration in its decision to deny removal of the 
encroaching structures. Similarly, in the case of Brian Lackey Trust, the Cape High 
Court also had to determine when the discretion should be exercised in favour of 
leaving the encroachment in place. In Brian Lackey Trust, the court raised the 
question whether the discretion was limited to minor encroachments, or whether the 
discretion could be exercised even in the case of significant encroachments. The 
Cape High Court found that the discretion was wide and equitable and was not only 
limited to minor encroachments. Therefore, it proceeded with the question whether 
the discretion should be exercised in the particular case. It relied on principles of 
neighbour law and the argument of disproportionality of prejudice to reach the 
conclusion that the encroachments should not be removed. 
 
Three arguments discussed in chapter three were used or could be used to 
determine when it may be justified to deviate from the common law remedy of 
removal and leave the encroachment in place. In the first instance, South African 
neighbour law principles were relied on as reasons why an encroaching structure 
should not be removed. This was based on the underlying idea that if harmony 
between neighbours could be maintained by not demolishing an encroaching 
structure, this should be done. Courts use the neighbour law standard of 
reasonableness to argue that the most suitable remedy should be sought in the 
particular case. However, I concluded that with regard to this argument courts 
actually mean fairness when they speak about reasonableness, in that they try to 
reach the most “fair” outcome. The factors in the particular case will then be taken 
into consideration in order to reach a fair outcome that is not too burdensome on 
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only one party. The courts will balance the interests of both parties in order to 
determine who would suffer more prejudice from either outcome.10 
 
The second argument in favour of a wide judicial discretion investigated in chapter 
three was based on English law. It was necessary to look at English law because it is 
used as authority by South African courts for identifying cases where compensation 
might be favoured instead of removal. In terms of English law, compensation should 
be awarded instead of removal when there has been a blatant disregard for the 
rights of the claimant. The English Supreme Court Act11 gives English courts a wide 
discretion to award monetary instead of injunctive relief in order to reach a just and 
equitable outcome. The size of the encroachment plays a role in determining which 
remedy would be the most appropriate in the circumstances. This is the settled 
principle of English courts in terms of Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting 
Company.12 In Shelfer, it was established that the award of monetary compensation 
instead of injunctive relief should be made in cases where the injury to the plaintiff’s 
legal rights is small, is capable of being estimated in money, where it can adequately 
be compensated by a money payment and it would be oppressive to the defendant 
to order removal of the encroachment.13 Analysis of case law in chapter three 
suggested that South African courts use English law principles as a basis for the 
deviation from the default remedy of removal, yet not in the same way as it has been 
used in English law. In fact, it was stated in Brian Lackey Trust that English law 
should be approached with caution.14 Therefore, Griesel J in Brian Lackey Trust 
found that the discretion could even be exercised in cases where the encroachment 
is significant.15 South African courts are apparently willing to treat all encroachments 
in the same way, whether they result in the loss of all use and enjoyment of the 
affected property or not. 
 
                                                 
10
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C); Phillips v South African 
National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010). 
11
  The Supreme Court Act 1981 (England & Wales). 
12
  [1895] 1 Ch 287. 
13
  Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Company [1895] 1 Ch 287 at 322. 
14
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) par 24. 
15
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) paras 29-30. 
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In the final instance the law and economics argument was considered in order to 
explain how the discretion should be exercised in the context of building 
encroachments. The law and economics argument could help explain why one 
remedy (the compensation award) is preferred over another (the remedy of removal). 
It is argued that the approach of courts to award compensation instead of removal in 
solving building encroachment disputes can be explained with regard to the 
tendency to prefer liability rules to property rules when transaction costs would 
mostly be high.16 The law and economics framework may help to explain why it may 
be better to prefer liability rules over property rules in certain cases. In cases where 
there are high transaction costs, bargaining becomes difficult or impossible and 
therefore there should be a certain level of government intervention or regulation, 
which would probably assume the form of liability rules. With regard to encroachment 
by building, this could primarily occur in cases where the encroachment is significant. 
Therefore, a large part of what is happening when courts exercise their discretion in 
favour of compensation instead of removal may be explained using the law and 
economics argument. 
 
The final question in chapter three was the extent of the courts’ discretion. Here the 
question was whether South African courts have the power in terms of the discretion 
to order that the encroached-upon land be transferred to the encroacher. The two 
cases that are generally relied upon as authority for the discretion to order that the 
affected land be transferred to the encroacher are unclear. In both Christie v 
Haarhoff17 and Van Boom v Visser,18 it seems as though the order for transfer was 
not made against the affected landowner’s will. There was some indication in both 
these cases that the affected landowner was willing to accept compensation for the 
continued existence of the encroachment and the subsequent loss of the 
encroached-upon portion of the property. There is authority for the fact that the order 
for transfer of the encroached-upon land does not have to be made when the 
discretion is exercised in favour of compensation instead of removal.19 
                                                 
16
  AJ van der Walt “Replacing property rules with liability rules: Encroachment by building” 
(2008) 125 SALJ 592-628 at 618-620. 
17
  Christie v Haarhoff and Others (1886-1887) 4 HCG 349 at 356. 
18
  Van Boom v Visser (1904) 21 SC 360. 
19
  De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217; Meyer v Keiser 1980 (3) SA 504 (D) 507. 
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Compensation would be the primary remedy in terms of the discretion.20 As a result, 
the encroacher cannot argue that a court should exercise its discretion in favour of 
transfer of the affected land. An order for transfer would be ancillary to the damages 
award. The impression is created that transfer may be awarded if the court, like Van 
der Merwe argued, deems it equitable. However, my conclusion was that this aspect 
of the law regulating building encroachments is very unclear. 
 
The court very recently in the Phillips case demonstrated the confusion that exists 
with regard to the transfer of the land affected by an encroachment.21 The 
respondent in Phillips argued that if the court exercised the discretion in favour of 
leaving the encroachment in place, it should additionally order that the portion of 
property be transferred to him.22 The court actually considered granting an order to 
transfer the portion of the applicant’s property incorporated as a result of the fence, 
without questioning whether such an order could be made. It considered that the 
order for transfer would amount to a deprivation of property for which the court could 
not find a compelling reason to justify the deprivation.23 In the end, the court 
dismissed the claim and eventually decided the case based on the fact that the 
respondent could not prove that its prejudice or other reasons for not demolishing 
the encroachment was stronger than the prejudice the applicant would suffer if it 
were left intact.24 
 
On the one hand, if a court exercises its discretion in favour of leaving the 
encroachment in place and additionally orders that the encroached-upon land be 
transferred to the encroacher, this court order results in an involuntary transfer of the 
affected property. This loss of property or property rights needs to comply with 
section 25 of the Constitution. On the other hand, if a court does not order transfer 
and the encroachment remains in place, there still are doctrinal uncertainties that 
                                                 
20
  De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217; Meyer v Keiser 1980 (3) SA 504 (D) 507. 
21
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010). 
22
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) 
par 3. 
23
  Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) 
par 51. 
24
  For a discussion of the extent of the courts discretion in the context of building 
encroachments, see s 3.6 in chap 3 above. 
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need to be cleared up. The aspect of constitutional compliance and the question of 
doctrinal implications were questioned in chapters four and five respectively. 
 
7.2.3 Private law implications 
The doctrinal issues were addressed in chapter four. This chapter highlighted the 
uncertainty that ensues when a court in a building encroachment dispute leaves the 
encroachment in place and says nothing about transfer of property or property rights. 
This order results in the encroacher remaining in possession of the encroachment, 
while the affected landowner apparently still owns the land on which the 
encroachment is erected. The question is why the principle of attachment was not 
applicable in these instances. If the principle of attachment had been applicable, it 
would have resulted in the affected landowner being able to demand removal of the 
building works erected on his land. The principle of inaedificatio governs the situation 
where buildings are erected on land. Inaedificatio ensures that that which is built 
permanently on the land accedes to the land and the building materials lose their 
independence and become part of the land. As a result, the owner of the land can 
demand removal of the building works because they become part of his land. If 
removal is denied and the encroacher is left in possession of the encroaching 
structure, one has to question why the natural consequence of accession (i e original 
acquisition of ownership) did not occur in the case of encroachment by building. I 
found that this outcome could be explained doctrinally, either by arguing that 
accession did not occur because the encroacher did not intend for ownership to 
transfer, or that the principle of accession was suspended to preclude an unfair 
outcome that would otherwise follow by operation of law. 
 
In terms of the first argument, the principle of accession did not occur because the 
encroacher did not intend for it to occur. This argument could perhaps be supported 
with reference to the new approach of South African courts in accession cases. As a 
point of departure in chapter four, it was emphasised how courts have started to 
focus on the subjective intention of the owner of the movable instead of objective 
factors in order to determine the occurrence of accession. This may lead, in the 
context of building encroachments, to the conclusion that accession did not occur 
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because the encroacher did not intend it to occur. In other words, courts may decide, 
in line with the new approach in accession cases, that accession did not take place 
and that the building belongs to the encroacher and the land to the affected 
landowner. This argument would provide an explanation for why the principle of 
attachment did not take place in the case of building encroachments. 
 
The second argument considered in chapter four was that the normal working of 
accession is suspended in encroachment cases for policy reasons. To determine 
whether it is possible to explain what happens doctrinally when courts deny a 
demolition order and leave an encroachment in place, I considered three different 
arguments that could justify suspension of the normal accession principle. These 
arguments are Pope’s approach to building encroachment problems in South Africa; 
Roman-Dutch authority with regard to praedial servitudes obtained through 
prescription; and the argument of Eiselen and Pienaar in the context of unjustified 
enrichment. 
 
In terms of Pope’s approach, the extent of the encroachment should guide the court 
in an encroachment dispute. She argues that in the case of large encroachments, 
the principle of accession should be applicable.25 Therefore, the building materials 
used in the construction of the encroaching structures would cease to exist 
independently and will become part of the affected landowner’s property. The 
affected landowner would be able to demand removal of anything that forms part of 
his property, including the encroaching structures. However, Pope argues that in the 
case of minor encroachments, encroachment principles should govern the situation, 
while accession principles are suspended. Therefore, a court can exercise its 
discretion in favour of either removing the encroachment or leaving the encroaching 
structures intact. If the court decides to leave the encroaching structures in place, 
she argues that the principle of attachment is suspended, so that ownership of the 
building materials remains with the encroacher and ownership of the affected land 
remains with the affected landowner. This solution is more difficult in the case of 
larger encroachments. It is for this reason that Pope limits the rules of encroachment 
                                                 
25
  A Pope “Encroachment or accession? The importance of the extent of encroachment in light 
of South African constitutional principles” (2007) 124 SALJ 537-556 at 538. 
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to minor encroachments, and in chapter four I argued that Pope’s approach may 
eliminate the possibility of keeping large encroachments in place, even where policy 
reasons dictate such an outcome. Pope’s narrow discretion-based outcome would 
mean that the courts can never exercise their discretion in cases where the 
encroachment is extensive and therefore she cannot provide an acceptable doctrinal 
reason for instances where the courts have ordered that large encroachments 
should remain in place against compensation. In Pope’s view these decisions must 
be wrong, but I concluded that it should be possible to justify them in cases where 
the decision to leave the significant encroachment in place is made on policy 
grounds, taking all circumstances into consideration, and the decision gives due 
consideration to section 25 of the Constitution. It should therefore be possible to 
provide a doctrinal explanation for cases like Rand Waterraad and Brian Lackey 
Trust, where the court left significant encroachments in place on policy grounds. A 
court will take policy considerations into account when deciding to leave the 
encroachment in place and these considerations will justify the suspension of the 
rules of accession in the case. Therefore, the assumption that the normal working of 
accession is suspended in the case could provide a doctrinal explanation for 
decisions of this kind, but not on Pope’s narrow construction of the discretion. 
 
Roman-Dutch law also provides evidence that the rules of attachment can 
sometimes be suspended. A building work that was erected on the land of another 
could be acquired through prescription, resulting in a praedial servitude coming into 
existence. The praedial servitude resulted in the transfer of the right to have the 
buildings on the land of another and not for transfer of the land on which the building 
stood. Therefore, from this early stage it was evident how ownership of land and 
ownership of the building works erected on land could be kept separate. This 
provides an example of how the principle of accession may be suspended in certain 
cases for policy reasons. 
 
Eiselen and Pienaar provide another explanation that may add weight to the notion 
that suspension of the rules of attachment is possible when policy reasons dictate a 
different outcome. They refer to suspension of attachment in the context of 
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unjustified enrichment.26 They argue that in some instances ownership of an 
accessory could sometimes remain “slumbering” until the principal and accessory 
are separated. However, the argument of Eiselen and Pienaar is limited in that it 
assumes that the principal and the accessory can be separated, which is not always 
possible in building cases. Furthermore, the historical evidence that they refer to was 
possibly not accepted in South African law, but their argument does add weight to 
the idea that suspension of the principle of attachment can occur for policy reasons. 
 
Judging by the assessment in chapter four, I concluded that it seems as though 
there is authority for the view that the principle of attachment may be suspended in 
certain instances. Therefore, it should be possible in at least some cases where the 
court decides to leave the encroachment intact to explain what happens doctrinally 
when an encroachment is not removed by using the rationale of suspension of 
attachment principles. Either the argument that accession did not take place 
because it was not the builder’s intention for it to occur or the argument that the 
principle of attachment is suspended for policy reasons could therefore be used to 
provide doctrinal answers to some of the questions that arise from a building 
encroachment situation. In either case it should be possible to argue that, when the 
necessary policy grounds (fairness, equity, balance of injustice) indicate that 
accession should not take place in a building encroachment conflict, the principles of 
accession may be suspended to give the courts the required discretion to not order 
removal of the encroachment. Ultimately, if such a doctrinal argument is not 
accepted by the courts, it could be entrenched in legislation. 
 
However, these doctrinal solutions raise another doctrinal question that has not been 
considered by South African courts adequately when the decision is made to leave 
an encroaching structure in place. If the court does not order removal of the 
encroachment, and if one assumes that this is possible because accession did not 
take place, the result is that one person owns a building (or at least has the right to 
occupy it) on land belonging to another. In the absence of a use right negotiated 
between the parties, this would mean that there is no clarity about the rights of the 
                                                 
26
  S Eiselen & G Pienaar Unjustified enrichment: A casebook (2nd ed 2005) 241. 
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respective parties when removal of an encroaching structure is denied. Therefore, it 
was necessary in chapter four to highlight the fact that courts do not mention this 
right, nor do they explain the nature of the right that is acquired by the encroacher 
when demolition is denied. It is clear that the encroacher is allowed continued 
possession of the encroachment and it seems as though a use right indirectly comes 
into existence in favour of the encroacher. Chapter four highlighted the fact that this 
situation causes unnecessary confusion that needs to be explained doctrinally. 
Failure to explain adequately what the nature of the right is that the encroacher gains 
(or the affected landowner loses) when the encroachment is left in place, may also 
have constitutional implications. When courts decide to deviate from the common 
law remedy of removal and leave the encroachment in place, it may result in 
infringement of section 25 of the Constitution, especially if the encroachment is 
significant. This aspect was dealt with in chapter five. 
 
7.2.4 Public law implications 
In chapter five, consideration was given to the possible constitutional implications of 
courts denying a demolition order in the context of building encroachments. The 
main purpose of the chapter was to determine whether the loss suffered as a result 
of these court orders may cause a constitutional infringement in view of the property 
clause. A distinction was drawn between three outcomes that could result when 
courts decide to leave building encroachments in place. The aim was to evaluate the 
constitutional validity of these outcomes with reference to the methodology in First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance (“FNB”).27 The 
deprivation of property or property rights that results when the encroachment 
remains in place needs to comply with section 25 of the Constitution. 
 
In terms of the first outcome, the court denies the affected landowner the right to 
demand removal in the case of insignificant encroachments and orders 
compensation instead. In this case the affected landowner is deprived of the right to 
                                                 
27
  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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the use and enjoyment of the portion of the property on which the encroachment is 
erected. The question is whether the loss that results in these instances amounts to 
a deprivation of property or property rights in terms of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. I found that the loss, however small, does amount to deprivation that 
needs to comply with section 25(1). However, the smaller the encroachment, the 
smaller the limitation on the affected landowner’s property and the easier it becomes 
to justify the deprivation that results when the encroachment remains in place. 
Generally, courts use considerations of fairness and equity to justify denying 
demolition. Therefore, courts deviate from the common law remedy of removal to 
reach a more fair and just outcome. The interests of the parties are weighed up in 
order to determine who would suffer more loss from either outcome. If a court 
decides that it would be unduly harsh for the encroacher if demolition were awarded, 
as opposed to the loss that would be suffered if the encroachment were left in place, 
this may be enough justification for the deprivation that may result in the case of 
insignificant encroachments. However, there is no clear-cut rule that leaving small 
encroachments in place will always be justified because the limitation on the affected 
landowners’ property rights is small. It depends on the circumstances of each case. 
There may be exceptional circumstances that may indicate that demolition would be 
the appropriate remedy even in the case of minor encroachments, for example mala 
fide behaviour by the encroacher or if the encroachment, even though it is small, 
causes unjustifiable harm for the affected owner. However, in the majority of cases 
where the encroachment is insignificant, the goal of reaching the most equitable 
outcome will no doubt be achieved by denying demolition and leaving the 
encroachment in place. In these cases, the deprivation that results will most likely be 
justified and it would not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property. 
 
The second outcome that was identified was where the court leaves a significant 
encroachment in place on policy grounds and it causes a deprivation of the 
entitlement of use and enjoyment of a significant portion of the affected landowner’s 
property. The limitation on the affected landowner’s property rights is significant in 
these cases and it needs to be adequately justified. It is clear from FNB that the 
larger the limitation on the affected landowner’s rights, the more justification is 
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needed in order to comply with section 25(1) of the Constitution.28 The court in an 
encroachment dispute will balance the interests of the parties involved. It is more 
difficult in the case of significant encroachments to prove that leaving the 
encroachment in place would be less harsh for the affected landowner than 
demolition would be for the encroacher, because the limitation on the affected 
landowner’s rights is significant. Therefore, other factors may be taken into 
consideration in order to prove that the balance should favour the encroacher and 
the encroachment should remain in place. The examples that were used to illustrate 
this were evident from case law. These may include the extent of the encroachment, 
unfairness of ordering demolition,29 delay in bringing the application,30 the duration 
for which the encroachment has stood,31 malicious intent by either parties involved in 
the dispute,32 whether the loss can adequately be compensated,33 whether removal 
will result in people’s homes being demolished34 or any other factor that may be 
relevant in the dispute.35 Consideration of all these factors in the case would indicate 
whether it could be justifiable to leave a significant encroachment in place and 
ensure that the deprivation that results in not arbitrary. 
 
The third outcome that may result when a court denies a demolition order occurs 
when the court, in addition to leaving the encroachment in place, orders that the 
encroached-upon land be transferred to the encroacher. I found that this order was 
the most difficult to justify because the affected right is ownership, for which a more 
compelling purpose is required. Also, because of the uncertainty regarding whether 
the courts have the authority to make an order like this at all, it may be difficult to 
justify this order. Like in FNB, the affected landowner loses ownership and all the 
incidents of ownership when a court makes an order like this. Therefore, a very 
strong reason is required in order to justify the deprivation that results. The 
circumstances in the particular case would need to be considered in order to 
                                                 
28
  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, s 25. 
29
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
30
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
31
  Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
32
  Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
33
  Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Company [1895] 1 Ch 287. 
34
  Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (UK); Site 
Developments (Ferndown) Ltd v Barratt Homes Ltd [2007] EWHC 415 (Ch) (UK). 
35
  See chap 3 above. 
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establish whether the deprivation is justified. However, even if it can be proven that 
the deprivation is justified because there is sufficient reason for it, the deprivation 
that results from this outcome may prove to be arbitrary on the basis of procedural 
unfairness. I found in chapter five that it seems as though there is inadequate 
authority for such an order, therefore section 25(1) would possibly not be complied 
with in this outcome because the deprivation that results is procedurally unfair. 
 
It was also investigated in chapter five whether the deprivation could amount to an 
expropriation that would need to comply with section 25(2) and (3) of the 
Constitution. This is because in all three outcomes it may look like an expropriation 
of either a use right (like in the first two outcomes) or an expropriation of the land 
itself (as in the third outcome) when the court orders compensation to be paid to the 
affected landowner. However, I found that an expropriation in the case of 
encroachment by building was not possible because the common law does not 
authorise expropriation and there is no legislation that authorises expropriation of 
this kind of court order either. For that reason, it seems highly unlikely that an 
expropriation was possible in the context of building encroachments. 
 
Therefore, chapter five highlights the doubt in terms of constitutional compliance of 
court orders made in the case of building encroachments. It was clear that the 
deprivation that results from all three outcomes needs to comply with section 25 of 
Constitution and in some cases it may be a problem. Although it should be possible 
to leave even significant encroachments in place, due consideration needs to be 
given to section 25 in order for it not to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property. 
 
7.2.5 Comparative law 
It has been the aim throughout the dissertation to emphasise that legislation is 
required in order to eliminate some of the uncertainties that exists in the law 
regulating building encroachments in South Africa. Foreign law, specifically in 
Australia, Germany and the Netherlands, provides good examples of effective 
approaches to the problem of building encroachments. Therefore, chapter six 
222 
 
comprises an analysis of the three jurisdictions with the aim of establishing how 
building encroachment disputes could effectively be dealt with in legislation. 
 
The Australian Encroachment of Buildings Act36 provides an illustration of what a 
special encroachment statute might look like. It contains a list of factors that a court 
can take into consideration to determine whether demolition should be ordered, or 
whether the encroachment should remain in place. However, this Act does not 
provide clarity in terms of the doctrinal and constitutional implications of the court 
orders made in the context of building encroachments in South African law, because 
the same problems do not exist in Australian law. Having clear answers in terms of 
what happens when an encroachment is not demolished is very important in the 
South African context, as was emphasised in chapters four and five. In this regard, 
the German and Dutch approaches were more helpful. 
 
The Dutch civil code provides for a servitude to come into existence to preserve the 
existing situation, and a one-off payment of compensation is awarded in exchange 
for the servitude.37 In German law, something equivalent to a lease is created where 
the encroacher is obliged to make periodic payments for the use of the portion of 
property on which the encroachment is erected.38 Therefore, there is clarity and 
certainty in both instances about the rights of the parties after the order is made to 
leave the encroachment in place. Additionally, in both jurisdictions the choice for the 
transfer of the affected land is left to the affected landowner, and not the courts or 
the encroacher. Therefore, the issue in the South African context concerning the 
forced transfer of the land on which the encroachment stands is solved satisfactorily 
in German and Dutch law. 
 
The comparative analysis undertaken in chapter six was useful because it provided 
answers to some of the questions that exist in the South African context when 
building encroachments are left intact. Therefore, I will take the approaches of these 
                                                 
36
  The Encroachment of Buildings Act 1922 (NSW). 
37
  See s 6.4 in chap 6 above. 
38
  See s 6.3 in chap 6 above. 
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jurisdictions into consideration when looking at the way forward for South African law 
regulating building encroachments. 
 
7.3 The way forward for South African law 
South African law could benefit from legislation to regulate building encroachments. 
The legislation envisaged can go one of two ways. In the first instance, the 
legislation can be a codification of the status quo. In other words, there can be a 
choice to maintain the current approach, where the courts have a wide discretion not 
to grant a demolition order on fairness grounds. It would explain the current 
approach and provide clarity in terms of the issues addressed in this dissertation. It 
would need to provide clarity with regard to pre-order considerations and post-order 
consequences of court orders made in the context of building encroachments. In 
other words, the legislation would have to prescribe how and in which circumstances 
the discretion should be exercised and provide answers to the doctrinal uncertainties 
and possible constitutional implications of leaving an encroachment in place. As a 
point of departure, this type of legislation should provide guidelines that may make 
the choice between demolition and compensation easier. It should be clear that 
these guidelines are a non-exhaustive list of factors that may guide the court to 
reach the most appropriate outcome; however, the circumstances in the particular 
case are important in determining which outcome would be the most appropriate. 
These factors will make it clearer in which cases the court will let the encroachment 
stand and in which cases the encroachment will most likely be removed. 
 
This legislation would also have to explain what happens when the encroachment is 
not removed. In other words, it should be clear that when demolition is denied, a use 
right is created in favour of the encroacher. Additionally, the legislation should also 
stipulate that the compensation that is paid in this regard is in exchange for the use 
right that is created. It is also important that the legislation should contain a provision 
concerning the transfer of the encroached-upon land. It should be clear whether the 
discretion of the court includes the power to transfer the encroached-upon land in 
certain instances. However, I would argue in line with the German and Dutch 
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approaches, that the decision for the transfer of the encroached-upon land should be 
left to the affected landowner and not the courts or the encroacher. 
 
Therefore, the first type of legislation described can be explained as follows: The 
point of departure is still the remedy of removal. However, in terms of this legislation 
the court has the discretion to deviate from the remedy of removal in certain 
instances. The discretion is wide and equitable and dependent on the circumstances 
of the particular case. Therefore, there may be exceptional circumstances that 
dictate an outcome other than removal. The legislation would provide factors that 
may guide the court in deciding which remedy would be the most appropriate in the 
particular case. There are some factors that would undoubtedly have to form part of 
this legislation, for example, the extent of the encroachment, the duration for which 
the encroachment has stood, the conduct of the parties both before the construction 
of the encroachment and afterwards, the potential harm for the encroacher should 
the encroachment be removed and the potential harm if the encroachment should 
remain intact. The legislation is not exhaustive and the court may take other factors 
that are relevant to the dispute into consideration. In some instances, a court may 
decide to leave the encroachment in place, which will result in a use right being 
created in favour of the encroacher. The legislation should specify the nature of this 
use right, which in the South African context should be a servitude created in favour 
of the encroacher. In terms of the legislation the encroacher would have to pay 
compensation to the affected landowner for the use of the portion of property on 
which the encroachment stands. Additionally, the court would not make an order for 
transfer of the encroached-upon land, because the legislation would prescribe that 
the choice for transfer is left to the affected landowner. 
 
The second type of legislation would be inspired by German law. This legislation 
would be much simpler as there is no discretion or balancing of interests required. 
The point of departure of this legislation would be that the encroachment should 
remain in place in all instances, unless the encroacher was grossly negligent or had 
malicious intent in constructing the encroachment, or if the affected owner 
immediately protested against the encroachment as soon as it occurred. There may 
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be other instances that could provide an exception to the default position in terms of 
this type of legislation. An example of this would be illegal or dangerous buildings; 
the legislation should provide that in these instances the affected landowner may at 
any time demand that measures be taken to remove the danger. Only in those 
exceptional cases would the court have a discretion to order demolition of the 
encroachment. If the encroachment is left in place, the legislation would have to 
contain a provision stipulating that a use right like a lease or, preferably, a servitude 
is created as a result of the continued existence of the encroachment and that the 
encroacher is obliged to pay compensation to the affected landowner. The legislation 
would also have to state that the choice for transfer of the encroached-upon land 
should be left to the affected landowner. 
 
Both types of legislation should reflect the calculation of compensation in the case 
where a court opts for compensation instead of removal. The legislation should 
indicate how the compensation should be determined and how it should be paid. The 
calculation of compensation and how the amount of compensation will be paid will 
differ depending on whether a servitude or a lease is created. If a servitude is 
established, the compensation would most probably be a one-off payment or an 
annual payment, much like in the case of a servitude of right of way of necessity. On 
the other hand, if a lease is created, the legislation should prescribe that 
compensation should be payable in either monthly or annual payments. Regardless 
of the direction the legislature opts for, both types of legislation should also stipulate 
that the encroacher has the option of rather removing the encroachment if he does 
not want to pay the amount of compensation, provided that removal is possible and 
does not cause harm to the affected landowner’s property. 
 
Either of these forms of legislation may be useful in the South African context to 
ensure that we are not left guessing in future what the nature of the right is that is 
established when courts exercise their discretion in favour of leaving (even 
significant) encroachments in place. The legislation should also ensure that the 
property rights of the affected landowner are adequately considered and protected in 
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view of the property clause. The unnecessary confusion and uncertainty that results 
from the inability to explain and justify the outcomes needs to be cleared up. 
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